People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 22 March 2011
• Citation: 920 N.Y.S.2d 154,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 02429,82 A.D.3d 1133
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,v.Darrell TAYLOR, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

82 A.D.3d 1133

920 N.Y.S.2d 154

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 02429

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Darrell TAYLOR, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 22, 2011.

Joseph R. Faraguna, Sag Harbor, N.Y., for appellant.Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Michael Blakey of counsel; Gregory Zak on the brief), for respondent.MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (R. Doyle, J.), rendered February 4, 2008, convicting him of gang assault in the first degree and assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials. The Supreme Court properly found that the defendant's initial statements to police officers when they first encountered him, and after he and his brother followed the officers back to their car, were admissible since the defendant was not then in custody. The record reveals that the defendant would reasonably have believed that he was free to leave the presence of the police at those times ( see People v. Brown, 295 A.D.2d 442, 443, 743 N.Y.S.2d 313). The defendant's subsequent statements to a police sergeant, made as he sat handcuffed in a police car, were also admissible since the record demonstrates that those statements were spontaneous and not the product of police interrogation or its functional equivalent ( see People v. Fernandes, 62 A.D.3d 721, 721, 878 N.Y.S.2d 418; People v. Patterson, 48 A.D.3d 487, 488, 849 N.Y.S.2d 798; see also People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 294–295, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295, 401 N.E.2d 405). Furthermore, the defendant's oral and written statements to a detective at the police precinct were admissible since they were made after he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights ( see People v. Latimer, 75 A.D.3d 562, 563, 904 N.Y.S.2d 763; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).

The defendant's challenge to the racial composition of the jury panel was waived by his failure to make that challenge in writing prior to the selection of the jury ( see CPL 270.10[2]; People v. Messiah, 247 A.D.2d 490, 491, 668 N.Y.S.2d 94; People v. Branch, 244 A.D.2d 562, 562, 665 N.Y.S.2d 674; People v. Battle, 221 A.D.2d 648, 648, 634 N.Y.S.2d 192).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions of gang assault in the first degree and assault in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. LaGuerre, 29 A.D.3d 820, 821, 815 N.Y.S.2d 211). In any event, viewing...