People v. Thomas, 335071
| Decision Date | 25 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 335071,No. 335669,335071,335669 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIAH THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEBRIE CROSS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: MURRAY, C.J., and BORRELLO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
In these consolidated appeals, defendants Mariah Thomas and Jebrie Cross each appeal as of right their convictions arising from an offense involving the firebombing of a house. Two persons died in the house fire and a third victim survived. Defendants were tried separately, each before a jury. The juries convicted each defendant of two counts of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and one count of first-degree arson, MCL 750.72. In addition, Thomas was convicted of an additional count of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and Cross was convicted of an additional count of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. The trial court sentenced Thomas to life imprisonment without parole for each murder convictions, and a parolable life term for the assault conviction. The court sentenced Cross as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life imprisonment without parole for each murder conviction and 10 to 20 years in prison for the assault conviction. We affirm in each appeal.
Defendants' convictions arise from their involvement in the firebombing of a house that led to the deaths of Jana John (Jana) and James Jordan (James). A third occupant of the house, Jalen John (Jalen), suffered fire-related injuries, but survived. Jana and James had been dating for a short period before the fire. James was Thomas's former boyfriend and the father of Thomas's child. On December 13, 2015, Thomas and codefendant Daquana Williams were driving by Jana's home and saw both James and Jana on the porch outside the house. Thomas stopped her vehicle, following which both she and Williams became involved in a verbal and physical confrontation with Jana, James, and Jana's sister. Williams sustained facial injuries from being assaulted by Jana and her sister. According to witnesses, Thomas and Williams left the house after the police were called, but Thomas threatened to return later and "shoot the place up."
The prosecution's theory of the case was that after Thomas and Williams left, they recruited others, including defendant Cross, to join them in returning to Jana's home to retaliate for the earlier assault. Before returning to Jana's house, Thomas, who was driving the group in her vehicle, stopped at a gas station. Defendant Cross then filled at least one, and up to three, bottles with gasoline. The group parked a few blocks away from Jana's house and approached on foot. One or more lighted glass bottles containing gasoline were thrown at the house, causing an intense, rapidly spreading house fire. Jana and James, who were asleep in an upstairs bedroom, died of smoke inhalation and burns. Jana's brother, who was asleep in the living room, suffered injuries from the fire but survived. Fearing retaliation from the fight, other family members who resided at the house had left earlier and spent the night at a hotel.
A codefendant, Tre'era Davis, who was present when the firebombing occurred, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and testified at trial. Davis testified that Cross made statements in the car as they drove to the victims' house about firebombing in particular that he planned to throw a bottle of gasoline at the house to get the victims to run out. Davis testified that she saw only Cross throw a bottle at the house. Afterward, however, when they were discussing the incident, Davis heard Thomas say that both she and Cross had thrown bottles at the house.
Thomas testified at her trial and admitted being involved in the earlier fight, but denied that she wanted to return to the house to continue the confrontation. She also denied that she ever intended to firebomb the house and denied knowing that Cross had filled any bottles with gasoline. Thomas testified that it was Cross who wanted to return to the house after he saw the injuries to Williams, and she claimed that she was forced to go along with the others. The jury also heard Thomas's statement to the police, in which she stated that they bought the gasoline because Cross was going to "cocktail" the victims' house, but this was supposed to occur after the group fought the women who assaulted Thomas and Williams earlier. Thomas testified at trial that she did not know about the plan to firebomb the house and only learned afterward that Cross had thrown a lighted bottle with gasoline at the house.
At Cross's trial, the jury heard his statement to the police, in which he described Thomas's plan to firebomb the victims' house. Cross stated that he did not see who threw the bottles at the home, and he denied that he threw any bottles himself.
Thomas argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder as a necessarily included lesser offense. We disagree. We review a trial court's determination whether a jury instruction applies to the facts of a case for an abuse of discretion. People v Mitchell, 301 Mich App 282, 286; 835 NW2d 615 (2013). To the extent that Thomas raises a question of law, including whether her right to due process was violated, our review is de novo. People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 40; 780 NW2d 265 (2010).
The trial court declined to instruct the jury on second-degree murder, reasoning as follows:
Thomas correctly observes that second-degree murder is a necessarily included lesser offense to felony murder. People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 257; 732 NW2d 605 (2007). Moreover, the trial court properly recognized that an instruction on second-degree is not automatically required in a felony-murder prosecution simply because it was requested. Instead, "a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it." People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 69; 731 NW2d 411 (2007).
Second-degree murder and felony murder both require (1) that the defendant caused the death of another person; and (2) malice, which is "the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 176; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). The element that distinguishes felony murder from second-degree murder is that for felony murder, the death must have occurred during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony, one of which is arson. Clark, 274 Mich App at 257; MCL 750.316(1)(b).
Therefore, an instruction on second-degree murder would have been appropriate only if a rational view of the evidence could establish malice without relying on the predicate felony. Here, the prosecution relied exclusively on the evidence of the arson to establish malice. Thomas claimed that she went to the house only intending to fight the women there in retaliation for the earlier assault against her and Williams. However, there was no evidence that Thomas or any of the others who were with her attempted to confront the occupants of the house before the house ignited. Conversely, there was substantial evidence that Thomas: (1) recruited the others to join her in returning to the victims' house, (2) drove, (3) stopped at the gas station where the gasoline used to make the Molotov cocktail was purchased, (4) knew that Cross intended to throw the Molotov cocktail at the house, and (5) may have thrown a gasoline-filled bottle herself. Because the only logical theories of malice revolve around Thomas' commission of arson, the predicate felony required for her felony murder conviction, the trial court was correct in its finding that an instruction on second-degree murder was unnecessary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder.
Furthermore, even if the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on second-degree murder, the error was harmless. People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994). Thomas argues that the jury might conceivably have found that she did not commit, or aid or abet in the commission of, arson; and found instead that she acted in wanton and willful disregard of human life sufficient to establish culpability for second-degree murder. However, the jury did convict Thomas of arson, showing that the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence of Thomas's guilt. Because the jury found that the predicate felony was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, any error in failing to give an instruction on second-degree murder was harmless.
Defendant Thomas raises additional issues in a supplemental...
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