People v. Smith
Decision Date | 11 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. F039752.,F039752. |
Citation | 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 779,110 Cal.App.4th 492 |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Stanley Lewis SMITH, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Jerome P. Wallingford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey D. Firestone and Brian Alvarez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After a court trial, appellant Stanley Lewis Smith was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife, Alice. The court also found that during the commission of the crime appellant used a deadly weapon—a ligature.1 Appellant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life, plus a one-year consecutive term for the enhancement. After the start of the court trial, defendant was found mentally incompetent, causing the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which later resumed with the consent of appellant and his counsel when his competency had been restored. Appellant primarily contends on appeal that his incompetency necessarily predated by at least a few days the suspension of the criminal proceedings; accordingly, argues appellant, his waiver of jury trial was not competently made and he was not competent during a portion of the presentation of evidence, causing structural, constitutional error. We affirm.
On April 17, 2001, after a series of motions in limine, the trial court took a waiver of appellant's right to jury trial and proceeded with a court trial.2 On April 18, immediately after the noon recess, defense counsel stated that Counsel explained that appellant was on medication to deal with a "major mental disorder" and had not received his first dose in the jail that morning, but had been given the second at noon. Counsel stated that as a result, "He's feeling a lot better and he seems more coherent." The court took steps to ensure that medication would be given in the morning before trial began and instructed counsel to check with appellant each morning to make sure the medication had been given. Trial continued without further discussion of appellant's competency.
On April 19, the morning session and most of the afternoon session continued without incident. Several witnesses testified. Toward the end of the afternoon session, defense counsel told the court he had "a very brief conversation with [his] client" and that appellant seemed confused as to how he got to court. The court noted it was late in the day and stated it suspected appellant's condition was "an imbalance of medication occurring late in the day." Defense counsel commented that appellant was "not totally out of it." Both defense counsel and the prosecution noted for the record that appellant had been lucid earlier. The court halted proceedings and ordered an evaluation by the jail staff over the weekend with particular attention to the medication issue.
Jail staff opined that appellant was "mentally fragile" and that the stress of the court proceedings had been and would continue to be overwhelming so that appellant would be "unable to rationally assist his counsel in his defense due to his psychosis and his continued decompensation." On Tuesday, April 24, the court stated it had a doubt as to appellant's "current competency to stand trial" and ordered a competency hearing pursuant to Penal Code3 section 1368.
At the competency hearing on May 4, the court reviewed the reports of four doctors,4 all of whom opined that appellant was incompetent. The court ordered that proceedings be suspended and committed appellant to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment. The court also stated that rather than declare a mistrial, the case would remained in a "continued status" until the first report was received from Atascadero.
On September 28, 2001, proceedings resumed after a certificate of restoration of competency had been issued pursuant to section 1372. Defense counsel stated it was appellant's "desire that we continue on with a court trial." The court, after checking that counsel had transcripts of the previous days of the trial, and noting the concurrence of all counsel in proceeding, asked appellant, "You do not want to make any motion for a mistrial based on your decompensation possibly that last day?" Appellant answered "No." There was no formal waiver of any rights. There was no discussion or finding by the trial court on the issue of appellant's competency during the first few days of trial. Thereafter, the trial resumed.
(People v Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) In California, these protections are implemented by statute. (Ibid.) Section 1367, subdivision (a), provides: (See also Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 [ ].)
To implement these guarantees in California, section 1368 provides that if "a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant," the court shall inquire of defense counsel as to the status of the defendant and, if counsel believes that the defendant may be incompetent, the court "shall order" a hearing to determine defendant's competency. (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) In addition, if a defendant comes forward "with substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial, due process requires that a full competence hearing be held as a matter of right." (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.)
All proceedings are suspended until competency is determined. (§ 1368, subd. (c).) If the defendant is found competent, proceedings are resumed. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A).) If the defendant is found incompetent, proceedings remain suspended until the defendant regains competency. The defendant is sent for evaluation and treatment. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Once competence is restored, a certificate of restoration of competence is filed with the court and the defendant is "returned to the committing court" for "further proceedings." (§§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.)
A criminal defendant may waive fundamental rights, including the right to a jury trial. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726 [ ].) A defendant's waiver of the right to jury trial, as with other fundamental rights, may be accepted by the court only if knowing and intelligent—made with a full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of the waiver. In addition, the waiver must be voluntary. (Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954; New York v. Hill (2000) 528 U.S. 110, 114-118, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 [ ].) The waiver must be taken from the defendant personally. (People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 829, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 579.)
(People v. Castaneda (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 334, 344, 125 Cal.Rptr. 9 [ ].)
Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact. The burden is on the party claiming the existence of the waiver to prove it by evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and doubtful cases will be resolved against a waiver. (See People v. McArthur (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 619, 627, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 203.) A defendant cannot waive a fundamental right while incompetent. (See Fay v. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 472, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.) [, ]overruled on other grounds, Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594.)
Appellant contends the initial jury waiver is invalid because his period of incompetence came so soon after the waiver was taken that the prosecution cannot prove a valid waiver. (Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 [ ].) Appellant claims the "close timing between the purported waiver and symptoms of obvious confusion suggests that appellant had already become mentally incompetent before he waived his right to a jury trial."
No authority supports appellant's argument that the temporal relationship between the waiver and the first...
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