People v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 20 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 90216.,90216.
• Citation: 759 N.E.2d 899,198 Ill.2d 103,259 Ill.Dec. 838
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Bruce THOMAS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

759 N.E.2d 899

198 Ill.2d 103

259 Ill.Dec. 838

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Bruce THOMAS, Appellant.

No. 90216.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 20, 2001.

Rehearing Denied December 3, 2001.

Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, and Robert S. Burke, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Gary Duncan, State's Attorney, Mt. Vernon (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), and Iain D. Pedden, law student, for the People.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Bruce Thomas, was charged in the circuit court of Jefferson County with one count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998). Defendant moved to suppress evidence of purported cocaine that police seized from him during a "pat-down" search. The circuit court granted the motion. The State appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the suppression order. 315 Ill. App.3d 849, 248 Ill.Dec. 724, 734 N.E.2d 1015. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

The following evidence was adduced at the suppression hearing. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on June 20, 1998, defendant was riding his bicycle on Tenth Street near Bell or Herbert Avenue in Mt. Vernon. He rode past Mt. Vernon police officer Farrin Melton, who was completing the issuance of a traffic ticket. Officer Melton noticed that defendant was holding a police scanner that permits a listener to monitor police radio transmissions.

Officer Melton had previously arrested defendant for drug offenses. Officer Melton had recently learned of defendant's release from prison. Also, Melton had heard of a confidential informant's tip that defendant was using his bicycle to deliver illegal drugs, most often in the evening.

Based on this knowledge and defendant's possession of a police scanner, Officer Melton drove after defendant to speak with him "about his activities." Upon finding defendant, Officer Melton radioed Officer Steven Burtnett and announced his intention to stop defendant and conduct a "field interview." Defendant heard the communication on the police scanner. Officer Melton overtook and passed defendant; he did not activate his emergency lights or instruct defendant to stop. Officer Melton positioned his squad car across defendant's path. Defendant abruptly turned into an alleyway and departed the area at an accelerated pace. Since Officer Melton was still behind the wheel of his car, he had no opportunity to verbally compel a stop.

At that point, Officer Burtnett was following Officer Melton and saw defendant's evasion. He was first to pursue defendant down the alley. Officer Burtnett overtook defendant, pulled his squad car alongside, lowered a window and directed defendant to stop. Defendant asked Officer Burtnett what he wanted. Before Officer Burtnett could answer, defendant changed direction and accelerated.

Officer Burtnett activated his emergency lights and, joined by Officer Melton, gave chase. Defendant eventually abandoned his bicycle and fled into a field. Officer Melton exited his squad car and pursued defendant on foot. The officer announced his office and ordered defendant to stop. Defendant became tangled in high grass, enabling Officer Melton to capture and arrest him for obstructing a police officer. Officer Melton conducted a "pat-down" search to determine if defendant was carrying a weapon. He recovered from defendant's pants pocket what appeared to be three rocks of crack cocaine. Officer Melton conceded that it was not illegal for defendant to possess a police scanner and admitted that he had no information that defendant was carrying illegal drugs on the night in question.

Defendant was initially charged with obstructing a police officer and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was eventually indicted on one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. See 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998). Defendant moved to suppress the purported cocaine that Officer Melton recovered from defendant's pants pocket and bar its use as evidence. Defendant argued that he was not violating any laws when he was detained.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed the circuit's court suppression order. The court held that defendant's flight corrected Officer Melton's ungrounded suspicion, upon which he based his initial, unwarranted attempt to stop defendant. 315 Ill. App.3d at 858, 248 Ill.Dec. 724, 734 N.E.2d 1015. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Generally, a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to reversal only if it is clearly or manifestly erroneous. People v. Foskey, 136 Ill.2d 66, 76, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192 (1990). This test is based on the understanding that suppression motions usually raise mixed questions of law and fact: a court first weighs the evidence and determines the facts surrounding the complained-of conduct, after which it decides whether, as a matter of law, these facts constitute an unconstitutional seizure. People v. Shapiro, 177 Ill.2d 519, 524, 227 Ill.Dec. 142, 687 N.E.2d 65 (1997). However, where, as here, neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is contested, the determination of whether there is reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory stop is a legal question which a reviewing court may consider de novo. See Foskey, 136 Ill.2d at 76, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192.

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. This provision applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1975); People v. Smithers, 83 Ill.2d 430, 433-34, 47 Ill.Dec. 322, 415 N.E.2d 327 (1980). Reasonableness under the fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d 257, 262, 227 Ill.Dec. 933, 688 N.E.2d 626 (1997); People v. Long, 99 Ill.2d 219, 227, 75 Ill.Dec. 693, 457 N.E.2d 1252 (1983).

However, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the traditional probable cause requirement. In Terry, the Court held that a police officer, under appropriate circumstances, could briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes. Under the Terry exception, a police officer may briefly stop a person for temporary questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906-07; Flowers, 179 Ill.2d at 262, 227 Ill.Dec. 933, 688 N.E.2d 626; Smithers, 83 Ill.2d at 434, 47 Ill.Dec. 322, 415 N.E.2d 327.

Whether an investigatory stop is valid is a separate question from whether a search for weapons is valid. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d at 263, 227 Ill.Dec. 933, 688 N.E.2d 626. The conduct constituting the stop under Terry must have been justified at its inception. A court objectively considers whether, based on the facts available to the police officer, the police action was appropriate. To justify the intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905-06; Long, 99 Ill.2d at 227-28, 75 Ill.Dec. 693, 457 N.E.2d 1252.

The Terry standards have been codified in our Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d at 262,227 Ill.Dec. 933,688 N.E.2d 626; Long, 99 Ill.2d at 228,75 Ill.Dec. 693,457 N.E.2d 1252. Section 107-14 of the Code provides, in pertinent part: "A peace officer * * * may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense * * *." 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 1998). The same standard is applied in determining the propriety of an investigatory stop under article I, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6). See People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 241-45, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984) (the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Illinois Constitution is measured by the same standards as are used in defining the protections contained in the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution).

In interpreting the above principles, this court has further defined the reasonableness standard for police conduct in the context of a Terry stop. Viewed as a whole, the situation confronting the police officer must be so far from the ordinary that any competent officer would be expected to act quickly. The facts supporting the officer's suspicions need not meet probable cause requirements, but they must justify more than a mere hunch. The facts should not be viewed with analytical hindsight, but instead should be considered from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time that the situation confronted him or her. Long, 99 Ill.2d at 228-29, 75 Ill.Dec. 693, 457 N.E.2d 1252 (and cases cited therein).

Defendant's sole contention is that Officer Melton effected the investigatory stop without having the requisite degree of suspicion to support it. We agree with the appellate court that Officer Melton's initial conduct constituted an unwarranted...