People v. Taylor

Decision Date23 January 2015
Docket NumberNo. 117267.,117267.
Citation25 N.E.3d 627
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Johnny TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Paul Alexander Rogers, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and

Garson S. Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Chief Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, one count of evading arrest, and one count of reckless driving. He pled guilty to one count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the other charges and to recommend a maximum sentence of 30 years. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, including a statutorily mandated 15–year sentencing enhancement for possession of the firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2), (b) (West 2004). Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The circuit court denied his motion and the appellate court affirmed.

¶ 2 In 2011, defendant filed a postconviction petition, which the circuit court of Macoupin County dismissed. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence as unconstitutional. The appellate court, following this court's decision in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007), found the 15–year sentencing enhancement to be a violation of the proportionate penalties clause. People v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (4th) 110633–U, ¶ 15, 2012 WL 7018251. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the postconviction petition and remanded the case to the circuit court. Id. ¶ 23. The State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied the petition but issued a supervisory order instructing the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider the validity of the sentence in light of two more recent decisions, People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, 369 Ill.Dec. 126, 986 N.E.2d 75, and People v. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, 371 Ill.Dec. 173, 989 N.E.2d 1101. People v. Taylor, No. 115416, 372 Ill.Dec. 462, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. May 29, 2013) (supervisory order). The appellate court vacated its decision and upheld the sentence, finding the enhancement constitutional under Blair. 2013 IL App (4th) 110633–UB, ¶ 7, 2013 WL 5658293. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). For the following reasons, we reverse the appellate court's determination that the sentence was constitutional and remand to the circuit court for resentencing in accordance with the statute.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At the sentencing hearing, Louis Nowell, manager of a fast-food restaurant, testified that on August 4, 2005, a woman entered his restaurant with a “skully cap” over her face, pointed a gun at him, and demanded cash. Nowell acquiesced and the woman exited the restaurant with $366. Nowell telephoned the police and watched as the woman entered a vehicle driven by defendant. Nowell then identified the vehicle to the police, who began to follow the vehicle. According to police officer Ryan Ray, who also testified, defendant refused to stop the vehicle when approached by police, and a chase ensued. At multiple points during the chase, the woman shot at the police car, and defendant drove through police blockades. Eventually, defendant lost control of the vehicle and crashed in a wooded area. Both the woman and defendant were arrested.

¶ 5 Defendant was charged by information with two counts of armed robbery on a theory of accountability, one count of evading arrest, and one count of reckless driving. After discovery was completed and the woman convicted and sentenced to 26 years in prison, defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement with the State's Attorney. He pled guilty to one count of armed robbery with a firearm. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a sentence not longer than 30 years.

¶ 6 Armed robbery is classified as a Class X felony subject to a 15–year sentencing enhancement if the defendant committed the crime while in possession of a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2), (b) (West 2004). A Class X felony conviction carries a statutory sentence of 6 to 30 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2004). At the sentencing hearing, the parties debated whether the sentencing enhancement applied when a defendant was charged under a theory of accountability. After hearing from the parties and reviewing the plea agreement with defendant, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 24 years in prison, including the 15–year enhancement.

¶ 7 Defendant filed a posttrial motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied. The appellate court affirmed. In 2011, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to section 122–1 of the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 2010) ), which was also dismissed. On appeal, the court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. In his amended brief, defendant for the first time argued that the 15–year enhancement violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ), and sought to vacate his guilty plea on this basis. In 2007, this court found that the 15–year sentencing enhancement did violate the proportionate penalties clause. People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007). In light of this decision, the appellate court found defendant's sentence void and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his plea. Taylor, 2012 IL App (4th) 110633–U, ¶ 23, 2012 WL 7018251.

¶ 8 The State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied the State's petition but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider the sentence in light of two more recent decisions, People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, 369 Ill.Dec. 126, 986 N.E.2d 75, and People v. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, 371 Ill.Dec. 173, 989 N.E.2d 1101. People v.Taylor, No. 115416, 372 Ill.Dec. 462, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. May 29, 2013) (supervisory order). In Blair, we concluded that Public Act 95–688, enacted shortly after our decision in Hauschild, corrected the proportionate penalties clause violation and rendered the 15–year enhancement constitutional. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 27, 369 Ill.Dec. 126, 986 N.E.2d 75. The appellate court applied the Blair conclusion retroactively, held that the enhancement as applied to defendant was constitutional and valid, thus affirming the circuit court's 24–year sentence. 2013 IL App (4th) 110633–UB, ¶ 24, 2013 WL 5658293. In Donelson, we held that when a sentence fails to meet the statutory requirements, the court should restructure the sentence so that it meets those requirements as well as the expectations of the parties to a plea bargain. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, ¶ 29, 371 Ill.Dec. 173, 989 N.E.2d 1101. The appellate court found Donelson to be irrelevant. 2013 IL App (4th) 113633–UB, ¶ 8, 2013 WL 5658293. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal to this court, defendant argues that the appellate court erred in concluding that Public Act 95–688 retroactively rendered the sentencing enhancement constitutional. The State now concedes that the sentencing enhancement was unconstitutional as applied to defendant, as Public Act 95–688 did not correct the proportionate penalties clause violation until 2007, two years after defendant committed the crime. On this basis defendant argues that this court ought to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, reduce his sentence by 15 years, or cap the sentence on remand at 24 years. However, defendant abandoned his request to withdraw the guilty plea in his reply brief to this court. The State argues this court should remand to the circuit court for resentencing subject to the statutory sentencing range, 6 to 30 years.

¶ 11 We first review whether the sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause and is thus void, then turn to the question of remedy. Whether a sentence is constitutional and whether a sentence is void are questions of law, which we review de novo. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d at 72, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 486–87, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005).

¶ 12 Constitutionality of the Fifteen–Year Sentencing Enhancement

¶ 13 Defendant was sentenced under section 18–2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides that armed robbery committed while the perpetrator “carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm” is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. 720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2), (b) (West 2004). Defendant concedes that the enhancement applies to defendants convicted under a theory of accountability. See People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill.2d 285, 294, 322 Ill.Dec. 563, 891 N.E.2d 854 (2008).

¶ 14 In People v. Hauschild, we found that this sentencing structure violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d at 86–87, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1. The proportionate penalties clause requires that [a]ll penalties * * * be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. ‘The identical elements test is an appropriate form of proportionality review.’ Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d at 83, 312 Ill.Dec. 601, 871 N.E.2d 1 (quoting People v. Harvey, 366 Ill.App.3d 119, 133, 303 Ill.Dec. 284, 851 N.E.2d 182 (2006) ). Under this...

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  • People v. Ligon
    • United States
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    • February 19, 2016
    ...(citing Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 14, 360 Ill.Dec. 293, 968 N.E.2d 1046 ); see also People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶¶ 16–17, 388 Ill.Dec. 935, 25 N.E.3d 627 (reaffirming the holdings in Hauschild and Clemons that offenses such as robbery and vehicular hijacking were eligible to serve as......
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    ...sentence, there was no sentence that was subject to “resentencing.” See also People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 29, 388 Ill.Dec. 935, 25 N.E.3d 627 (noting that section 5–5–4 does not apply if the original sentence was determined to be void); cf. People v. Donelson, 2013 IL 113603, ¶ 29, 3......
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    ...Public Act 95–688 did not retroactively correct the proportionate penalties violation. People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 36, 388 Ill.Dec. 935, 25 N.E.3d 627. Consequently, defendant's 2003 armed robbery sentence, which did not include the firearm sentencing enhancement, is not void becaus......
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