People v. Thomas

Decision Date06 February 2020
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 16CA0107
Citation490 P.3d 569
CourtColorado Court of Appeals
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Weston Jefferson THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jacob B. McMahon, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Taubman and Grove, JJ., concur

Opinion by JUDGE CARPARELLI*

¶ 1 Defendant, Weston Jefferson Thomas, appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of third degree assault (a class 6 felony), resisting arrest (a class 2 misdemeanor), and negligent bodily injury to an at-risk adult (a class 6 felony). He also appeals his adjudication and sentencing as a habitual criminal. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 Thomas lived in a trailer on the victim's property. According to the victim, she went to Thomas's trailer after receiving complaints that Thomas was being loud and disruptive. When she did so, Thomas grabbed her by the neck with two hands and slammed her into a nearby parked car. During the altercation, Thomas yelled at the victim that she "didn't belong in this world."

¶ 3 S.F., who lived in a nearby trailer, testified that he came out of his trailer when he heard a ruckus. He said he saw Thomas with two hands around the victim's neck, holding her up against a parked car, and yelling that she did not "need to be in this world." S.F. further testified that he separated Thomas from the victim and restrained him on the ground until the police arrived. When the police arrived, they arrested Thomas. As they attempted to handcuff him, Thomas resisted their efforts by flailing his arms. As they attempted to put him in the patrol car, he resisted their efforts by going limp.

¶ 4 At trial, the evidence centered on Thomas's and the victim's conflicting testimony. The jury found Thomas guilty of third degree assault, negligent bodily injury to an at-risk adult, and resisting arrest.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Thomas's Conviction for Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest

¶ 5 Count 2 of the amended complaint and information alleged that Thomas resisted arrest by using means that "created a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the peace officer or another; in violation of section 18-8-103 [(1)(b)], C.R.S. [2019]." Thomas contends his conviction should be reversed because

(1) his conduct after he was handcuffed cannot properly be considered to prove the offense of resisting arrest;
(2) the physical condition of the area in which he was handcuffed and carried to the patrol car cannot properly be considered to prove that he created a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the arresting officer; and
(3) there is insufficient evidence that his conduct created a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the arresting officer.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Thomas of resisting arrest.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 6 We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v. Perez , 2016 CO 12, ¶ 8, 367 P.3d 695. To determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, we evaluate whether the evidence, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 24. In doing so, we give the prosecution "the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be fairly drawn from the evidence." People v. Davis , 2012 COA 56, ¶ 12, 296 P.3d 219.

¶ 7 A person is guilty of resisting arrest as a class 2 misdemeanor when "he knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer, acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest" by, among other things, using "means which create[ ] a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the peace officer or another." § 18-8-103(1)(b).

B. The Evidence

¶ 8 One of the responding officers testified that he told Thomas he was under arrest and instructed him to put his hands behind his back. According to the officer, as he attempted to put the handcuffs on, Thomas struggled and kept pulling his arms away. As that officer tried to grab one of Thomas's arms, a second officer tried to grab the other arm.

¶ 9 The responding officer also testified that the area in which he handcuffed Thomas was run down and had debris lying all over the ground. He explained that it was a place where the police were required to step over the debris. The officer testified that as he tried to walk Thomas to the patrol car, Thomas went limp and the other officer had to help carry Thomas approximately twenty feet to the car. He testified that he watched his steps so he would not fall, trying to walk Thomas back to the patrol car, stepping over debris, and preventing Thomas from pulling away from him and fighting him.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Thomas admitted that he did not want to be arrested and resisted "a little." He also described the area in which he was handcuffed and taken to the car as having "broken glass, and TVs and microwaves, things like that" on the ground. He admitted that if the officer had fallen on the ground, he could have been injured. Thomas further agreed that "going limp when somebody is trying to arrest you could easily cause them to fall down[.]" He testified that because he "was shook up from being jumped, and wanting to be with [his] dog," he "wasn't really thinking about" the risks that his actions posed to the responding officers.

C. Physical Condition of Surrounding Area Properly Considered

¶ 11 We reject Thomas's contention that the physical condition of the area in which he was handcuffed and carried to the patrol car cannot properly be considered to prove that he created a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officer. This argument is contrary to logic and the plain meaning of the statute.

¶ 12 As pertinent here, a person commits resisting arrest when he knowingly attempts to prevent a peace officer, acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest of him or another, by:

(a) Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace officer or another; or
(b) Using any other means which creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the peace officer or another.

§ 18-8-103(1).

¶ 13 We review the application of statutes de novo. Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. , 2012 CO 54, ¶ 68, 285 P.3d 986. When the statutory language is clear, we apply its plain and ordinary meaning in a manner that gives effect to the General Assembly's intent, and we construe each provision in the context of the statute "as a whole to give ‘consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all [parts of the statute].’ " Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Costilla Cty. Conservancy Dist. , 88 P.3d 1188, 1192-93 (Colo. 2004) (quoting People v. Luther , 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo. 2002) ); accord Lobato v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 105 P.3d 220, 223 (Colo. 2005). And, in so doing, we must not apply the statute in a manner that renders any part of it meaningless or absurd or in a manner that leads to an illogical or absurd result. State v. Nieto , 993 P.2d 493, 501 (Colo. 2000) ; Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2012 COA 160M, ¶ 9, 305 P.3d 409.

¶ 14 Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of section 18-8-103 provide distinct ways in which a person can commit resisting arrest. Subsection (1)(a) is plainly limited to the use or threat of physical force or violence against an arresting officer. Implicit in this description is that the accused knowingly attempted to prevent arrest by causing or threatening to cause bodily injury either by physical contact or an instrument of force or violence. In contrast, subsection (1)(b) explicitly pertains to means other than the use or threat of physical force and requires only that the other means create a substantial risk of bodily injury.

¶ 15 Considering the two subsections together, we perceive nothing in the plain language of the statute dictating that "other means" cannot include conduct that puts an officer at risk of injury by falling or contacting nearby objects or conditions. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury could properly consider evidence of the physical surroundings in which Thomas was handcuffed and transported to the patrol car.

D. Conduct When Handcuffed Sufficient

¶ 16 As the first officer tried to handcuff Thomas, (1) Thomas struggled and kept pulling his arms away, (2) a second officer was needed to try to grab the other arm, (3) there was "broken glass, and TVs and microwaves" on the ground, and (4) Thomas knew that the officers could have been injured if they fell into the debris. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that Thomas attempted to prevent the officers from initiating an arrest by means that created a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the officers.

E. Conduct After Handcuffing Properly Considered

¶ 17 Thomas contends that the arrest was completed when he was handcuffed and that his conduct after that, including his resistance to being transported to the patrol car, cannot properly be considered to prove the offense of resisting arrest. We are not persuaded.

¶ 18 To "effect an arrest, the peace officer must apply a level of physical control over the person resisting the arrest so as to reasonably ensure that the person does not leave ." People v. Armstrong , 720 P.2d 165, 169 (Colo. 1986) (emphases added).

¶ 19 The police told Thomas he was under arrest, and, by placing handcuffs on him, the police exercised a level of physical control over him. At that point, a reasonable person in Thomas's situation "would necessarily believe that he was being placed under arrest," was not free...

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