People v. Sypien

• Citation: 763 N.E.2d 264,261 Ill.Dec. 294,198 Ill.2d 334
• Decision Date: 20 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 89265.,89265.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Mark SYPIEN, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

763 N.E.2d 264

198 Ill.2d 334

261 Ill.Dec. 294

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Mark SYPIEN, Appellee.

No. 89265.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 20, 2001.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Michael Hoard, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

No appearance for appellee.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)) when it enacted Public Act 90-456 (Pub. Act 90-456, eff. January 1, 1998). The legislation in Public Act 90-456, styled as an act "in relation to criminal law," amended, among other statutes, the disorderly conduct provision of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)). Charged with disorderly conduct under the amended provision, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting a single subject violation. The circuit court of De Kalb County granted defendant's motion, and the State now appeals. Based upon the following discussion, we affirm and hold that Public Act 90-456 violates the single subject rule.

BACKGROUND

On or about August 1, 1999, defendant allegedly reported to De Kalb County Sheriff's Deputies Ryan Loyd and Tim Rogers that a certain motor vehicle had been stolen. A brief investigation led the deputies to conclude that defendant's report was false. He was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct in violation of section 26-1(a)(4) of the Code. Section 26-1(a)(4) was amended by section 15 of Public Act 90-456 and now provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:

* * *

(4) Transmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner to any peace officer, public officer or public employee a report to the effect that an offense * * * has been committed, knowing at the time of such transmission that there is no reasonable ground for believing that such an offense * * * has been committed[.]" 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998).

Section 15 of Public Act 90-456 also amended the sentencing portion of the Code's disorderly conduct provision to provide:

"(b) Sentence.

(1) * * * A violation of subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(9) of this Section is a Class 4 felony." 720 ILCS 5/26-1(b) (West 1998).

Prior to the amendment, a violation of section 26-1(a)(4) was a Class B misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(b) (West 1996). In its present form, an accused faces a maximum three-year prison term if convicted of a section 26-1(a)(4) violation.

The other amendments accomplished by Public Act 90-456 are summarized as follows:

(1) 911 False Alarms. Section 5 amended the Emergency Telephone System Act (50 ILCS 750/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) by adding the following: "Any person calling the number '911' for the purpose of making a false alarm or complaint and reporting false information is subject to the provisions of Section 26-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961." 50 ILCS 750/15.2 (West 1998).

(2) Juvenile Court Act. Section 10 of Public Act 90-456 amended the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1998)) to provide that once an adjudicatory hearing is commenced in an abused or neglected juvenile proceeding, subsequent delay in the proceeding may be allowed by the court when necessary to ensure a fair hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 1998). Formerly, the adjudicatory hearing was required to be "held" within 90 days, and there was no provision for delays. See 705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 1996).

(3) Search Warrants. Section 20 amended the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 1998)) to authorize an officer executing a search warrant to make entry without first announcing his office and without knocking in certain exigent circumstances. 725 ILCS 5/108-8(b) (West 1998).

In the trial court, defendant maintained that Public Act 90-456 violated the single subject rule because the amendment to the Juvenile Court Act in section 10 of Public Act 90-456, unlike the other three amendments, does not relate to criminal law. The trial court agreed, specifically finding that it "could see no relationship to the criminal law with neglected or abused juveniles." Thus, the issue presented for our review is whether the amendment to the Juvenile Court Act bears any natural and logical relationship to criminal law.

ANALYSIS

Legislative acts are to be afforded a considerable presumption of constitutionality. In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill.2d 414, 422, 223 Ill.Dec. 647, 680 N.E.2d 380 (1997); Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill.2d 434, 441, 233 Ill.Dec. 782, 701 N.E.2d 1056 (1998). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing the constitutional violation. Russell, 183 Ill.2d at 441, 233 Ill.Dec. 782, 701 N.E.2d 1056. We review de novo a circuit court's holding that a statute is unconstitutional. People v. Jung, 192 Ill.2d 1, 4, 248 Ill.Dec. 258, 733 N.E.2d 1256 (2000).

The single subject rule provides as follows:

"Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject." Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d).

The rule is designed to prevent the passage of legislation that, if standing alone, could not muster the necessary votes for enactment. Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill.2d 239, 258, 180 Ill.Dec. 135, 606 N.E.2d 1212 (1992). Such "logrolling" by legislators is a practice strictly prohibited by this state's constitution. People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 98, 243 Ill.Dec. 233, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999); People v. Wooters, 188 Ill.2d 500, 518, 243 Ill.Dec. 33, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999).

The term "subject" in this context is to be liberally construed in favor of the legislature. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill.2d 1, 8-9, 237 Ill.Dec. 74, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (1999); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill.2d 235, 255, 209 Ill.Dec. 53, 650 N.E.2d 1026 (1995); Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill.2d 409, 423-24, 204 Ill.Dec. 136, 641 N.E.2d 360 (1994). The matters included in the enactment, however, must have a natural and logical connection to the single subject. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 427, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000); Cutinello, 161 Ill.2d at 423, 204 Ill.Dec. 136, 641 N.E.2d 360; People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill.2d 476, 487, 274 N.E.2d 87 (1971), quoting People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 607-08, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953). In other words, while the legislature is free to choose subjects comprehensive in scope, the single subject requirement may not be circumvented by selecting a topic so broad that the rule is evaded as "a meaningful constitutional check on the legislature's actions." Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 515-18, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). There is no additional requirement that the individual provisions be related to each other. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 356, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999).

Consequently, determining whether a public act runs afoul of the single subject rule is a two-tiered analysis. First, we must determine whether the act, on its face, involves a legitimate single subject. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 361-62, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Second, we must discern whether the various provisions within an act all relate to the proper subject at issue. Arangold, 187 Ill.2d at 362, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).

Considering the first tier of the analysis, the purported subject of Public Act 90-456 is one that we have already found to be legitimate for single subject purposes. For example, this court found in Malchow that Public Act 89-8 (Pub. Act 89-8, eff. March 21, 1995), entitled "An Act in relation to criminal and correctional matters * * *," did not comprehend a subject too broad to pass constitutional muster. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d at 428-29, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433. Likewise, we found that Public Act 81-1270 (Pub. Act 81-1270, eff. July 3, 1980), embracing the lone subject of amending the Criminal Code of 1961, did not run afoul of the single subject rule. See People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill.2d 235, 255, 209 Ill.Dec. 53, 650 N.E.2d 1026 (1995). Thus, having found that the subjects of criminal and correctional matters and amendment of the Criminal Code of 1961 are legitimate subjects, we need not reexamine the issue in this case. The subject of Public Act 90-456, on its face, is permissible. See also Wooters, 188 Ill.2d at 512-13, 243 Ill.Dec. 33, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (while invalidating the public act at issue, we held the legislature could pass legislation that amended several acts as long as the amendments related to the single subject of "crime"). Moving to the second tier of our analysis, we must determine whether each individual amendment in Public Act 90-456 relates to the single subject of the criminal law. The State maintains that the trial court's ability to extend the time of an adjudicatory hearing for abused, neglected or dependent children relates to the criminal law because the parent or person responsible in loco parentis for the abuse, neglect or dependency may face criminal liability as a direct result of the hearing. According to the State, the legislature's concern with the timing of an adjudicatory hearing under the Act is somehow connected to two criminal-law-related goals: (1) preventing the criminal activity of parents who abuse or neglect their children; and (2) ensuring that innocent parents are not exposed to criminal liability. The State further cites People v. Majors, 308 Ill. App.3d 1021, 242 Ill.Dec. 474, 721 N.E.2d 753 (1999), and argues that the enactment...