People v. Smith, 44

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: FEINMAN, J.
• Citation: 128 N.E.3d 649,33 N.Y.3d 454,104 N.Y.S.3d 572
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Samuel J. SMITH, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 44,44
• Decision Date: 06 June 2019

33 N.Y.3d 454
128 N.E.3d 649
104 N.Y.S.3d 572

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Samuel J. SMITH, Appellant.

No. 44

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 2019

128 N.E.3d 651

104 N.Y.S.3d 573

Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Drew R. DuBrin of counsel), for appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Daniel Gross of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FEINMAN, J.

104 N.Y.S.3d 574

33 N.Y.3d 456

In People v. Gonzalez , 68 N.Y.2d 424, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796, 502 N.E.2d 583 (1986), we set forth the conditions necessary to warrant a missing witness charge and a burden-shifting analysis to determine whether those conditions are met. We hold that the People failed to meet their burden under this established framework.

In May 2013, the victim was struck in the torso by a bullet when a stranger repeatedly shot at her and her then-boyfriend, James Dees. At trial, the victim testified that she and Dees were walking in the City of Rochester when Dees called out to the driver of a gold car. Although it was a hot day, the victim saw a man in the car's back seat putting on a pull-over jacket. The driver ignored Dees's greeting and drove off. As the victim and Dees continued on their walk, she noticed that a man wearing a green hooded sweatshirt and a black baseball hat with bright red or orange trim was following them. When the pursuing man was 15 to 18 feet from them, Dees said that the man had a gun and tried to push the victim to the ground. The victim did not fall, but turned around and looked at the man.

33 N.Y.3d 457

The victim testified that the man smiled at her, shot her, and then fired several other shots.

The police found the victim lying face-down in a pool of blood in a driveway. She was taken to a hospital, where doctors found that she had a significant liver injury

128 N.E.3d 652

and significant lung lacerations. About two hours after she arrived at the hospital, the victim was lethargic but able to speak. She told the police that she could not identify the shooter by name, that he was wearing a blue baseball hat and a green jacket, and that he was standing approximately five feet from her when he shot her. Defendant Samuel J. Smith was later arrested for the shooting and charged in an indictment with attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree.

At trial, surveillance footage admitted into evidence showed a man wearing a green hooded sweatshirt and black baseball hat with red trim exit a gold car in the vicinity of the shooting. A witness who had called 911 to report the shooting testified that he saw a man walking down the street remove and discard a green sweatshirt in a location where it was later recovered by the police. The man was then wearing a white tank top. Additional recordings corroborated testimony from a customer and an employee of a nearby convenience store that a man in a white tank top tried to give them his black baseball hat with red trim shortly after the shooting. The victim identified defendant both as the man who shot her and as the man in the white tank top appearing in the convenience store surveillance footage. A police investigator also identified defendant as the man in the convenience store surveillance footage. The other witnesses to the events following the shooting did not identify defendant.

Dees initially was on the People's witness list, but he never testified. Defendant requested a missing witness charge with respect to Dees, arguing that Dees was in the People's direct control, had seen the shooter first, and had attempted to push the victim out of the way before fleeing.¹ In response, the People did not

104 N.Y.S.3d 575

dispute their control of Dees, but contended, without elaboration, that Dees's testimony would have been cumulative to that of the victim. Supreme Court denied defendant's application

33 N.Y.3d 458

without stating its rationale. The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts of the indictment and the court imposed sentence.

The Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. After stating that one seeking a missing witness instruction "has the initial, prima facie burden of showing that the testimony of the uncalled witness would not be cumulative of the testimony already given" ( 162 A.D.3d 1686, 1687, 80 N.Y.S.3d 577 [4th Dept. 2018] ), the Court held that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for the charge. The dissenters disagreed that the proponent of a missing witness charge bears the initial burden with respect to cumulativeness. The dissenters concluded that Supreme Court erred by denying the application because the People failed to demonstrate that Dees's testimony would have been cumulative. A dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court (see 32 N.Y.3d 943, 84 N.Y.S.3d 870, 109 N.E.3d 1170 [2018] ).

"The ‘missing witness’ instruction allows a jury to draw an unfavorable inference based on a party's failure to call a witness who would normally be expected to support that party's version of events" ( People v. Savinon , 100 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 761 N.Y.S.2d 144, 791 N.E.2d 401 [2003] ). The instruction "derives from the commonsense

128 N.E.3d 653

notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party's cause" ( Gonzalez , 68 N.Y.2d at 427, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796, 502 N.E.2d 583 [internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted] ). The charge "seeks to dispel any advantage a party may receive when expected to call a particular witness but for strategic reasons does not" ( Savinon , 100 N.Y.2d at 197, 761 N.Y.S.2d 144, 791 N.E.2d 401 ). A missing witness charge is appropriate when three conditions are met. "First, the witness's knowledge must be material to the trial" ( id. ). "Second, the witness must be expected to give noncumulative testimony favorable to the party against whom the charge is sought" ( id. ). "Third, the witness must be available to that party" ( id. ; see Gonzalez , 68 N.Y.2d at 427, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796, 502 N.E.2d 583 ). "We review a trial court's decision whether to grant a missing witness charge on an abuse of discretion standard" ( Savinon , 100 N.Y.2d at 197, 761 N.Y.S.2d 144, 791 N.E.2d 401 ).

In Gonzalez, we established the analytical framework for deciding a request for a missing witness instruction. The proponent initially must demonstrate only three things via a prompt request for the charge: (1) "that there is an uncalled witness believed to be knowledgeable about a material issue

33 N.Y.3d 459

pending in the case," (2) "that such witness can be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party," and (3) "that such party has failed to...