People v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 08 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA1486 |
| Citation | 521 P.3d 1042,2022 COA 100 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Anthony VASQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katharine Gillespie, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD*
¶ 1 This case presents two related questions of first impression in Colorado. First, can someone be convicted of fourth degree arson for lighting another person's clothing on fire while that person is wearing the clothing? Second, if so, can such an arson serve as the predicate felony for felony murder? We answer both questions "yes." Accordingly, we affirm the felony murder conviction of defendant, John Anthony Vasquez, and otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction.
¶ 2 Defendant and the victim were in a relationship. In June 2016, they decided to go camping with the victim's sons, who were then six and ten years old, near Idaho Springs.
¶ 3 The trip got off to a bad start. They arrived at the destination after dark, and they could not figure out how to set up their tent. This led to a shouting match, and defendant locked himself in their vehicle. Eventually, one of the victim's sons called 911, but the victim reported that nothing was wrong.
¶ 4 Things would go very wrong.
¶ 5 In the morning, after everyone had spent the night in the vehicle, its battery was dead. Defendant and the victim began to argue again, and the argument escalated quickly. The victim grabbed a bottle of beer from which defendant had been drinking and smashed it. Defendant then picked up a can of gasoline, poured its contents on the victim, and lit her clothing on fire with a lighter. She suffered third-degree burns over most of her body. Although she lived long enough to be taken to the hospital, she died from her injuries.
¶ 6 The prosecution charged defendant with numerous offenses in connection with the victim's death, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found him guilty of felony murder (with arson as the predicate felony), second degree murder, first degree assault, fourth degree arson, two counts of child abuse, criminal impersonation, and two counts of violation of a protection order.
¶ 7 Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for arson and, by extension, his conviction for felony murder. More specifically, he submits that the evidence was insufficient because, (1) as a matter of law, one cannot be convicted of arson for lighting another person's clothing on fire while that person is wearing the clothing; and, (2) the prosecution did not present enough evidence to establish that he set fire to anyone's property. We disagree with both contentions.
¶ 8 Defendant's first argument is principally a question of statutory interpretation. We review such questions de novo. People v. Weeks , 2021 CO 75, ¶ 24, 498 P.3d 142. When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Cali , 2020 CO 20, ¶ 15, 459 P.3d 516. To do so, we start with the language of the statute, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. We read those words and phrases in context, giving consistent effect to all the statute's parts, construing each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design. People v. Harrison , 2020 CO 57, ¶ 17, 465 P.3d 16. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id. at ¶ 18.
¶ 9 As is relevant to this case, the arson statute provides as follows: "A person who knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a fire ... on his own property or that of another, and by so doing places another in danger of death or serious bodily injury ... commits fourth degree arson." § 18-4-105(1), C.R.S. 2021. "Fourth degree arson is a class 4 felony if a person is thus endangered." § 18-4-105(2).
¶ 10 At trial, defendant asked the court to enter a judgment of acquittal for the crime of felony murder. He argued that Colorado's fourth degree arson statute does not contemplate setting fire to a person, and the prosecution alleged that he had poured gasoline on the victim and then lit her on fire. This was fatal to the felony murder charge, he continued, because "the fact that she [was] wearing clothing at the time should not be construed ... to mean that, somehow, her property is being set on fire and, as a result, she ... ends up injured."
¶ 11 The court rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that, under section 18-4-105, "[t]here is absolutely no qualification with respect to the term ‘property’ or its location or proximity to the person involved," and that, in this case, the "property" at issue was the victim's clothing.
¶ 12 Defendant repeats his argument on appeal, adding that the court's interpretation "arguably converts fourth degree arson into a specialized form of assault." We are not persuaded because defendant's argument sidesteps the clear language of the fourth degree arson statute, specifically the phrase "starts or maintains a fire ... on his own property or that of another." § 18-4-105(1) (emphasis added).
¶ 13 According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1574 (2002), the first subsense of "on" is that it is "used as a function word to indicate position over and in contact with that which supports from beneath." The relevant verbal illustration for this subsense of the word is "was built [on] an island." Id. Applying this definition, we can see that the phrase "on his own property or that of another" focuses on the location of the fire, as in the place where the fire was started or maintained—for example, on the accused's land—not on what was burned. To put it another way, fourth degree arson criminalizes knowingly or recklessly starting or maintaining a fire on property situated anywhere in Colorado, and by doing so endangering a person, a building, or an occupied structure.
¶ 14 Two other arson statutes focus on what was burned, instead of where the fire started, and they do so by using the word "to" instead of the word "on." First degree arson, as defined in section 18-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2021, prohibits "set[ting] fire to ... any building or occupied structure of another." (Emphasis added.) And second degree arson, as defined in section 18-4-103(1), C.R.S. 2021, prohibits "set[ting] fire to ... any property of another ... other than a building or occupied structure." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 15 Returning to the dictionary, we see that the word "to" in this sense is "used as a function word to indicate the receiver of an action or the one for which something is done or exists," as in the verbal illustration "make alterations [to] the text." Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2401. So, for first degree arson, one must set fire to "a building or occupied structure of another"; for second degree arson, one must set fire to "any property of another" that is not a building or occupied structure.
¶ 16 Applying the preceding reasoning to this case, we conclude that defendant's contention is a red herring. It does not matter, for the purposes of fourth degree arson, that the victim was wearing clothing and that defendant ignited it after dousing her with gasoline. Under the statute's plain language, what matters was that defendant knowingly started a fire on the property of another (a campground), and that the fire placed the victim in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
¶ 17 Defendant's second argument fares no better. "[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain the convictions." Dempsey v. People , 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if "the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Donald , 2020 CO 24, ¶ 18, 461 P.3d 4 (quoting Clark v. People , 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010) ).
¶ 18 Based on defendant's briefing, his argument on appeal appears to be that his arson conviction must be vacated because the prosecution did not present enough evidence that he set fire to either his own property or anyone else's. But, as we have explained, fourth degree arson applies to a fire that is set or maintained on property situated anywhere in Colorado that, for the purposes of this case, places the victim in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The prosecution presented ample evidence that defendant doused the victim with gasoline, lit her on fire, and caused her death, including forensic evidence and eyewitness accounts from both the victim's sons.
¶ 19 Defendant next contends that his felony murder conviction cannot stand because lighting the victim on fire was not independent of the homicide. Refining this contention, he submits that the act that formed the basis for his arson conviction—lighting the victim's clothing on fire—was the same act that caused her death. We are not persuaded.
¶ 20 This is another question of statutory interpretation, so we will apply the same interpretive rules here that we did when addressing defendant's sufficiency argument.
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