People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 07 April 1952
• Citation: 202 Misc. 265
• Parties: The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>John Taylor, Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

202 Misc. 265

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

v.John Taylor, Defendant.

April 7, 1952.

T. Vincent Quinn, District Attorney (John Londergan of counsel), for plaintiff.

Patrick I. Flannelly for defendant.

SHAPIRO, M.

The defendant came on for trial before me, sitting as a Court of Special Sessions, charged with a violation of the provisions of subdivision 5 of section 70 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York, in that he operated a motor vehicle: "in a parking lot * * * rear of 536 Beach 22nd Street, Far Rockaway, and on New Haven Avenue, a public highway in the County of Queens, City and State of New York, while he was in an intoxicated condition."

The People adduced no proof that the defendant operated the automobile in question "on New Haven Avenue, a public highway in the County of Queens," and the question is, therefore, directly posed as to whether the defendant may be found guilty of a violation of subdivision 5 of section 70 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for operating a motor vehicle in a privately owned parking lot in the rear of the apartment house at 536 Beach 22nd Street.

At the conclusion of the entire case the court was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated the automobile in question in the parking lot "while he was in an intoxicated condition", and so stated. Decision was reserved on whether, as a matter of law, the subdivision in question covered the driving of a motor vehicle on private property under the circumstances here present. The defendant contends that "violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law can be had only for acts committed on a public highway or in public areas."

Subdivision 5 of section 70 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, so far as here material, reads as follows: "Operating motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition. Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

The first legislative recognition of a motor vehicle appeared slightly over fifty years ago when by chapter 531 of the Laws of 1901 the definition of a "carriage" as included in the Highway Law was amended to include "automobiles or motor vehicles * * * and all other vehicles propelled * * * by electricity, steam, gasoline, or other source of energy."

In 1929 by the enactment of chapter 54 of the Laws of 1929, the modern Vehicle and Traffic Law was consolidated into one act (Consolidated Laws, ch. 71).

The rapid growth of the use of automobiles is so well known as not to require discourse, but the citation of some figures may be in order. In 1901 only 954 vehicles were registered by the Secretary of State; in 1925, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles issued a total of 1,635,337 registrations of all types; in 1950, the total of all registrations had grown to 3,882,155. The picture is similar as to drivers' licenses. In 1903 the Secretary of State issued licenses to 2,383 chauffeurs; in 1925, the year after operators' licenses were required State-wide, the commissioner licensed 1,953,988 drivers. On December 31, 1950, there was a total of 5,289,991 licenses in force.

The registration of motor vehicles and of licensed operators and chauffeurs running into the millions makes it manifest that the State has a vital interest in legislating with respect to the proper operation and management of motor vehicles. Their capacity for harm when improperly operated is unquestionable. Under the circumstances a construction which would unduly limit the applicability of the driving-while-intoxicated section of the Motor Vehicle Law should not be countenanced unless directly required by the language of the statute or the intention of the Legislature as evidenced therein.

The facts in this case highlight that conclusion. The parking lot in question was adjacent to and was provided for use by the occupants and visitors to the apartment house at 536 Beach 22nd Street, Far Rockaway, in the borough of Queens, city and State of New York. Thus, it was open to the use of the public and in truth and in fact, even though not in law, an extension of the public highway. Persons using a parking lot require just as much protection from drunken drivers as do those on public sidewalks and highways.

It is obvious from a reading of the section "Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle while in an intoxicated condition" that no requirement is therein contained that the place where the defendant must be operating a motor vehicle before he can be found guilty of driving while in an intoxicated condition is on a public highway, and the question is whether such a limitation must be read into the statute.

There are many provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which by their very terms are limited to operation of vehicles while on the public highway, which, by subdivision 2 of section 2, is defined as including "any highway, road, street, avenue, alley, public place, public driveway or any other public way."

Thus, subdivision 1 of section 11 provides that "No motor vehicle shall be operated or driven upon the public highways of this state without first being registered"; subdivision 14 of section 11 deals with vehicles "operated upon public highways connecting farms or portions of a farm"; subdivision 1 of section 12 prohibits the operation of "a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state unless such motor vehicle shall have a distinctive number assigned to it"; subdivision 3 of section 12 prohibits the drawing of "a trailer on the public highways of the state, unless such trailer shall have a distinctive number assigned to it"; (emphasis ours). Other similar instances of specific limitations to the public highways of the State by affirmative recitation in their very provisions are found in subdivision 4 of section 12, and sections 14, 15, 17, 20, 51, 56, 58 and 59.

It is thus obvious that the Legislature when it meant to limit the applicability of any particular sections of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to the public highways said so in so many words. If it had intended to so limit the effect of subdivision 5 of section 70 it could have very easily have done so by using the same phraseology employed in the section set forth and cited above. Not having done so, the section should be given the full effect and intent of its apparent meaning and should not be so interpreted as to destroy or limit the very purpose for which the statute was enacted. (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes [1942 ed.], §§ 148, 276; 61 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, § 625). This court has been unable to find any appellate court decision in this State which deals with or passes upon the question here at issue, and recourse has, therefore, been had to decisions of other States having statutes similar to ours.

Wherever the question has come up for decision, the appellate courts in other States, have uniformly followed the rule laid down (42 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, § 1294) that, "The essential elements of the offense, under a statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle upon any public street or highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, are: (1) Driving an automobile (2) upon a public street and (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. However, a statute which merely provides that no person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition does not require, as an element of the offense, that the driving should be done on a public highway." (Emphasis ours.)

In passing on a statute which is almost a verbatim replica of our own, and which reads "Whoever operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition is guilty of a misdemeanor," the highest court of Alabama in O'Reilly v. State, 235 Ala. 328, 329 said: "Under the terms of this statute, enacted by the Legislature in the exercise of the police power, the place of operation is not made an element of the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

In State v. Carroll (225 Minn. 384) the driving-while-intoxicated statute was also similar to our own. In affirming a judgment of conviction thereunder, the court said (p. 386): "It would be absurd to say that a person driving or operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs was not guilty of a violation of the statute under consideration merely because at the moment such person was stopped or apprehended he happened to be either on or near a private roadway instead of on a public street or highway, because no one can say when such a person, while in a confused or befuddled state of mind as a...