People v. Vanrees

• Decision Date: 13 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01CA0149.,01CA0149.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon VANREES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

80 P.3d 840

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon VANREES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01CA0149.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

February 13, 2003.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 2003.

Certiorari Granted December 8, 2003.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.

Defendant, Vernon Vanrees, appeals the judgment of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of attempted second degree murder, second degree assault, attempted first degree sexual assault, and first degree burglary. We affirm the conviction for second degree assault and reverse and remand for a new trial on the remaining charges.

The undisputed evidence established that, following his work shift at a restaurant, defendant voluntarily consumed a very large volume of alcohol, broke into a residence, physically assaulted the sixty-six-year-old victim, attempted to sexually assault her, and caused her serious bodily injury. During the assaults, defendant's conduct ranged from confrontational, combative, and enraged assault, to meek pleading for sexual favors, to granting permission to the victim to kill him, to an expression of a desire to take his own life. After the assault, and at the victim's request, defendant called for emergency assistance, and he was arrested at the scene.

By his own testimony, the twenty-nine-year-old defendant was "mentally slow," always had been in special education classes, and never had lived apart from his parents. He knew the victim—his parents had been tenants of her parents—but he had not seen her for many years.

The victim could not identify any problems between the two families, had never had any dealings or conversation with defendant, and knew of no reason that he would want to hurt her. She characterized defendant's conduct as bizarre and inexplicable.

Defendant professed no recollection whatsoever of the incident, agreed that he had never had any problems with the victim, and testified that he had no feelings for her and no reason to hurt her. His defense was voluntary intoxication and lack of mens rea.

During its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note that read: "Almost every count includes the term `knowingly.' Can mental capacity, `slowness' of an individual, or potential insanity be part of the knowingly definition[?] Please provide us a better definition of knowingly."

Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury in response that mental capacity and slowness may be considered in determining whether the prosecution has proved the mens rea of knowingly beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court rejected that proposal and instead instructed the jury:

The defendant has not entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, whether the defendant suffered from a severely abnormal mental condition caused by mental disease or defect that grossly and demonstrably impaired his perception or understanding of reality is not an issue for your consideration.

You will not receive any additional instruction regarding the culpable mental state "knowingly," other than that contained in Instructions Nos. 17 and 18.

In determining whether or not the element of "knowingly" has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider any evidence, other than intoxication, presented in this case, or lack of evidence, that you believe to bear on that element.

You are reminded that you must consider the instructions as a whole.

Instruction 17, to which the supplemental instruction referred, told the jury, in relevant part:

A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such a nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts "knowingly" with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.

Instruction 18 informed the jury that it could not consider evidence of intoxication in determining whether the prosecution had proved the mental state of "knowingly" beyond a reasonable doubt, but could consider such evidence in determining whether defendant acted with intent and after deliberation. It also defined intoxication as a "disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body."

The trial court, explaining its reasoning for the supplemental instruction, stated that the instruction on insanity inured to defendant's benefit, because if it had told the jury only that defendant had not entered an insanity plea, the jury would not know how insanity was defined. It further observed that the jury had referred to the concept of mental capacity and that the prosecution was required to prove not that defendant had the capacity to form the culpable mental state of knowingly, but that he actually had this culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.

This appeal followed defendant's conviction.

We note that counsel asserted at oral argument that defendant is "developmentally disabled." However, that term was not employed during trial to describe defendant's condition. Accordingly, we use the terms employed at trial.

I.

Defendant contends the trial court's supplemental instruction erroneously precluded the jury from considering his "mental slowness" and low mental capacity in determining whether the prosecution had proved that he acted knowingly beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends that, by addressing only the issue of insanity and not "mental slowness" or capacity, and by providing that the jury could not consider insanity, the court's instruction erroneously permitted the jury to determine that evidence of his "mental slowness" and low mental capacity fell within the given definition of insanity and thus could not be considered. We agree.

Generally, we presume that a jury understands the instructions it is given. Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo.2000); Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1986). However, that presumption is rebutted when, as here, the jury indicates that it does not understand an element of the offense charged or some other matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Leonardo v. People, supra, 728 P.2d at 1256.

Here, the parties agree, and we concur, that an additional instruction was appropriate. The jurors were unclear as to whether they could consider defendant's "mental slowness" or capacity to determine whether he knowingly committed the crimes charged, and the relevant instructions provided no clear answer to this question. Whether defendant acted knowingly was central to his guilt or innocence, and the definition of "knowingly" presents a question of law.

A defendant's right to due process requires correct jury instructions bearing on the prosecution's burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo.2000); see also Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173 (Colo.1984)(jury must be adequately instructed to enable it to assess whether every element of an offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt).

A plea of insanity is waived if it is not specifically pleaded at the time of arraignment or, upon a showing of good cause, prior to trial. Section 16-8-103(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2002; People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 630 (Colo.1987)(evidence of insanity irrelevant and inadmissible at a trial on the merits in the absence of a special plea). However, if a defendant's "mental slowness" does not rise to the level of insanity or impaired mental condition, he or she is not required to plead such a defense in order to present evidence regarding that mental condition as it bears on mens rea. See Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.1982); People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874 (Colo.App.1996).

Here, in response to the jury's question whether "potential insanity [can] be part of the knowingly definition," the trial court was faced with a difficult task in trying to define the various mental conditions that could apply. Its supplemental instruction accurately informed the jury that defendant had not asserted insanity. The instruction also gave the jury a definition of insanity ("a severely abnormal mental condition caused by mental disease or defect that grossly and demonstrably impaired his perception or understanding of reality"), adapted from § 16-8-101.5, C.R.S.2002. However, the instruction did not inform the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's "mental slowness" and capacity in assessing whether he knowingly committed the crimes charged, but instead simply referred the jury to some original instructions. Essentially, it thus failed to answer part of the jury's question. See Leonardo v. People, supra, 728 P.2d at 1255 (a jury should be referred back to instructions only when it is apparent that it has overlooked some portion of the instructions or when the instructions clearly answer the jury's inquiry).

The jury may have erroneously understood the court's instructions to preclude consideration of "mental slowness" or capacity because such evidence fell within the insanity definition provided. For example, it could have concluded that defendant's "mental slowness" constituted an "abnormal mental condition" that "impaired his perception or understanding of reality." Therefore, the jury could have concluded that such evidence "was not an issue" for its consideration.

Thus, while the court's instruction on insanity was not per se erroneous, it did not provide the jury with a meaningful distinction between insanity and the less severe mental conditions, and it did not explain the legal implications of those conditions. In the context of defendant's case, we view this...