People v. Triplett, Court of Appeals No. 13CA1736

• Decision Date: 02 June 2016
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 13CA1736
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Justin TRIPLETT, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

411 P.3d 1054

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Justin TRIPLETT, Defendant–Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 13CA1736

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. A.

Announced June 2, 2016

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB

¶ 1 Defendant, Justin Triplett, appeals his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Triplett's motion to suppress evidence. At the time the charged offense was committed, Triplett was an offender residing in the Mesa County residential community corrections facility. He contends on appeal that a vial of drugs was found in his clothing as the result of an unconstitutional search and that statements he made to law enforcement after being confronted with the illegally obtained evidence should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree" and as involuntary.

¶ 2 To address Triplett's arguments, we must determine, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, whether his status as a residential community corrections offender entitled him to a greater expectation of privacy than that of traditional, incarcerated offenders. Under the circumstances here, we conclude that it did not and that, therefore, the search of his clothing was legal and his subsequent statements to law enforcement officials were not tainted nor were they involuntary. Thus, we affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶ 3 All of the facts below are taken from the transcript of the suppression hearing, the trial court's findings of fact, and defendant's motion to suppress. Moody v. People , 159 P.3d 611, 617 (Colo.2007) (when reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, an appellate court must only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing); see also People v. Gomez–Garcia , 224 P.3d 1019, 1022 (Colo.App.2009).

¶ 4 At the time of the alleged offenses, Triplett was serving the remainder of a Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) sentence ¹ at a residential community corrections facility. As a "client" at this facility, he was able to obtain passes to leave the premises for work and other approved activities. However, he lived at the facility and was required to remain on the premises if he did not have a valid pass and to return each time his pass expired.

¶ 5 While Triplett was showering in the bathroom located off of the facility's community room, a community justice officer,² Daniel Wells, entered the bathroom to conduct a routine cleanliness inspection. When Wells saw Triplett's clothing hanging next to the shower, he decided to conduct a random unscheduled search of the clothing. Wells found a vial of off-white powder in Triplett's sock, which was in the pocket of his pants. Triplett's inmate identification card was in the other pants pocket.

¶ 6 Upon finding the vial, Wells consulted with Triplett's case manager, who advised Wells to bring Triplett to a problem solving technique (PST) room after his shower. In a conversation with three community corrections personnel,³ Triplett stated that he bought what he believed to be Adderall from a coworker, that he had taken Adderall in pill form while in the facility, and that he had crushed the remaining pills into a powder.

¶ 7 The case manager asked Triplett if he wanted to write a statement, and Triplett responded that he did. Triplett made a written statement of the incident on a template routinely provided to community corrections clients.

¶ 8 Triplett was left alone in the room with a clipboard to write his statement. The door was shut and Triplett knew that he could not open it from the inside. While he was writing his statement, a police officer, Chris Kopp, arrived at the facility. Kopp was dispatched on a request to test an unknown substance, but upon arriving, he realized that the facility's officials wished to proceed with charges against Triplett.

¶ 9 Kopp waited until Triplett had finished writing his statement before entering the PST room. When he entered the PST room, he advised Triplett of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and asked Triplett if he wanted to talk about what had happened. Triplett paused briefly and then began telling the officer what had happened, namely that he had purchased Adderall from a coworker and had taken the pills twice and then crushed the remaining pills into a powder.

¶ 10 The powder was tested at a lab and was identified as methylphenidate, a schedule II controlled substance. The prosecution charged Triplett with introducing contraband in the first degree and possession of a controlled substance—schedule II—four grams or less.

¶ 11 Prior to trial, Triplett moved to suppress the vial of powder, arguing that it had been obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the search was not based on a warrant or any individualized or reasonable suspicion. Triplett also moved to suppress his statements to community corrections personnel and Kopp. The trial court held a suppression hearing and issued a written order denying Triplett's motion.

¶ 12 At a bench trial, the prosecution proffered and the court admitted into evidence the vial of powder, the lab results on the powder, and Triplett's statements to Kopp. The court acquitted Triplett of introducing contraband, but it found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The court sentenced Triplett to two years of unsupervised probation. This appeal followed.

II. Suppression Hearing and Order

¶ 13 Because we are limited to the facts and evidence presented at the hearing and the court's application of the law to those facts, we set out the details of the motion, hearing, and court order below. Moody , 159 P.3d at 617 ; Gomez–Garcia , 224 P.3d at 1022.

A. Triplett's Motion

¶ 14 In his motion, Triplett argued that he had a greater expectation of privacy than an incarcerated inmate because of his status as a community corrections offender. Thus, he argued, the search was required to be based, at the very least, on a warrant or individualized or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. He also asserted that his statements to the community corrections personnel and Kopp should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree or, in the alternative, as involuntary statements in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

B. The Suppression Hearing

¶ 15 The evidence showed that Triplett was referred to the Mesa County community corrections program by the DOC. At the time of the hearing and during his stay in community corrections, Triplett was an "inmate" searchable on the DOC inmate database. Moreover, a manager of the Mesa County Criminal Justice Department (the manager) testified on cross-examination that Triplett was considered an inmate within the DOC while residing at the facility.

¶ 16 The community corrections facility where Triplett lived was referred to as a "detention facility." As an offender in a residential program, Triplett could request passes to leave the facility for work and other authorized activities, but if he left without a pass or failed to return before the pass expired, he was subject to escape charges; Triplett could not lawfully leave the facility whenever he chose. On the day of the search and interrogations, Triplett did not have a pass and was not free to lawfully leave the facility.

¶ 17 Wells testified that cleanliness inspections are a normal part of his job and that he inspects certain areas of the facility, including bathrooms, five times per day. He further clarified that clients are subject to random searches three times per week when they return to the facility and must undergo urinalysis tests every month. Clients are also subject to searches before entering a PST room. Moreover, he said an officer such as himself could conduct unscheduled searches as often as necessary.

¶ 18 Wells admitted that the search of Triplett's clothing was a random unscheduled search and that he had no reason to suspect Triplett of wrongdoing. He further testified that he decided to conduct the random search because of advice given to him by another corrections officer regarding the best time and place to search for contraband.

¶ 19 The manager testified that when Triplett was admitted to the facility, he underwent a standard intake process. Intake included inventorying his property, signing intake paperwork, an orientation on the program, and filling out personal health information. As part of the intake process, Triplett was given a client handbook that contained all of the rules and expectations of the program. The handbook specifically advised clients that they could be searched for contraband at any point for any reason. The manager further testified that clients are given a test to demonstrate their understanding of the rules. While looking at Triplett's community corrections file, the manager testified that Triplett had taken and passed the test on the client handbook. Specifically, Triplett missed only two of the "fifty some" questions and answered the question about contraband searches correctly.⁴

¶ 20 According to Wells, the questioning by the community corrections personnel was "cordial" and not aggressive. The PST room was approximately eight feet by ten feet and had windows. The room contained a single chair and no table. The personnel stood in the door frame or just outside the room in the hall to speak with Triplett—the door was open during that interrogation.

¶ 21 The entire incident, including both interrogations and the time Triplett took to write his statement, lasted one hour. Defense counsel did not make any argument or proffer any evidence that there was...