People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 28 February 2012
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc. appellant, v. David TAYLOR, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 01622
92 A.D.3d 961
940 N.Y.S.2d 103

The PEOPLE, etc. appellant,
v.
David TAYLOR, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Feb. 28, 2012.

[940 N.Y.S.2d 104]

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Gary S. Fidel and Donna Aldea of counsel), for appellant.

Randall D. Unger, Bayside, N.Y., for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, A.P.J., ARIEL E. BELEN, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.

[92 A.D.3d 961] Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grosso, J.), dated March 24, 2010, which, after a hearing before a Judicial Hearing Officer (Cooperman, J.H.O.), granted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. “An inventory search is ... designed to properly catalogue the contents of the item searched. The specific objectives of an inventory search, particularly in the context of a vehicle, are to protect the property of the defendant, to protect the police against any claim of lost property, and to protect police personnel and others from any dangerous instruments” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 252, 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385). “ ‘[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence’ ” ( id., quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1). “To guard against this danger, an inventory search should be conducted pursuant to ‘an established procedure clearly limiting the conduct of individual officers that assures that the searches are carried out consistently and reasonably’ ” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d at 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385, quoting [92 A.D.3d 962] People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d 715, 719, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362). “The procedure must be standardized so as to ‘limit the discretion of the officer in the field’ ” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d at 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385, quoting People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d at 719, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362). “While incriminating evidence may be a consequence of an inventory search, it should not be its purpose” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d at 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385).

“[W]hen determining the validity of an inventory search, ‘two elements must be examined: first, the relationship between the search procedure adopted and the governmental objectives that justify the intrusion and, second, the adequacy of the controls on the officer's discretion’ ” ( People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d 6, 10, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555, quoting People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d at 719, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362).

As is relevant to this appeal, “courts may take judicial notice of the standardized search procedure. While this procedure need not be offered into evidence, a description of what the procedure requires must be proffered” ( People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555). Here, contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court, the procedure

[940 N.Y.S.2d 105]

utilized “d [id] what it must do: create[d] a usable inventory” ( People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d at 720, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362, see People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555; People v. Cochran, 22 A.D.3d 677, 678, 804 N.Y.S.2d 346).

Significantly, the Court of Appeals has explained that the failure to use an “inventory search form” is “not fatal to the establishment of a valid inventory search as long as (1) the search, in accordance with the ‘standardized procedure,’ is designed to produce an inventory and (2) the search results are fully recorded in a usable format” ( People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555). Here, contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court, the arresting officer specifically testified that the procedure routinely followed was to use a “property clerk's invoice” form, also referred to as a “voucher,” to record the items removed from a vehicle during an inventory. Moreover, the search results were fully recorded in this manner by the officer in this case ( id.; see People v. Cochran, 22 A.D.3d at 678, 804 N.Y.S.2d 346).

Contrary to the further finding of the Supreme Court, there is nothing in the hearing testimony to support the conclusion that the back seat of the vehicle was “removed.” The People established that the lifting up of the middle seat of the back row of the vehicle, underneath which there was a “metal,” “square” storage area, was justified under the established police inventory procedure ( see generally People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555). The record supports the conclusion that the search was conducted in accordance with the New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, of which we take judicial notice ( see People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555), which states that officers should search areas under the seats and any closed containers in a vehicle as [92 A.D.3d 963] part of an inventory search ( see NYPD Patrol Guide § 218–13). Moreover, all of the items were removed and inventoried, and no property was left in the vehicle when the search was complete ( cf. People v. Gomez, 13 N.Y.3d at 10–11, 884 N.Y.S.2d 339, 912 N.E.2d 555; see generally People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d at 718–719, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362). Furthermore, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing was sufficient to establish that the motivation of the police officers in conducting the inventory search was caretaking rather than criminal investigation ( see People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d at 718–719, 594 N.Y.S.2d 689, 610 N.E.2d 362; People v. Cochran, 22 A.D.3d at 677, 804 N.Y.S.2d 346).

Accordingly, considering the police testimony elicited on both direct and cross-examination, we find that the hearing evidence amply demonstrated that the search in this case was performed pursuant to an established and standardized procedure which limited the discretion of the police, safeguarded the defendant's constitutional rights, and fulfilled the legitimate purposes of a valid inventory search.

MASTRO, A.P.J., CHAMBERS and ROMAN, JJ., concur.

BELEN, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order with the following memorandum:

The majority's upholding of the purported inventory search of the defendant's vehicle despite the lack of any evidence demonstrating that the police officer who conducted the search was familiar with departmental regulations regarding inventory searches or that the search was conducted pursuant to any such regulations is inconsistent with precedent of both the United States Supreme Court ( see e.g....