People v. Springer

• Decision Date: 23 April 1987
• Citation: 514 N.Y.S.2d 555,127 A.D.2d 250
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Frederick A. SPRINGER and Larry B. Denno, Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 555

514 N.Y.S.2d 555

127 A.D.2d 250

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Frederick A. SPRINGER and Larry B. Denno, Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

April 23, 1987.

Elan Y. Cherney, Hudson Falls, for Frederick A. Springer, appellant.

Jeffrey V. Canale, Glens Falls, for Larry B. Denno, appellant.

Gordon M. Hemmett, Jr., Dist. Atty. (Robert M. Winn, of counsel), Hudson Falls, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and KANE, WEISS, YESAWICH and LEVINE, JJ.

LEVINE, Justice.

Defendants, Frederick A. Springer and Larry B. Denno, were jointly indicted with Robert Middleton for arson in the third degree and conspiracy in the fourth degree (to commit the same arson), arising out of a fire at a vacant house owned by Denno at 36 Maple Street in the Village of Hudson Falls, Washington County, which occurred at about 4:00 A.M. on July 19, 1984. At the trial, the evidence was overwhelming and essentially uncontested that the fire was of an incendiary origin. A gasoline can was found in the house, there was a strong odor of gasoline at the scene and forensic evidence established that gasoline had been an accelerant in the fire. Additionally, a neighbor testified that she saw a man with a mask and gloves carrying a gas can outside the house at about 1:00 A.M. on July 19, 1984 and observed him apparently entering the house through the rear door.

The principal evidence linking defendants and Middleton to the crime came from the testimony of Frank Pallor. Pallor described having been contacted by Springer in early June 1984 as to whether he could arrange for the arson and being recontacted some three weeks later. He then approached Middleton, who agreed to actually set the fire. When Pallor reported this to Springer, he was told how to contact Denno by telephone. Pallor and Denno arranged to meet at a Lum's Restaurant in South Glens Falls, located near Denno's place of business. At the meeting they agreed on a price of $3,500 for the arson, $1,500 for Middleton and $1,000 each for Pallor and Springer. Pallor recontacted Middleton, who insisted on advance payment of $300. At their next meeting at Lum's, Denno gave Pallor the $300 for Middleton and a key to the rear door of the house for gaining entry. In early July, Pallor took Middleton to Maple Street to point out the house and rear entrance and they secreted a can of gasoline in the vicinity. About two days after the fire, Pallor again met Denno at Lum's, receiving $1,000 for himself and $1,250 for Middleton, the latter representing the balance of what was due Middleton and an additional $50 as a reward for the success of the operation. Pallor was led to understand that the $1,000 due Springer would be paid directly by Denno. In exchange for these payments Pallor returned Denno's key to the rear door. When Pallor later met with Middleton to pay him his share, Middleton related how he had worn a mask and gloves and used the key to enter the rear door of the house at about 1:00 A.M., then waited several hours before starting the fire because of the presence of several police cars cruising on Maple Street.

The remaining prosecution evidence was as follows: the rear door of Denno's house was not forcibly entered; Denno withdrew $300 in cash from a bank account about one week before the fire and $2,500 in cash from that account the day following the fire; because the house was vacant, insurance coverage on it was limited to fire loss and the house was not insured for vandalism; in fact, it had been repeatedly vandalized. The last item of prosecution evidence was the testimony of a police officer as to an exchange between Springer and Denno that he overheard when they were arrested for the crime some three weeks after the fire and he was escorting Springer to join Denno in a holding cell area. As they approached Denno, the two men greeted each other. Then Springer said, "Looks like they got us", to which Denno replied "Sh".

Denno took the witness stand in his own defense. He admitted meeting twice with Pallor, whom he had not known before, at Lum's in June 1984. He explained that the purpose of their contact was to discuss whether Pallor would be hired to paint another house Denno owned. Denno also conceded that he had been attempting to sell 36 Maple Street for four months, without success, that vandalism at the house had been a serious and frustrating problem and that he regretted having ever purchased the property. He also stated that the rear door to the house was securely locked. His explanation for the withdrawal of $2,500 in cash on July 20 was that he had planned to take his family to Niagara Falls for a weekend vacation and intended to buy his wife a porcelain doll there in anticipation of her birthday the following month.

The jury acquitted Middleton of both counts of the indictment, and Springer and Denno were acquitted of the arson count but convicted of conspiracy. Each received a sentence of six months in jail, five years' probation and a $2,500 fine. These appeals ensued.

Defendants' primary argument for reversal is that there was insufficient corroborative evidence of Pallor's testimony to sustain their convictions. Pallor was an accomplice as a matter of law. Consequently, the convictions cannot stand unless there was "corroborative evidence tending to connect" each defendant with the conspiracy (CPL 60.22[1] ). The statutory requirement of such corroboration has long been a part of our law, reflecting the well-founded suspicion concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony. The inherent risk of unreliable accomplice testimony is guarded against by insuring that inculpation of the accused in the crime does not depend entirely on the possibly fabricated version of the accomplice (see, People v. Hudson, 51 N.Y.2d 233, 238-239, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 414 N.E.2d 385). The requisite corroborative evidence must be truly independent; it is not satisfied by evidence merely bolstering the testimony of the accomplice or lending credibility to the details of his testimony (id., at 238, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 414 N.E.2d 385). It must be "evidence from an independe source of some material fact tending to show that defendant was implicated in the crime" (People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 460, 31 N.E.2d 892). This does not mean, however, that the corroborative evidence must prove guilt (see, People v. Hudson, supra, p. 238, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 414 N.E.2d 385), or even actually connect defendant with the commission of the crime (see, People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, 131 N.E. 752). Moreover, the elements of independent proof are to be considered cumulatively and not in isolation (see, People v. Hudson, supra, p. 240, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 414 N.E.2d 385), for "[m]atters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" (People v. Dixon, supra, pp. 116-117, 131 N.E. 752). In other words, the essential corroboration is a quantum of independent, material evidence, i.e., probative of a fact in issue as to guilt, of sufficient weight to support a reasonable inference that defendant was somehow implicated in the commission of the crime. If so, it does not matter that individual pieces of evidence could also give rise to nonincriminatory inferences or be subject to an innocent connotation (see, People v. Hudson, supra, p. 240, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 414 N.E.2d 385; People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 74, 286 N.Y.S.2d 657, 233 N.E.2d 705).

To illustrate from the caselaw, in People v. Cunningham, 64 A.D.2d 722, 406 N.Y.S.2d 899, affd. 48 N.Y.2d 938, 425 N.Y.S.2d 59, 401 N.E.2d 182, the independent proof in a prosecution for...