People v. Superior Court (Mitchell)

• Decision Date: 18 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. S026362,S026362
• Citation: 5 Cal.4th 1229,859 P.2d 102,23 Cal.Rptr.2d 403
• Parties: , 859 P.2d 102 The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Monterey County, Respondent; Joseph D. MITCHELL, Jr., Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 403

23 Cal.Rptr.2d 403

5 Cal.4th 1229, 859 P.2d 102

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Monterey County, Respondent Joseph D. MITCHELL, Jr., Real Party in Interest.

No. S026362.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Oct. 18, 1993.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 30, 1993.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama and Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Attys. Gen., Laurence K. Sullivan, Morris Beatus and David D. Salmon, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioner.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., San Diego, Thomas F. McArdle and Paul M. Morley, Deputy Dist. Attys., as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

James H. Newhouse, Skemp, Dozier & Moser and James H. Dozier for real party in interest.

James S. Thomson, John G. Cotsirilos and Elizabeth Missakian as amici curiae on behalf of real party in interest.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

Proposition 115, adopted by the people at the June 1990 Primary Election, contains a variety of provisions relating to criminal law and procedure, including sections authorizing reciprocal pretrial discovery by the parties to a criminal action. (Pen.Code, § 1054 et seq.; see Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304 [hereafter Izazaga ].) In the present case, we must decide whether and to what extent these discovery provisions are applicable to the penalty phase of a capital trial. As will appear, we conclude that reciprocal discovery is available with respect to penalty phase evidence, and that such discovery ordinarily should be made at least 30 days prior to the commencement of the guilt phase of the trial, but that trial courts are empowered to exercise discretion in an appropriate case to defer disclosure of all or part of the defendant's penalty phase evidence until the guilt phase has been completed.

I. FACTS

In the underlying proceeding, real party in interest (hereafter defendant) is charged with felony murder with special circumstances. (The trial has been stayed pending our review.) The People requested discovery as authorized by Penal Code section 1054.3. (Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.) That section requires the defendant and his attorney to disclose to the prosecutor the names and addresses of persons he intends to call as witnesses "at trial," together with any relevant statements or reports of those persons, and any real evidence intended to be offered in evidence. Similar disclosures are required of the prosecutor. (§ 1054.1.) Another provision states that "no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States." (§ 1054, subd. (e); see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c) ["In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature...."].)

Defendant refused to provide any discovery pertinent to the penalty phase of the trial. The trial court denied the People's motion to compel discovery on the ground that the reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 do not apply to the penalty phase of the trial, which is instead governed by the more specific provisions of section 190.3, requiring pretrial notice to the defendant of penalty phase aggravating evidence. The People sought mandate from the Court of Appeal to direct the trial court to compel discovery of materials relevant to the penalty phase pursuant to Proposition 115. The Court of Appeal upheld the People's right to discovery and would have issued the requested writ of mandate. We will affirm the judgment issuing the writ.

II. AVAILABILITY OF RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY

As noted above, the trial court concluded that section 190.3, with its specific reference to penalty phase evidence, constituted the sole discovery provision applicable to such evidence. Section 190.3 in pertinent part states: "Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation."

Defendant, observing that we have construed section 190.3 as requiring production of the actual evidence on which the prosecutor intends to rely (see People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 987, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475, and cases cited), contends that the section was thus intended to constitute a nonreciprocal discovery provision that would preclude prosecutorial discovery under section 1054.3. The Court of Appeal herein disagreed, finding nothing in section 190.3 that would preclude application of the new reciprocal discovery provisions. (Accord, People v. Superior Court (Sturm) (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 172, 181-182, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 [hereafter Sturm ].) As the Court of Appeal herein observed, section 1054, subdivision (e), quoted above, expresses an intent to allow reciprocal discovery in all criminal cases unless contrary to some "express" statutory provision or the United States Constitution. Because section 190.3 does not by its terms prohibit reciprocal discovery, section 1054, subdivision (e), should apply. We agree with the Court of Appeal.

Although section 190.3 does not affirmatively authorize reciprocal discovery, the omission is not significant. At the time section 190.3 was adopted, discovery by the prosecution was precluded by judicial decisions interpreting the state Constitution. (See Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 369-371, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304, and cases cited.) The state Constitution now expressly provides for reciprocal discovery "in criminal cases." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c); see also § 1054 [expressing purposes of reciprocal discovery to ascertain truth, save court time, and protect victims and witnesses "in criminal cases"].)

Defendant asserts that the penalty phase is a sentencing proceeding and not part of a criminal "case" or "trial" within the meaning of the foregoing provisions. (See People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288 [term "trial" is "ambiguous as to whether it includes proceedings following the determination of guilt prior to sentencing"]; People v. Gilbert (1944) 25 Cal.2d 422, 428, 154 P.2d 657; People v. Williams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 532, 536-537, 95 P.2d 456.) As the People observe, however, we have confirmed that the penalty phase of a capital trial is merely a part of a single, unitary criminal proceeding. (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 45-46, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109.) In Robertson, construing the similar notice provision in former section 190.3, we observed that "[w]here the question of notice arises in the context of the initial trial in which the guilt and penalty phases occur in immediate sequence and thus are part of a unitary proceeding, we have construed 'trial' as the whole proceeding; hence notice must be given in advance of the guilt phase. [Citation.] ... We conclude, therefore, that the 'trial' to which former section 190.3 refers embraces the original trial, as defined above, or the retrial, be it of the entire proceeding or the penalty phase only." (People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 45-46, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109, italics added; see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 94-95, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.)

As the Court of Appeal herein observed, "[a]lthough Robertson did not consider the issue before us, its language embracing the penalty phase within the concept of the 'trial' under section 190.3 is authority that the proceeding is unitary and should not be arbitrarily broken down into distinct and separate procedures. From this it follows that section 1054, which refers to regulation of discovery in a criminal trial, applies to the penalty phase, which is part of the trial." (See also § 190.1 ["A case in which the death penalty may be imposed ... shall be tried in separate phases...."]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311-312, and fn. 10 [general discovery principles apply to penalty phase evidence]; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 375, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304 ["The phrase 'at trial' means exactly that--at the trial, not merely during the prosecution's case-in-chief."].)

Sturm, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 179, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 652, is directly on point, holding that, "under the plain language of the statutory scheme in place when Proposition 115 was enacted, the jury's penalty determination was a part of the trial. [p] Moreover, the stated purpose of Proposition 115 is 'to restore balance to our criminal justice system.' [Citation]. To accomplish that goal to the greatest extent possible in a capital case, the penalty phase would have to be included in the reciprocal discovery provision." (Fn. omitted.)

Defendant, disagreeing with Sturm, analogizes the penalty phase of a capital trial to a "sentencing" hearing in a noncapital trial, and argues that because discovery is unavailable at sentencing hearings, it is unfair, and a denial of equal protection, to allow it in capital cases. Although the issue is not presently before us, Sturm suggested that reciprocal discovery may indeed be available as to sentencing proceedings under the new provisions of Proposition 115. The broad language of section 1054.3, requiring disclosure of evidence to be elicited "at the trial," could well encompass such proceedings. (See Sturm, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 185, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 652.)

The Court of Appeal herein acknowledged that "There are cases holding that sentencing hearings differ from trials in some respects. For instance, strict evidentiary rules...