People v. Stansbury

• Decision Date: 25 June 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 471
• Citation: 263 Cal.App.2d 499,69 Cal.Rptr. 827
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Juanita Joy STANSBURY, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 827

69 Cal.Rptr. 827

263 Cal.App.2d 499

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Juanita Joy STANSBURY, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 471.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 25, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1968.

Hearing Denied Aug. 21, 1968.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Edsel W. Haws and John Fourts, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for appellant.

Silveira, Garrett, Goul & Curry and Ben Curry, Jr., Merced, for respondent.

CONLEY, Presiding Justice.

After closing hours, in their Mariposa bar called the Capitol Club, Juanita Joy Stansbury killed her husband, Phillip Stansbury; she shot him twice with a .22 caliber pistol and when he was stretched out on the floor, incapacitated and quite possibly already dead, she shot him seven times more. When the deputy sheriff came to arrest her, she said, 'Scotty, I have done something bad. * * * I shot him.' And when the officer expressed the belief that her husband was dead she stated, 'Well, I hope that son-of-a-bitch is dead, because I told him if he ever hit me again, I'd kill him.' She was given a preliminary examination in the Justice Court of Mariposa Judicial District; after hearing the evidence, the justice of the peace found that the offense of murder had been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe Juanita Joy Stansbury guilty thereof; he ordered that she be held to answer, releasing her, however, on her own recognizance, pending proceedings in the superior court.

In the superior court, the trial judge took the position, under section 995 of the Penal Code, that the defendant had been committed without reasonable or probable cause; at the same time the court directed that the district attorney file an amendment to the People's pleading, or a new information, charging the defendant only with manslaughter. The People appealed contending that the order of the magistrate finding that murder had been committed and that there was reasonable ground to believe the defendant guilty thereof was justified by the record.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (Pen.Code, § 187.)

'All murder which is perpetrated by means of * * * wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing * * * is murder of the first degree.' (Pen.Code, § 189.)

Evidence of the circumstances existing at the time of the homicide as well as applicable facts before and after the killing are competent to show deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307, 315, 57 Cal.Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208; People v. Sears, 62 Cal.2d 737, 743, 44 Cal.Rptr. 330, 401 P.2d 938.) Those murders which are not specified as first degree murders are considered murders of the second degree. (Pen.Code, § 189.) Proof of malice without the further proof that the homicide was wilful, deliberate and premeditated would establish second degree murder rather than first degree murder. (People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 70, 153 P.2d 21.)

The classic method of trial of a murder charge is this: the decision of the jurors, the twelve finders of fact from the community, should be received to determine whether the killing is murder of the first degree with or without capital punishment, murder of the second degree, or manslaughter, and, in a proper case, whether if selfdefense or other legal excuse is urged it has been established and that the defendant should be acquitted. In the present case, the Attorney General contends that there is ample evidence which, if believed and not offset by other pertinent considerations in the record, would establish the existence of murder. Obviously, the court's order in the premises is not a trial verdict. The question to be determined by us is whether or not the superior court was justified in holding that there was no substantial evidence which, if believed, could result in a verdict of murder. Putting it otherwise in practical terms: was there evidence from which malice could be adjudged?

It must be kept in mind that the test at this point is not identical with that which controls a jury in trying a murder case. The jury must be convinced to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the crime charged in the information and of each and every essential element of the crime. But a magistrate conducting a preliminary examination must only be convinced of '* * * such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.' (People v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344, 347.) (See also: Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 178, 183--184, 281 P.2d 250; Lorenson...