People v. T.O. (In re T.O.)

• Decision Date: 18 October 2022
• Docket Number: E077783
• Citation: 84 Cal.App.5th 252,300 Cal.Rptr.3d 281
• Parties: IN RE T.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. T.O., Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

84 Cal.App.5th 252

300 Cal.Rptr.3d 281

IN RE T.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

T.O., Defendant and Respondent.

E077783

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 18, 2022

As Modified November 1, 2022

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Natalie M. Lough, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, and William A. Meronek, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

CODRINGTON J.

I.INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal by the People after the juvenile court's order declaring defendant and respondent T.O. (minor) a ward of the court and placing him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The People contend that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code ¹ section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section 290.008, we affirm the judgment.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2020, then 17-year-old minor pulled his seven-year-old cousin, Jane Doe, into a bedroom, covered her mouth with a scarf, and then anally and vaginally raped her. Jane reported the sexual assault to her mother and aunt the following day. Minor was subsequently arrested.

On May 6, 2020, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed charging minor, who was six weeks shy of his 18th birthday, with rape of a child under 14 years old ( § 261, subd. (a)(2) ) and forcible sodomy on a child under 14 years old ( § 269, subd. (a)(3) ).

On May 7, 2020, the Riverside County District Attorney's Office filed a request to transfer jurisdiction to adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1).

On April 13, 2021, the juvenile court issued a written order denying the People's request to transfer the matter to adult court. The court thereafter referred the matter to the probation department for dispositional recommendations.

The probation department pointed out three possible dispositions for minor: the Alan M. Crogan Youth Treatment and Education Center (YTEC), Pathways to Success (Pathways), or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). YTEC "is a secure treatment facility, operating using the same basic levels of promotion of a high school campus." Pathways is "a secured treatment environment with a four-tiered school campus model resembling" the YTEC. Regarding sexual behavior treatment at Pathways, the probation officer noted that "a modified version of the Department of Juvenile Justice's (DJJ) program was developed" and that the "youth do not have to register as a sex offender." The probation officer also pointed out that "[o]n June 30, 2021, DJJ will cease accepting youth into the program who were not ordered prior to that date, with a final closure of their facility in 2023" and that youths "must register as sex offenders" if placed in the DJJ program. Following further interviews and meetings, the probation officer ultimately recommended that minor be placed in the Pathways program.

The parties thereafter disputed whether minor would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290.008 upon competition of the Pathways program should he admit the allegations in the delinquency petition. The sole disputed issue was whether the commitment to a local secure facility required sex offender registration following Senate Bill No. 823 (Senate Bill 823), which codified the plan to close the DJJ within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and establish local programs.

On July 22, 2021, after reviewing the briefs and hearing arguments from the parties, the juvenile court denied the People's request to require minor to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290.008. After noting that Senate Bill 823 was silent on the issue of registration under section 290, the court explained its ruling as follows: "The relevant bills, the new bills that came out, did not discuss or did not accomplish anything in regards to registration. But when you look at ... section 290.008, subdivision (a), in the Court's view, this very straightforwardly premises mandatory sex offender registration for juveniles on being, quote, discharged or paroled from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. [¶] ... [¶] ... [I]t's important to note that there is no similar requirement of registration for wards who have been committed to juvenile hall for the same sexual offense. So just to kind of stop and pause there as to that point, the Legislature did carve out situations in which the minor, as a ward, must register as a sex offender, and then in other areas where they're not required to register as a sex offender. So, again, you have the requirement upon a discharge from the Youth Authority or DJJ. We do not have the requirement perhaps on a discharge from juvenile hall. [¶] ... [¶] It's my belief that the Court does not have the power, outside of ... section 290.008, to order a minor to register. As stated in the case of People versus Eastman ,² a 2018 case, a trial court may not order an individual to register under section 290 when that individual does not fall within the scope of the act. Also it was stated in Derrick B. ,³ a California Supreme Court case, that discretionary sex offender registration provisions do not apply in juvenile cases. [¶] To me, as I look at the law right now as it stands today, I think it's a pretty straightforward answer. If the minor is not committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections, they cannot be ordered to register as a sex offender. [¶] Now, I don't know what the Legislature thought of when they created or when [Senate] [Bill] 823 was being put together and passed, but clearly the law, as previously written and as written now, is very clear that they know the issue. The Legislature knows that there's an issue regarding registration. And if they wanted minors to now register after completing a local program, they could have ordered that, and they did not. [¶] ... [¶] I believe based on the case law that I already cited and the law, as it exists today, I simply cannot add to or create a requirement that a minor register as the law stands today. [¶] Now, this may be fixed later down the road. The Legislature may decide otherwise in the future, and they may amend certain things. But as it stands today, I believe I'm without authority to order a minor to register.... [¶] So I would not be imposing registration, whether it be in an admission, at a trial, at a jurisdictional contested hearing. Regardless of how this case goes, I will not be ordering registration."

On July 26, 2021, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, minor admitted that he had raped a child under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than him ( §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 269, subd. (a)(1) ). The juvenile court thereafter declared minor a ward of the court, dismissed the remaining allegation in the petition, and placed him in the Pathways program on various terms and conditions for a period of four years. The court declined to impose sexual registration pursuant to section 290.008 based on the prior determination. The People timely appealed.

III.DISCUSSION

The People argue that the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration because its statutory interpretation of section 290.008 misconstrued the legislative intent by focusing solely on the plain language of the statute without harmonizing the law in the context of the entire statutory scheme. The People also assert the court ignored the established presumption against a repeal by implication and inadequately considered the results of its interpretation. The People further contend that application of the statute violates the equal protection clause because in-state juveniles are treated differently than out-of-state juveniles with respect to sex offender registration.

Minor initially responds that the matter is not cognizable on appeal because the court's order is lawful. As to the merits, minor contends the juvenile court properly denied the People's request to impose a registration requirement because the plain language of section 290.008 does not include sexual offender registration for those minors committed to a county program such as Pathways and that the People did not demonstrate a valid exception to the plain language rule of statutory construction. Finally, minor asserts that the People's equal protection argument fails.

A. Standard of Review

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. ( People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309 ; In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 718, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 64 ["Our review of the interpretation and application of a statute is de novo."].) As with any case involving statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent. ( People v. Lewis, supra , at p. 961, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) We begin by examining the statute's words, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, giving them a plain, usual and commonsense meaning. ( People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) "When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citation...