People v. Stander

• Decision Date: 08 September 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 25659
• Citation: 251 N.W.2d 258,73 Mich.App. 617
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles John STANDER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 258

251 N.W.2d 258

73 Mich.App. 617

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles John STANDER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 25659.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 8, 1976.

Released for Publication March 18, 1977.

State Appellate Defender Office by James R. Neuhard, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Patricia J. Boyle, App. Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., William L. Cahalan, Prosecutor, Robert M. Morgan, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BRONSON, P. J., and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr. and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court on May 21, 1974, of unlawfully driving away an automobile, M.C.L.A. § 750.413; M.S.A. § 28.645. He was sentenced to a term of 2 1/2 to 5 years in prison and now appeals as of right raising eight assignments of error.

Shortly after 5 p. m. on March 20, 1974, Sergeant Gerald Schornack of the Redford Township police department received a phone call from an informant who stated that "Floyd" and one or two others intended to steal an automobile later that evening. The officer was told that the vehicle was parked on Lyndon Street in Livonia. At about 11 p. m. Sergeant Schornack and Sergeant Ericson of the Livonia police department took up surveillance of a late model Camaro parked in a resident's driveway at 29527 Lyndon Street. At 1:45 a. m. the next morning two individuals (later identified as Giorgio Raguso and Elton Mizel, also known as Floyd Blount), were observed in front of the premises under observation and walking about the Camaro. The pair left the scene and returned 40 minutes later accompanied by defendant. After Mizel had gained entry to the vehicle with a wire tool, Raguso and the defendant pushed the car out of the driveway. Mizel drove the car for a block or two and was immediately apprehended by police. Raguso and defendant fled on foot and were caught in a nearby yard.

Stander's defense was that he had assisted Mizel and Raguso under the mistaken impression that they were involved in a legal repossession of the Camaro. This theory was bolstered by the testimony of Mizel and Raguso; defendant declined to take the stand.

During cross-examination of Sergeant Schornack defense counsel attempted to elicit the identity of the informant. When the witness refused to disclose the name, the jury was excused and counsel urged the court that disclosure was critical to the defense because that individual might have information favorable to his client. The trial judge denied this request and counsel resumed cross-examination. Defendant now contends that the court's failure to require production of the informant was reversible error because, as a matter of law in Michigan, the informant was a res gestae witness and secondly, that he was entitled to disclosure of the informant's identity under the requirements of "fundamental fairness" as set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The people dispute the informant's status as a res gestae witness and further urge that disclosure of his identity was not required under the "fundamental fairness" doctrine since he was not a "material witness on the issue of guilt." People v. Wenrich, 31 Mich.App. 644, 648, 188 N.W.2d 102, 104 (1971), People v. Phelps, 57 Mich.App. 300, 305, 225 N.W.2d 738 (1975).

Treating the second part of defendant's contention we note that the Roviaro decision involved a government informer who played a key role in a heroin transfer scheme and who was instrumental in setting up the transaction. The Supreme Court there found that the informant was a "material witness" who might have been able to offer testimony favorable to the defendant in the areas of guilty knowledge or a possible entrapment defense. Defendant's "vital need for access to any material witness" outweighed the government interest in concealing the informant's identity and, under those particular facts, principles of fundamental fairness required disclosure. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 63, 77 S.Ct. 623, 629, 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 647 (1957).

The purpose for the "informant's privilege", as it is sometimes called, is to encourage citizens to communicate information regarding criminal activity to law enforcement agencies by preserving their anonymity. However, the court in Roviaro did recognize a limitation on the applicability of the privilege arising from the "fundamental requirements of fairness". ¹ We adopt the following edited passage from Justice Burton's majority opinion:

"Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.

"We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 60-62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-629, 1 L.Ed.2d at 645-646 (fn. omitted.)

The procedural vehicle generally recognized as being the most useful for helping a trial judge to strike the appropriate balance between these competing interests is the in camera hearing, see e. g., United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (CA3, 1967), cert. den., 392 U.S. 932, 88 S.Ct. 2292, 20 L.Ed.2d 1390 (1968); United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (CA5, 1976); United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (CA6, 1968); United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878 (CA5, 1976); United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (CA9, 1973), cert. den., 415 U.S. 984, 94 S.Ct. 1579, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974); United States v. Winters, 420 F.2d 523 (CA3, 1970).

Thus where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant's testimony, the trial judge should require production of the informant and conduct a hearing in chambers, and out of the presence of the defendant. At this hearing the court will have an opportunity to examine the informant in order to determine whether he could offer any testimony helpful to the defense. A record should be made of the in camera session and its contents sealed so that only an appellate court will have access thereto.

Other appropriate measures may be taken by the trial court so that the identity of the informant will remain undisclosed in the event the court determines that fundamental fairness does not require that the informant be produced as a witness at trial.

We are aware of our limited rule-making powers, Const.1963, art. 6, § 5, People v. Aldridge, 47 Mich.App. 639, 652, 209 N.W.2d 796 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Danhof, J.); however, we suggest the use of this in camera hearing as a means of allowing limited disclosure, thereby protecting the government's interest in the free flow of information to law enforcement officials, while at the same time insuring the right of the accused to develop the testimony of every witness who may be able to furnish information helpful to his defense.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court with directions to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion. If the trial judge finds that the informant could offer no testimony favorable to the defense, defendant's conviction shall be affirmed. A finding to the contrary shall require reversal and a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

We proceed to discuss two of the remaining seven issues because of their importance and the likelihood of recurrence in the event of a new trial.

During cross-examination of defense witness Mizel, the assistant prosecuting attorney was permitted, over objection, to introduce evidence of a prior auto theft involving both Mizel and the defendant. Mizel's March 19, 1973, plea-based conviction was offered to refute the defense theory that defendant had participated in the instant transaction without the intent to steal, but rather with the impression that he was helping to repossess the automobile. The defendant attacks the admission of this evidence on several grounds.

First, defendant contends that the subject matter sought to be introduced was in reality an arrest not resulting in a conviction on the grounds that Mizel had pled to a misdemeanor under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, M.C.L.A. § 762.14; M.S.A. § 28.853(14). Evidence of an arrest not resulting in conviction is inadmissible for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a witness. People v. Falkner, 389 Mich. 682, 695, 209 N.W.2d 193 (1973). But that does not prevent its introduction where it is independently admissible under the so-called similar acts statute, M.C.L.A. § 768.27; M.S.A. § 28.1050. See People v. Severance, 43 Mich.App. 394, 398, 204 N.W.2d 357 (1972). Nor does People v. Renno, 392 Mich. 45, 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), require exclusion, even if the prior act is regarded as a misdemeanor, if the evidence is properly admissible as a "like act" under the statute. M.C.L.A. § 768.27; M.S.A. § 28.1050. See People v. Clark, 62 Mich.App. 740, 747, 233 N.W.2d 856 (1975).

Second, defendant contends that this evidence, if admissible at all, more properly belonged in the people's case in chief. We disagree. Where a prior bad act is offered under the similar act statute, to prove defendant's intent or absence of mistake, two requirements must be met: (1) intent, or absence of mistake, must be "material" to the case; and (2) the act must be sufficiently similar to the charged offense so as to be probative of intent or absence of mistake. M.C.L.A. § 768.27;...