People v. Swift
| Citation | 300 N.Y.S.2d 639,32 A.D.2d 183 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph SWIFT, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court Appellate Division |
James J. McDonough, Mineola (Matthew Muraskin, Mineola, of counsel), for appellant.
William Cahn, Dist. Atty., Nassau County (Jules E. Orenstein, Great Neck, of counsel), for respondent.
Before CHRIST, Acting P.J., and BRENNAN, HOPKINS, MUNDER and MARTUSCELLO, JJ.
The defendant was indicted for robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the second degree, and possession of a weapon as a felony. A hearing under the statute (Code of Crim.Pro., Part VI, Title II--C) was held concerning the admissibility of certain statements made by him after his arrest. The court found the statements admissible. Thereafter the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the third degree in satisfaction of the indictment and was sentenced.
The single issue raised by the defendant is whether he was accorded his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and knowingly waived them before making the statements found admissible. Hence we review the testimony at the hearing.
Patrolman John Mallon of the Long Beach Police Department testified that while on duty on December 15, 1967, at about 10:20 p.m., he Henry Klejmont, a detective, testified that he saw the defendant first at the supermarket and then at police headquarters. Before questioning the defendant, he advised him orally of his rights in the following language:
saw the lights illuminating Waldbaum's Supermarket, but did not see any employees within. Entering the store, he saw [32 A.D.2d 184] the defendant standing near the door to a storage area. The defendant disappeared from view. The officer drew his revolver and discovered the defendant hiding behind some boxes. The officer searched the defendant and found on his person a starter's pistol, nylon stockings and gloves. The defendant had been accompanied by another man who assisted him in herding the employees of the store into a room and blocking the entrance by a fork-lift truck prior to the coming of the patrolman.
'I told him that he had a right to counsel, to an attorney; that one would be present if he so desired; that he did not need to talk to me if he didn't want to; if he wanted to and wanted to have lawyer present he could.
'I told him that anything he said may be held against him in any court.
The detective also gave the defendant a paper upon which was written the following:
'POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF LONG BEACH NEW YORK YOUR RIGHTS
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. Yor also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
I have read the statement of my rights shown above. I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a lawyer. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.'
The contents of the paper were read to the defendant by the detective; and the defendant read the paper as well. The defendant was asked whether he desired to waive his rights and he said that he did. He then signed his name below the waiver; and his signature was witnessed by Detective Klejmont. The defendant's statement was thereafter taken by the detective; and it is this statement which the defendant urges was erroneously held to be admissible at the hearing. 1
First, the defendant assails the oral warnings spoken to him as incomplete, because he was not told that if he wanted counsel, but was unable to retain one, counsel would be assigned to him. Second, he asserts that the written warnings read to him and by him were defective, because he was not informed that he might have assigned counsel at police headquarters. The language to which he specifically objects is the following in the body of the writing:
The defendant contends that the waiver of his rights under these circumstances was ineffective, for he could not waive rights with which he was not acquainted. It is his submission that, without a knowing and understanding waiver, his statement could not be received in evidence against him and his conviction must fall.
The rule in Miranda describes the warnings which must be given to an accused before interrogation in the following terms (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, Supra):
If the statement of the defendant had been made following the oral warnings of Detective Klejmont, it would have been inadmissible, for the detective's admonitions failed to inform the defendant that he was entitled to the assignment of counsel if he were indigent (People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 3--4, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 227--228, 233 N.E.2d 255, 256--257). 'It is essential that each of the four warnings required by Miranda shall have been given prior to the time that a statement was made and that a finding to that effect shall have been made by the trier of the fact' (People v. Raymond Q. (Anonymous), 29 A.D.2d 1053, 289 N.Y.S.2d 241).
The oral warnings in this case, however, were supplemented by the written warnings read to the defendant by the detective, and then read by the defendant. By the written warnings the defendant was informed that (1) he had a right to remain silent, (2) anything he said could be used against him in court, (3) he had a right to talk to a lawyer before and during questioning, (4) he had a right to a lawyer's advice and presence even if he could not afford to hire one, (5) a lawyer would be appointed for him, if and when he went to court, and (6) he had a right to stop answering questions at any time until he talked to a lawyer. We think that these warnings met the standards prescribed by Miranda.
The defendant's complaint that the written warnings were incomplete because of the advice to him that the police could not provide him with a lawyer, but that one would be appointed for him by the court, has no substance. First, Miranda does not direct that the accused be furnished with counsel by the police. In its discussion of the right to counsel during the questioning of an indigent person, the opinion of Chief Judge Warren is quite specific (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, Supra):
'In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.'
The opinion continues (Id., at p. 474, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1627):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Duckworth v. Eagan, 88-317
...196, 201-202, 182 N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 960, 28 L.Ed.2d 228 (1971); People v. Swift, 32 App.Div.2d 183, 186-187, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643-644 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 584, 24 L.Ed.2d 510 (1970). Other courts, although not using the prec......
-
Jones v. State
...State v. Carpenter (1973), 211 Kan. 234, 505 P.2d 753; People v. Campbell (1970), 26 Mich.App. 196, 182 N.W.2d 4; People v. Swift (1969), 32 A.D.2d 183, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639.Contra: United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey (7th Cir. 1972), 467 F.2d 1248; United States v. Garcia (9th Cir. 1970),......
-
United States v. Rawls
...228 (1971); Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S.W.2d 800 (1969); Jones v. State, 253 Ind. 235, 252 N.E.2d 572 (1969); People v. Swift, 32 A.D.2d 183, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S. Ct. 584, 24 L.Ed.2d 510 (1970); State v. Ruud, 41 Wis.2d 720, 165 N.W.2d 153 (1969......
-
People v. Smith
...We reject that contention. As noted, there is no prescribed form for the warnings (see, California v. Prysock, supra; People v. Swift, 32 A.D.2d 183, 187, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639, cert. denied 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 584, 24 L.Ed.2d 510) and the New York State Legislature, in prescribing warnings ......