People v. Superior Court (Sparks)

• Decision Date: 08 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. S164614.,S164614.
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF YUBA COUNTY, Respondent. DUSTIN WILLIAM SPARKS, Real Party in Interest.

48 Cal.4th 1

224 P.3d 86

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF YUBA COUNTY, Respondent.

DUSTIN WILLIAM SPARKS, Real Party in Interest.

No. S164614.

Supreme Court of California.

February 8, 2010.

[48 Cal.4th 4]

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, John G. McLean, R. Todd Marshall and George M. Hendrickson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner.

Mitchell Keiter as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

S. Michelle May, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Scott and Heitman and Justin B. Scott for Real Party in Interest.

[48 Cal.4th 5]

OPINION

CHIN, J.

Real party in interest, Dustin William Sparks (hereafter defendant or Sparks), was charged with two felony murders. Before his case came to trial, two other persons were tried for the same murders. One was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and the other was acquitted. Concerned about possible inconsistent verdicts, and applying the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel adopted in a criminal case in People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686 [117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622] (Taylor), the superior court ruled that those verdicts prohibit the prosecution from trying defendant for a crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.

(1) We conclude that decisions postdating Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686, including decisions from this court and the United States Supreme Court, have undermined Taylor's reasoning and the authority on which it relied. Occasional inconsistent jury verdicts are inevitable in our criminal justice system. If a verdict regarding one participant in alleged criminal conduct is inconsistent with other verdicts, all of the verdicts may stand. (Standefer v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 10, 25-26 [64 L.Ed.2d 689, 100 S.Ct. 1999] (Standefer); People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234] (Palmer).) Accordingly, a verdict regarding one defendant has no effect on the trial of a different defendant. Courts should determine the propriety of a prosecution based on that prosecution's own record, not a different record. Nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply to verdicts in criminal cases.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which set aside the superior court's ruling, and overrule People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged with two counts of felony murder based on a plan to steal marijuana plants that resulted in the killing of two people. Two other participants in the events leading to the deaths, Michael Huggins and Matthew Griffin, were tried separately for the murders before defendant's case came to trial. Griffin was acquitted and Huggins convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal summarized the evidence presented at Huggins's trial, which that court and this court have judicially noticed:

"In September 2005, Huggins lived in a house in Antelope with his girlfriend, Angelic Rampone, Matthew Griffin, and Griffin's girlfriend, Amy Butler. Levill Hill would sometimes spend the night at the house.

"In the house one day there was a discussion in which Butler told Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill that she knew of a house in Olivehurst where they could steal marijuana plants. The Olivehurst house belonged to Michael Hance. In back of the Olivehurst house was a trailer occupied by two men who had gone to school with Butler—Scott Davis and Michael Hance's son, Christopher Hance. Davis lived rent free in the trailer in exchange for guarding marijuana plants that were on the property.

"One evening in the beginning of September 2005, Butler, Griffin, Huggins, Rampone, and Hill drove to the Olivehurst house but decided not to steal the marijuana plants at that time. Later, Huggins, Griffin, and Butler talked about returning to the Olivehurst house, tying `the boys up,' and trying to steal the marijuana plants. Butler said she wanted nothing more to do with the plan.

"In the early morning of September 27, Huggins, Rampone, Hill, and Griffin drove back to the Olivehurst house. En route, they picked up Huggins's cousin, Sparks. When they got to the Olivehurst house, they parked the car, and Huggins, Sparks, Griffin, and Hill got out. Huggins had a .45-caliber pistol and Sparks had a toy gun that looked real. Hill was handed duct tape and Griffin rope `just in case' they needed to tie anybody up. Hill threw the duct tape back inside the car. They all then walked past the house and decided that none of them were going to go ahead with the plan to steal marijuana. They then split up in to two groups—Huggins and Sparks ahead and Hill and Griffin behind—and all headed back toward the Olivehurst house.

