People v. Superior Court (Corona)

• Decision Date: 16 November 1981
• Citation: 178 Cal.Rptr. 334,30 Cal.3d 193,636 P.2d 23
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 636 P.2d 23 The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; Juan Vallejo CORONA, Real Party In Interest. S. F. 24282.

Page 334

178 Cal.Rptr. 334

30 Cal.3d 193, 636 P.2d 23

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent Juan Vallejo CORONA, Real Party In Interest.

S. F. 24282.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 16, 1981.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur G. Scotland, Joel Carey and J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attys. Gen., H. Ted Hansen, Dist. Atty., Ronald W. Fahey, Roger W. Pierucci and Mark L. Musto, Sp. Pros. Attys., for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Terence K. Hallinan, Michael A. Mendelson, San Francisco, Isaiah B. Roter and Roy J. Van Den Heuvel, Yuba City, for real party in interest.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Following reversal of his conviction on 25 counts of first degree murder because of his trial counsel's incompetence and conflict of interest, defendant Juan Corona was permitted to relitigate his earlier unsuccessful challenges to two search warrants which had produced evidence leading to his conviction. The People (hereinafter petitioner), protesting relitigation of the search issues, and contending in any event that the search warrants were properly obtained and executed, seek a writ of mandate to set aside the trial court's order suppressing much of the evidence seized pursuant to these two warrants. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.)

During oral argument, defense counsel stipulated to the admission (subject to possible relevancy objections) of a portion of the evidence seized during execution of the first warrant (namely, six rounds of nine millimeter ammunition found in defendant's van), and all of the evidence seized during execution of the second warrant. This stipulation, assertedly based upon counsel's appraisal of the relevance and incriminatory nature of this evidence, was made in furtherance of expediting retrial. On the basis of our review of the complete record and the legal issues therein presented, we accept the stipulation which substantially narrows the issues before us and, accordingly, we do not further consider whether the foregoing evidence was properly seized.

With respect to the remainder of the evidence seized under the first warrant, we have concluded that the writ should issue. While rejecting petitioner's challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to relitigate the suppression issues, we nonetheless conclude that the court erred in ordering the remaining evidence at issue suppressed. We further conclude that the thoughtful opinion of Justice Grodin for the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, in this case correctly treats these issues in this prolonged litigation and we adopt a portion of his opinion as our own.

The Court of Appeal opinion, with appropriate deletions and additions, ^* is as follows:

( ) PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 18, 1973, Defendant was found guilty and convicted of 25 counts of first degree murder. On May 8, 1978, (the Court of Appeal) set the conviction aside because of inadequate legal representation and conflict of interest on the part of defendant's original trial counsel. (People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 684, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) The factual background of the case is fully set forth in that opinion (id., at pp. 693-701, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), and need not be repeated here. The court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kane, found that "trial counsel in gross neglect of his basic duty, failed to conduct the requisite factual and legal investigation in an effort to develop fundamental defenses available for his client and as a result of his neglect, crucial defenses were withdrawn from the case" (id., at p. 706, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894), thus warranting reversal on the basis of the then-prevailing standard of incompetency (People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464, 34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487). In addition, and as independent grounds for reversal, the court determined that Corona's trial counsel, by obtaining and exploiting literary and dramatic rights to Corona's life story "created a situation which prevented him from devoting the requisite undivided loyalty and service to his client. From that moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests-he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client the accused." (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.) Without deciding whether such a conflict of interest was sufficient in itself to demonstrate denial of the right to effective representation as a matter of law, or whether a showing of actual prejudice was required, the court held that the case met both criteria, and that trial counsel's conduct "constituted not only an outrageous abrogation of the standards which the legal profession has set for itself and upon which clients have a right to rely, but also rendered the trial a farce and mockery calling for reversal of the conviction and requiring a new trial." (Id., at p. 727, 145 Cal.Rptr. 894.)

The court concluded its opinion by considering several issues relating to the new trial which was to take place. Of these, only one is relevant here. In a proceeding under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress certain evidence, the trial court had refused to permit defendant's counsel to call witnesses for the purpose of challenging the accuracy of information contained in affidavits supporting various search warrants. Justice Kane's opinion found this to be error under Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 100-101, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 324, but due to the unavailability of a transcript of the suppression hearing it could not be determined whether the error was prejudicial. The opinion states: "If, on retrial, appellant offers evidence to challenge the factual allegations of the affidavits supporting the search warrants, the court should proceed in accordance with the precepts enunciated in Theodor and as expressed herein." (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 324.)

On March 28, 1979, Corona's present attorneys noticed a motion to suppress all evidence seized under six search warrants. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, but only to hear a Theodor motion as mandated by Justice Kane's opinion. Corona's attorneys countered that certain significant arguments had not been made at the original section 1538.5 motion, and that prior counsel's incompetency and conflict of interest had prevented full determination at that time.

Judge Patton, a distinguished and experienced jurist who tried the original case, presided at the new hearings which began April 25, 1979. At first he expressed doubt about the propriety of hearing the issues sought to be presented by Corona's attorneys, but reserved judgment on that question and insisted on hearing the mandated Theodor aspects first. After doing so, however, he decided that the hearing would encompass all issues raised.

Almost nine court days were required to hear that matter, in the course of which twenty-five witnesses were sworn and testified. At the conclusion of the hearing the court issued a 44-page written opinion suppressing part of the evidence seized under the first warrant on the ground that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search a specific building, and all of the evidence seized under the second warrant on the ground that the warrant was overly broad. The People stipulated that no evidence seized under the third through sixth warrants would be used (and, as noted above, defendant has now stipulated to the admission of all evidence seized under the second warrant). Consequently the validity of those warrants ( ) is not an issue here.

1. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear Corona's section 1538.5 motion on the validity of the search warrants.

Petitioner contends that in view of the earlier (1972) proceedings the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a full-blown section 1538.5 motion on the validity of the warrants. Petitioner relies on People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306; Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33; People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 40, 155 Cal.Rptr. 414 and People v. Superior Court (Green) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 477, 89 Cal.Rptr. 223.

In Brooks, the court held that a trial court has jurisdiction to hear a second section 1538.5 motion on the grounds presented in the first motion but not reached by the trial court when it granted the motion on other grounds. (26 Cal.3d at p. 474, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306.) It based its decision on defendant's lack of opportunity for a "full determination" of the merits of his motion as originally made and noticed. In Madril, the court held that section 1538.5 does not confer jurisdiction upon a trial court, having once granted a defendant's suppression motion, to reconsider it prior to trial. (15 Cal.3d at p. 75, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Green was to the same effect, and its reasoning was approved in Madril. (Id., at p. 77, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33.) Brooks distinguished both Madril and Green as presenting situations "in which a party ... sought review or reconsideration of an adverse ruling rendered after a complete hearing on the search and seizure issues." (26 Cal.3d at p. 478, 162 Cal.Rptr. 177, 605 P.2d 1306.) In both cases, the court noted, "the second hearings were properly characterized as relitigation of matters that the parties had opportunity to fully air in the first hearings." (Ibid.)

None of the cases cited by either party involved a trial court's jurisdiction to entertain a second suppression hearing after a conviction is reversed on grounds of constitutional denial of effective counsel. (Cf. People v. Dorsey (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 70, 73, 109 Cal.Rptr. 712 (overruled on other grounds, Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602, 119...