People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 10 March 2022
• Docket Number: 111708
• Citation: 203 A.D.3d 1320,164 N.Y.S.3d 320
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tamale HARRIS, Also Known as MAX and BAGS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

203 A.D.3d 1320

164 N.Y.S.3d 320

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Tamale HARRIS, Also Known as MAX and BAGS, Appellant.

111708

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 6, 2022

Decided and Entered: March 10, 2022

Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Christopher D. Horn of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Clark, Aarons and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered April 26, 2019 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of manslaughter in the second degree, conspiracy in the fifth degree and concealment of a human corpse.

On March 13, 2018, defendant rented a motel room where he, the victim and Jodi Noisseau spent the evening drinking alcohol and taking drugs. When it was time to check out the following morning, defendant and Noisseau were unable to wake the victim, and the two decided to carry the victim to defendant's car and transport her to Noisseau's apartment, where Noisseau would stay with the victim as she "sle[pt] it off." The victim died in that apartment, and her body was disposed of in the snow on the side of a residential street in the City of Albany. Defendant and Noisseau were subsequently arrested and charged with manslaughter in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence, conspiracy in the fifth degree and concealment of a human corpse. Noisseau pleaded guilty, and defendant proceeded to trial. A jury ultimately found defendant guilty on the manslaughter, concealment and conspiracy counts, and he was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate prison term of 9½ to 19 years. He appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant challenges his convictions as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence and as against the weight of the evidence. Only defendant's legal sufficiency arguments regarding his manslaughter conviction were adequately preserved for our review,¹ and, as to that conviction, he argues that the People failed to prove his awareness that the victim was overdosing and that his conduct caused the victim's death. Nevertheless, as part of our weight of the evidence review, we necessarily assess whether each element of all three offenses, as charged in the indictment, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Serrano, 200 A.D.3d 1340, 1341–1342, 158 N.Y.S.3d 389 [2021] ; People v. Kabia, 190 A.D.3d 1105, 1106, 139 N.Y.S.3d 443 [2021] ).

"When assessing the legal sufficiency of a jury verdict, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the People and examine whether ‘there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt’ " ( People v. Lendof–Gonzalez, 36 N.Y.3d 87, 91–92, 139 N.Y.S.3d 84, 163 N.E.3d 15 [2020], quoting People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). When assessing whether a verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence, we must first determine whether, "based on all the credible evidence[,] a different finding would not have been unreasonable," and, if it would have been reasonable for the jury to reach a different conclusion, then we must "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" to determine whether "the [jury] has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643–644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 [2006] ).

As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when ... [h]e [or she] recklessly causes the death of another person" ( Penal Law § 125.15[1] ). For purposes of that offense, a person acts "[r]ecklessly" when he or she "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that death will occur, and "[t]he risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" ( Penal Law § 15.05[3] ). The defendant must be shown to have engaged "in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk" ( People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677, 684, 976 N.Y.S.2d 10, 998 N.E.2d 810 [2013] ; see People v. Gaworecki, 37 N.Y.3d 225, 230–231, 154 N.Y.S.3d 33, 175 N.E.3d 915 [2021] ; People v. Acevedo, 187 A.D.3d 1030, 1032, 133 N.Y.S.3d 271 [2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1117, 146 N.Y.S.3d 186, 169 N.E.3d 544 [2021] ), and that "conduct must be the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general sense of right and wrong" ( People v. Li, 34 N.Y.3d 357, 364, 117 N.Y.S.3d 642, 140 N.E.3d 965 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Lavalley, 158 A.D.3d 993, 994, 71 N.Y.S.3d 688 [2018] ; People v. Crosby, 151 A.D.3d 1184, 1188, 56 N.Y.S.3d 376 [2017] ). "Although the awareness and corresponding disregard of [the] risk indeed is measured from the defendant's perspective, ‘objective evidence of the surrounding circumstances may be weighed in making [that] factual determination’ " ( People v. Briskin, 125 A.D.3d 1113, 1119, 3 N.Y.S.3d 200 [2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 1069, 12 N.Y.S.3d 621, 34 N.E.3d 372 [2015], quoting People v. Licitra, 47 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 419 N.Y.S.2d 461, 393 N.E.2d 456 [1979] ; see People v. Marin, 164 A.D.3d 916, 918, 84 N.Y.S.3d 495 [2018] ).