"When they got to the house, however, Huggins kneeled down between the south and north gate to the house. Sparks stood right by Huggins. Hill and Griffin walked by them, and Hill asked what they were doing. Huggins replied, `"We're going to do it."' Hill responded, `"No, you're not."' Hill and Griffin then walked away. In Hill's view, he and Griffin abandoned the plan, but Huggins and Sparks did not.

"Huggins walked through the gate to the side of the house. Sparks stayed at the gate. While Sparks was at the gate, someone hit him.

"After Sparks was hit, Hill heard a gunshot. Hill and Griffin ran back to the car. Sparks and Huggins followed. They drove back to the Antelope house.

"Michael Hance was home at the time of the shooting and described what he heard and saw. He was in the house talking with his son while Davis was sleeping in the trailer. Michael and Christopher Hance heard one of the gates open, so Christopher went out to investigate. Michael Hance then heard `scuffling' `between the two gates' and heard a shot.

"Michael Hance ran outside and saw Huggins go into the trailer, heard `some yelling,' and then `a shot or two' inside the trailer. As Michael Hance started going toward the trailer, Christopher Hance, Huggins, and Davis `poured out' of the trailer. Davis, who was holding his neck, fell to the ground.

"Michael Hance called 911. When police arrived, they found Davis dead. Christopher Hance was bleeding profusely from his lower abdomen and right leg and died from blood loss.

"Based on this and other evidence introduced at trial, the jury in Huggins's case was instructed on felony murder with the underlying felony being robbery or burglary or attempted robbery or burglary and on voluntary manslaughter based on intent to kill or conscious disregard for life. The jury found Huggins guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter while personally using a firearm."

As a result of the verdicts as to Huggins and Griffin, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution from trying him for any crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. He argued that collateral estoppel prevented the prosecution from relitigating issues decided in the previous trials.

In opposing the motion, the district attorney argued that evidence not admitted at the earlier trials could be used in defendant's trial. As the Court of Appeal summarized: "This evidence included statements made by Sparks during a police interview. In that interview, Sparks initially explained that he, Huggins, Griffin, and Hill all planned to participate in stealing the marijuana with his role being to `grab the plants.' When they got to the street, Griffin got scared, `punk[ed] out,' and went back to the car. Sparks and Huggins stood by the gate. Huggins went onto the property. As Sparks was standing outside the gate, he was confronted by someone wanting to know who he was, leading to a short physical altercation. Sparks then heard gunshots and ran back to the car. When Huggins returned to the car, he said to Sparks, `[W]here the Fuck were you a[t] Dustin?' Not wanting Huggins to think he `just punked out,' Sparks said that he got into a fight." (Fn. omitted.)

The trial court, which had presided over Huggins's trial, granted defendant's motion. Relying largely on Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686, it found that collateral estoppel applied because it would preclude a "third trial on these same facts" and would prevent inconsistent judgments, thus "eliminat[ing] the risk of undermining the integrity of the justice system." It prevented the prosecution "from pursuing a conviction for homicide . . . on the basis [that] the homicides allegedly occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, or an attempt of either crime."

The People filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal challenging the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and ultimately a peremptory writ directing the superior court to vacate its order and to issue a new order denying defendant's motion to preclude the People from trying him for any crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.

We granted defendant's petition for review. We also directed the parties to brief the question of whether Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686, should be overruled.

II. DISCUSSION

In Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d 686, three persons (Taylor, Daniels, and Smith) planned to rob a liquor store operated by Jack and Linda West. Taylor remained in the getaway car while the other two entered the store. There Daniels and Smith robbed the Wests at gunpoint of money in the cash register. In the process, a gun battle broke out in which the Wests shot Smith, killing him. (Id. at pp. 689-690.) We explained that, in an earlier opinion, we had held that Taylor could be prosecuted for Smith's murder "on a theory of vicarious liability if it independently appeared that his confederates entertained malice aforethought . . . ." (Id. at p. 691; see Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578 [91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 477 P.2d 131].) However, before Taylor's trial, Daniels was tried for that murder and, although convicted of robbery, was acquitted of murder. In light of this verdict, ...