People v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 24 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. S073982.,S073982.
• Citation: 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 734,22 Cal.4th 304,992 P.2d 1102
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur K. SNYDER et al., Defendants and Appellants.

92 Cal.Rptr.2d 734

22 Cal.4th 304

992 P.2d 1102

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur K. SNYDER et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S073982.

Supreme Court of California.

February 24, 2000.

Law Offices of Dennis A. Fischer, Dennis A. Fischer, Santa Monica; Geragos & Geragos and Mark J. Geragos, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Appellants.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Acting Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Marc J. Nolan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Tony Miller for League of Women Voters of California, California Common Cause, Californians for Political Reform Foundation, Craig B. Holman and Ruth Holton as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

William W. Larsen, Special Assistant District Attorney (Santa Clara); Grover C. Trask, Lawrence G. Brown and George M. Palmer for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mark T. Morodomi for the Fair Political Practices Commission as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

The Political Reform Act of 1974 (the Act; Gov.Code, § 81000 et seq.)¹ prohibits any person from making a campaign contribution in someone else's name. The question here is whether section 83116.5, by which the Legislature amended the Act in 1984, exempts lobbyists from criminal liability for violation of this prohibition and subjects them solely to administrative sanctions. We find such a restriction would not only conflict with manifest legislative intent but would contravene the Legislature's statutory and constitutional authority to amend or repeal the Act as an initiative measure. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which concluded sections 83116.5 and 91015 precluded criminal liability for violations of the Act by lobbyists.

Factual and Procedural Background

Only a few essential facts are relevant to the question before us: Defendant Arthur K. Snyder (defendant), a lawyer primarily engaged in lobbying, was convicted of eight misdemeanor counts of making political contributions in a false name and one count of conspiring to make such contributions during the period from January 1989 through May 1992 on a plea of guilty,² and obtained a certificate of probable cause.³ (§§ 84301, 91000, subd. (a).) The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that section 83116.5 exempted lobbyists from criminal prosecution for violations of the Act. (See § 91015.) We granted review to determine the proper construction of the statute.

Discussion

In 1974, the voters approved the Act as an initiative measure concerning elections and various means for preventing corruption and undue influence in political campaigns and governmental activities. (See Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 37, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46.) Its provisions included a broad prohibition against what is commonly termed money laundering: "No contribution shall be made, directly or indirectly, by any person in a name other than the name by which such person is identified for legal purposes." (§ 84301.) Violation of this proscription subjects the person to criminal penalties. (§ 91000, subd. (a).)

In 1984, the Legislature added section 83116.5: "Any person who violates any provision of this title, who purposely or negligently causes any other person to violate any provision of this title, or who aids and abets any other person in the violation of any provision of this title, shall be liable under the provisions of this chapter. Provided, however, that this section shall apply only to persons who have filing or reporting obligations under this title, or who are compensated for services involving the planning, organizing, or directing of any activity regulated or required by this title, and that a violation of this section shall not constitute an additional violation under Chapter 11." (See § 91015; Stats.1984, ch. 670, § 2.)

In concluding section 83116.5 exempts defendant from criminal liability for money laundering, the Court of Appeal reasoned thusly: Defendant is a lobbyist.⁴ (See § 82039.) Lobbyists have reporting obligations under the Act. (§ 86100 et seq.) As originally adopted, the Act prohibited any person, including lobbyists, from making campaign contributions in a false name and made the violation a misdemeanor. Since 1984, however, section 83116.5 has provided that as to "persons who have filing or reporting obligations under this title," they "shall be liable under the provisions of this chapter" and "violation of this section shall not constitute an additional violation under Chapter 11." "[T]his chapter" refers to chapter 3 of the Act, which created the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and granted the FPPC authority to institute administrative action for violations of the Act. (§ 83100 et seq.; see McCauley v. BFC Direct Marketing (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 498 (McCauley).) Chapter 11 sets forth the Act's civil and criminal enforcement provisions. (§ 91000 et seq.) Section 91015, also part of the 1984 amendment, further states, "The provisions of [Chapter 11] shall not apply to violations of Section 83116.5." Accordingly, defendant's status as a lobbyist removed him from the criminal purview of the Act, and he could incur only administrative sanctions for any violation.

The Court of Appeal impliedly acknowledged that its construction of section 83116.5 subjected defendant—and by extension anyone else with statutory filing and reporting obligations—to weaker sanctions for money laundering than ordinary citizens, but found this anomaly compelled by the "plain language" of the statute. In its view, the electorate "corrected]" this disparity in 1996 by approving Proposition 208, which deleted the statutory proviso and repealed section 91015. (But see California Prolife Political Action Committee v. Scully (E.D.Cal.1998) 989 F.Supp. 1282, 1301-1302, affd. (9th Cir.1999) 164 F.3d 1189 [enjoining enforcement of Proposition 208 provisions].)

Like the Act itself, section 83116.5 is not "a prototype of sapient drafting" (Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 54, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46 (cone, and dis. opn. of Newman, J.)), and no plain meaning appears on the face of the statute. Nevertheless, neither the language of section 83116.5 nor its legislative history supports the Court of Appeal's interpretation. Both the specific prohibition against money laundering (§ 84301) and the general charging statute (§ 91000, subd. (a)) are cast in the broadest terms, applying to "any person" coming within their ambit. (See post, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 738-741, 992 P.2d at pp. 1106-1108.) Nothing in section 83116.5 reflects an object or intent to narrow the scope of this preexisting liability. Indeed, the statute expressly provides that "violation of this section shall not constitute an additional violation under Chapter 11" (italics added), which further connotes that any independent civil or criminal sanctions then available would continue unaffected by the amendment.

Moreover, the purpose of the legislation was to broaden the reach of the Act. The FPPC sponsored Senate Bill No. 1438 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), which eventually became section 83116.5. The bill was prompted by concern that "in certain circumstances, violations of the Act cannot fairly be attributed to those persons named in the Act, particularly true [sic] in the area of campaign reporting where the candidate and treasurer are responsible for violations of the Act, and yet, rely on others who cannot be held liable for their errors and omissions under the Act." (FPPC, Mem. to Sen. Com. on Elections & Reapportionment (Feb. 27, 1984) p. 1; id., (May 22, 1984) p. 1.)⁵ In summarizing its impact, the Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment reported that "[i]n practical terms, this renders campaign managers and associates liable [for violations of the Act] as well as candidates and treasurers." (Sen. Com. on Elections & Reapportionment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1438 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 7, 1984, p. 1 (Senate Committee Analysis); see Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment & Constitutional Amendments, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1438 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) June 19, 1984, p. 1 (Assembly Committee Analysis).)

The original version allowed for civil and criminal penalties. The Legislature, however, ultimately restricted liability to administrative sanctions apparently in response to concern that campaign volunteers and low-paid workers would incur substantial responsibility even though they were not involved in significant campaign reporting activities. (See FPPC, Mem. to Assem. Com. on Elections, Reapportionment & Constitutional Amendments (June 11, 1984).) As the Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments explained in its analysis, the bill "extends ... liability [then imposed only on candidates and treasurers] to other persons who are, in effect, in decision making capacities on a campaign, but does not apply to rank and file campaign volunteers." (Assem. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 2.)

It thus appears evident the Legislature sought to expand the class of persons the FPPC could hold accountable for reporting violations under the Act, not limit liability for money laundering by lobbyists and others with filing and reporting obligations. In its amicus curiae brief, the FPPC supports this view, which "because of the agency's expertise ... is entitled to great weight unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized." (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 111, 172 Cal.Rptr. 194, 624 P.2d 244.)

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