As to defendant's other convictions, as limited by the People's indictment, "[a] person is guilty of concealment of a human corpse when, having a reasonable expectation that a human corpse ... will be ... used as physical evidence in ... an examination by law enforcement personnel as part of a criminal investigation[,] such person, alone or in concert with another, ... alters ... such corpse ... with the intent to prevent its ... use" ( Penal Law § 195.02 ). Lastly, "[a] person is guilty of conspiracy in the fifth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting ... a felony be performed" – here, concealment of a human corpse – "he [or she] agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct" ( Penal Law § 105.05[1] ).

Noisseau testified on behalf of the People at trial, pursuant to the terms of her plea agreement. She met defendant about a week prior to the subject incident, when she purchased crack from him. She met the victim for the first time on March 13, 2018, when the three were on their way to the motel. Noisseau had already smoked crack before she arrived, all three consumed alcohol once at the motel and, according to Noisseau, defendant also put "[l]ittle crystals," which she believed to be "[m]olly" or ecstasy, in their drinks. Defendant provided Noisseau with more crack, which she smoked in the bathroom. Noisseau later observed the victim in the bathroom with "four lines of heroin" on her cell phone. She declined the victim's offer to share in the heroin and exited the bathroom, claiming that she did not see the victim consume the heroin. She testified that defendant did not provide either woman with heroin that evening. Defendant and the victim later had sex, and the victim spent time in the bathroom thereafter before going to sleep. Noisseau then had sex with defendant in exchange for the crack that he had previously provided her. Noisseau also testified that there was a four-hour gap in her memory from that evening.

The next morning, defendant and Noisseau could not wake the victim for the 11:00 a.m. check out, and defendant accordingly dressed her, carried her to his vehicle and, upon Noisseau's suggestion, transported her to Noisseau's apartment, where Noisseau would watch her. During that process, housekeeping staff observed the victim, inquired as to her well-being and offered to call the police, but defendant and Noisseau stated in return that she was "just drunk." At trial, however, Noisseau testified that she did not believe the victim to be just drunk and "could tell something was definitely wrong" at that time.

Surveillance video from the motel captured the victim being brought to the vehicle by defendant. Her body appears lifeless, or "like a rag doll," as Noisseau described, and defendant has repeated difficulty keeping her off the ground. A white substance may also be seen on the victim's face. Noisseau testified that, every time that she had seen someone in the victim's state "nodd[ed] out," "[t]hey've come to." She also testified that she had never witnessed an overdose.

Defendant then drove the women to Noisseau's apartment. He helped get the victim into the apartment, placed her on a bed, sold crack to Noisseau's roommate, Christopher Kondracki, and then left. Noisseau testified that she and defendant did not discuss calling 911 or going to a hospital at any point prior to him leaving. Once at the apartment, Noisseau continued to check on the victim every hour, while she admittedly continued to smoke crack. She testified that the victim "seemed the same during that time," meaning "[u]nconscious." At one point, she heard the victim gurgling. Kondracki, who was "in and out" of the apartment that day, was also under the impression that the victim had "nodded out" and would "sleep [it] off," but he had also never witnessed an overdose. He heard the victim "snoring[,] and then her breathing changed [to] something like that of sleep apnea."

At about 4:00 p.m., Noisseau called defendant because she noticed the victim's "pulse was weakening" and "felt [that] he should know." According to Noisseau, she told defendant on a subsequent call that she wanted to call an ambulance for the victim and he responded that Noisseau should "let her rest." Instead...