Taylor v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 02 December 1970 |
Docket Number | S.F. 22730 |
Citation | 91 Cal.Rptr. 275,477 P.2d 131,3 Cal.3d 578 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 477 P.2d 131 Alvin TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. |
John D. Nunes, Public Defender, and Gordon Van Kessel, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Boags, Oakland, as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Arlo E. Smith, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Derald E. Granberg and James B. Cuneo, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and for real party in interest.
Petitioner and his codefendant Daniels were charged by information with the murder of John H. Smith, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon against Linda West, and assault with a deadly weapon against Jack West. The superior court denied petitioner's motion to set aside the information as to the murder count (Pen.Code, § 995), and we issued an alternative writ of prohibition.
At the preliminary hearing, the following facts were adduced regarding the murder count: On the evening of January 12, 1969, two men attempted to rob Jax Liquor Store which was operated by Mrs. Linda Lee West and her husband Jack. Mrs. West testified that James Daniels entered the store first and asked Mr. West, who was behind the counter, for a package of cigarettes. While Mr. West was getting the cigarettes, John Smith entered the store and approached the counter. Mrs. West, who was on a ladder at the time the two men entered the store, then heard her husband say something about money. Turning her attention to the counter, she heard Daniels repeatedly saying, 'Put the money in the bag,' and observed her husband her husband complying with the order.
While Mr. West was putting the money from the register in the bag, Daniels repeatedly referred to the fact that he and Smith were armed. According to Mrs. West, Daniels 'chattered insanely' during this time, telling Mr. West Throughout this period, Smith's gun was pointed at Mr. West. Mrs. West testified that Smith looked 'intent' and 'apprehensive' as if 'waiting for something big to happen.' She indicated that Smith's apparent apprehension and nervousness was manifested by the way he was staring at Mr. West.
While Daniels was forcing Mr. West to the floor, Mrs. West drew a pistol from under her clothing and fired at Smith, who was standing closest to her. Smith was struck on the right side of the chest. Mrs. West fired four more shots in rapid succession, and observed 'sparks' coming from Smith's gun, which was pointed in her direction. A bullet hole was subsequently discovered in the wall behind the place Mrs. West had been standing, approximately eight or nine feet above the floor. During this period, Mr. West had seized a pistol and fired two shots at Smith. Mrs. West's last shot was fired at Daniels as he was going out of the door. He 'lurched violently and almost went down, (but) picked himself up and kept going.' Smith died as the result of multiple gunshot wounds.
The evidence at the preliminary examination indicated that petitioner was waiting outside the liquor store in a getaway car. He was apprehended later and connected with the crime through bills in his possession and through the automobile which was seen by a witness leaving the scene of the robbery.
Under Penal Code section 995, an information must be set aside if the defendant has been committed without 'reasonable or probable cause.' Of course, the probable cause test is not identical with the test which controls a jury in a murder case. The jury must be convinced to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the crime charged in the information and of every essential element of that crime. But a magistrate conducting a preliminary examination must be convinced of only such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197; Jackson v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.2d 521, 525--526, 42 Cal.Rptr. 838, 399 P.2d 374; Roads v. Superior Court, 275 A.C.A. 681, 685, 80 Cal.Rptr. 169; People v. Stansbury, 263 Cal.App.2d 499, 502, 69 Cal.Rptr. 827.) In other words, (Rideout v. Superior Court, Supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. at p. 583, 432 P.2d at p. 199.)
The information herein charged petitioner with the crime of murder. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.' (Pen.Code, § 187.) Except when the common-law-felony-murder doctrine is applicable, an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely to kill.' (People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 780, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133.) Petitioner correctly contends that he cannot be convicted under the felony-murder doctrine, since 'When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery.' (People v. Washington, Supra, at p. 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. at p. 445, 402 P.2d at p. 133.) However, apart from the felony-murder doctrine, petitioner could be found guilty of murder on a theory of vicarious liability.
As stated in People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 704--705, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 917, 408 P.2d 365, 373, rev. on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, (See People v. Washington, Supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781--782, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130).
Therefore, if petitioner were an accomplice to the robbery, he would be vicariously responsible 1 for any killing attributable to the intentional acts of his associates committed with conscious disregard for life, and likely to result in death. We must determine whether the committing magistrate had any rational ground for believing that Smith's death was attributable to intentional acts of Smith and Daniels meeting those criteria.
Petitioner relies upon the following language in Washington, wherein defendant's accomplice merely pointed a gun at the robbery victim who, without further provocation, shot and killed him: (62 Cal.2d at p. 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. at p. 445, 402 P.2d at p. 133, italics added.)
As indicated by the italicized words in the foregoing quotation, the central inquiry in determining criminal liability for a killing committed by a resisting victim or police officer is whether the Conduct of a defendant or his accomplices was sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice. If the trier of fact concludes that under the particular circumstances of the instant case Smith's death proximately resulted from acts of petitioner's accomplices done with conscious disregard for human life, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, then petitioner may be convicted of first degree murder. 2
For example, we pointed out in Washington that (62 Cal.2d at p. 782, 44 Cal.Rptr. at p. 446, 402 P.2d at p. 134; see People v. Gilbert, Supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 704--705, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365.)
Petitioner contends that since neither Daniels nor Smith fired the first shot, they did not 'initiate' the gun battle which led to Smith's death. However, depending upon the circumstances, a gun battle can be initiated by acts of provocation falling short of firing the first shot. Thus, in People v. Reed, 270 Cal.App.2d 37, 75 Cal.Rptr. 430 (hg. den.), defendant resisted the officers' commands to 'put up your hands,' and pointed his gun toward the officers and toward the kidnap-robbery victim. The...
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