People v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 20 March 1997 |
| Citation | 89 N.Y.2d 521,655 N.Y.S.2d 870,678 N.E.2d 482 |
| Parties | , 678 N.E.2d 482 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edwin VASQUEZ, Appellant. In the Matter of Jose CORDERO, Appellant, v. Daniel K. LALOR, Judge of the Greene County Court, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
The primary issue in each of these appeals is whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions bar the criminal prosecution of an inmate who has previously been the subject of internal prison disciplinary sanction. We conclude that the disciplinary sanctions imposed do not constitute "criminal punishment" triggering double jeopardy protections. Thus, the claims that the criminal prosecutions were barred under double jeopardy principles were correctly rejected.
On February 26, 1994, while incarcerated at the Elmira Correctional Facility, defendant Vasquez was searched by prison guards after setting off a metal detector during a routine walk-through. During the search, the guards saw defendant throw a metal object into a nearby laundry basket. The object was a sharpened eight-inch piece of metal, commonly referred to as a "shank." At the time, defendant was serving an indeterminate sentence of 5 to 10 years for criminal possession of a controlled substance and a concurrent indeterminate sentence of 2 1/2 to 5 years for criminal possession of a weapon. Defendant was charged by prison officials with a Tier III violation of the standards of inmate behavior (7 NYCRR 270.2). 1 Pursuant to 7 NYCRR 270.3, a Superintendent's hearing was held on or about March 23, 1994, and defendant was found guilty. By decision dated March 26, 1994, the Hearing Officer imposed a disciplinary penalty of 180 days in the Special Housing Unit and six months loss of privileges and good time. This penalty was ultimately modified by the Southport Disciplinary Review Committee to 145 days in the Special Housing Unit.
On April 14, 1994, defendant was indicted by the Chemung County Grand Jury and charged with one count of promoting prison contraband, a class D felony (Penal Law § 205.25). By omnibus motion dated April 29, 1994, defendant moved to dismiss the charge on double jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied by the trial court. Defendant was convicted upon a jury trial and ultimately sentenced as a second felony offender to an indeterminate consecutive term of 3 to 6 years' imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal.
The charges in Cordero's case also involved a shank, this one having been used to stab a fellow inmate at the Coxsackie Correctional Facility on March 26, 1995. Prison officials charged Cordero with four violations of the standards of inmate behavior (7 NYCRR 270.2): assault on an inmate (rule 100.10); fighting (rule 100.13); possession of a weapon (rule 113.10); and refusing to obey a direct order (rule 106.10). After a Tier III disciplinary hearing, Cordero was found guilty of all specifications of misconduct. The Hearing Officer recommended that Cordero receive 48 months in a Special Housing Unit, loss of privileges and 12 months' loss of good time. On administrative appeal, Cordero's placement in the Special Housing Unit was reduced to 24 months, and was further reduced to 18 months by the Southport Disciplinary Review Committee.
One week after the decision on the disciplinary hearing, Cordero was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury and charged with two counts of second degree assault (Penal Law § 120.05[2], [7] ), one count of third degree criminal possession of a weapon (Penal Law § 265.02[1] ), and one count of first degree promoting prison contraband (Penal Law § 205.25[2] ). On September 12, 1995, Cordero pleaded guilty to the first count of second degree assault in full satisfaction of all charges, subject to his right to challenge the proceedings on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court held a hearing to determine the merits of Cordero's double jeopardy claim on October 10, 1995. Despite finding that the disciplinary action constituted punishment, the court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar criminal prosecution of Cordero.
Thereafter, Cordero commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of a writ of prohibition in the Appellate Division, arguing that his criminal prosecution should be prohibited on double jeopardy grounds under both the Federal and State Constitutions and CPL article 40. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. With respect to the statutory claim, the Court held that the double jeopardy protections afforded by article 40 are not triggered by an administrative action. With respect to the constitutional claim, the Court noted that it has consistently held that a prior disciplinary proceeding does not bar a subsequent criminal conviction. The Appellate Division further rejected petitioner's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, dictated a contrary result. The Court relied on the Second Circuit decision in United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 806, which rejected the same argument. Cordero appeals to this Court as of right, asserting a substantial constitutional question.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" (U.S. Const. Fifth Amend.). This Federal constitutional protection is made applicable to the States by virtue of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment (see, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; see also, N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6). 2 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits both multiple prosecutions for the same offense (following either conviction or acquittal) and multiple punishments for the same offense (United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S., at 440, 109 S.Ct., at 1897; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917). It is the latter prong that is implicated in this case; Cordero and Vasquez contend that, having been previously subject to prison disciplinary punishment, they may not be made to suffer again for the same conduct through formal criminal proceedings.
The Double Jeopardy Clause has deep common-law roots, 3 which must be considered in properly construing its boundaries and limitations (United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133-134, 101 S.Ct. 426, 435-436, 66 L.Ed.2d 328). Historically, the primary function of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been to bar consecutive criminal prosecutions stemming from the same conduct (Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-549, 63 S.Ct. 379, 386-387, 87 L.Ed. 443; Helvering v. Mitchell, supra; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns 187, 202). Indeed, it was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Mitchell (supra) that courts in this country began to consider the argument that double jeopardy protections may be extended to proceedings which are not nominally criminal. Notably, prior to its 1989 decision in United States v. Halper (supra), the Supreme Court had never held that double jeopardy protections extended to a noncriminal proceeding (see, Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 800 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1956-1957, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 [Scalia, J., dissenting] ).
In Helvering v. Mitchell (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether the assessment of a tax penalty for filing a fraudulent return was barred on double jeopardy grounds where the taxpayer had previously been acquitted of criminal charges for willfully attempting to evade income taxes. The Court looked beyond whether the proceedings were traditionally classified as criminal or civil, and instead focused on whether the sanctions involved were remedial rather than punitive. The Court stressed, however, that the fundamental question was whether the tax penalty amounted to criminal punishment, (Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S., at 399, 58 S.Ct., at 633). A decade later, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, 317 U.S., at 548-549, 63 S.Ct., at 386-387, the Court noted that criminal punishment, for double jeopardy purposes, means punishment designed "to vindicate public justice."
While the argument does not appear to have been made with great frequency prior to Helvering, courts considering the question had held that prison disciplinary action did not trigger the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause (State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486, 194 N.W. 191; People v. Huntley, 112 Mich. 569, 71 N.W. 178). Nothing in Helvering suggests a contrary result, and in the years after it was decided, courts continued to adhere to this general proposition (see, Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930; Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327; Pagliaro v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State ex rel. Franklin v. McBride
- People v. Arnold
-
People v. Jenkins
...( see People v. Asencia, 280 A.D.2d at 679, 721 N.Y.S.2d 105; People v. Vasquez, 226 A.D.2d 932, 932–933, 641 N.Y.S.2d 437 [1996], affd 89 N.Y.2d 521, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d 482 [1997], cert. denied sub nom. Cordero v. Lalor, 522 U.S. 846, 118 S.Ct. 131, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 [1997]; compare......
-
People v. Hall
...to preserve for our review his contention that he was improperly absent from the courtroom during those pauses ( see People v. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d 521, 534, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d 482,cert. denied [964 N.Y.S.2d 392]sub nom. Cordero v. Lalor, 522 U.S. 846, 118 S.Ct. 131, 139 L.Ed.2d 80;......