People v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 15 June 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19SC448
• Citation: 465 P.3d 16
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Brittany Page HARRISON, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

465 P.3d 16

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

v.Brittany Page HARRISON, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 19SC448

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 15, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jessica Sommer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In Colorado, if a person suffers an emergency drug or alcohol overdose

event and certain requirements are satisfied, she may not be prosecuted, or even arrested, for possession of a controlled substance or possession of drug paraphernalia. § 18-1-711(1) – (3), C.R.S. (2019). One of those requirements is that someone must have "report[ed] in good faith [the] emergency drug or alcohol overdose event to a law enforcement officer, to the 911 system, or to a medical provider." § 18-1-711(1)(a).

¶2 Brittany Page Harrison was charged with possession of two controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. Before trial, she filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was entitled to immunity pursuant to section 18-1-711 because she had suffered an emergency drug overdose event that was reported by another person to the 911 system. Though the district court denied her motion, it allowed her to rely on that statute to raise an affirmative defense at trial. The jury found Harrison guilty as charged, but a division of the court of appeals vacated her judgment of conviction.

¶3 In what is our first foray into the safe haven created by section 18-1-711, we must resolve two questions. First, did the division correctly construe the requirement in section 18-1-711(1)(a) that a person must "report[ ] in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose

event"? Second, did the division correctly conclude that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove Harrison's affirmative defense and, consequently, to support her convictions? Because we answer both questions in the negative, we reverse the division's judgment.

¶4 Though section 18-1-711 is hardly a paragon of clarity, we hold that the plain language of subsection (1)(a) requires both that a person report in good faith what she subjectively perceives is an acute condition caused by the consumption or use of drugs or alcohol and that a layperson would reasonably believe that the reported condition is a drug or alcohol overdose

needing medical assistance. Further, assuming without deciding that Harrison was entitled to invoke section 18-1-711 as an affirmative defense at trial, we hold that the evidence introduced, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 One morning, Harrison and her teenage friend, A.M., walked into a Burger King, ordered food, and sat down in a booth. About an hour and a half later, staff noticed that Harrison and A.M. had not touched their food, were slumped on the table, and appeared to be asleep. At the request of the restaurant's manager, an employee attempted to wake them up by touching their shoulders, shaking them, banging on the table, and yelling. Harrison and A.M. didn't even flinch or open their eyes. Shortly thereafter, the manager asked the employee to take another crack at waking Harrison and A.M. He obliged, but was unsuccessful.

¶6 Because she was concerned for the two patrons' well-being and wondered if something was wrong, the manager called 911. She asked for help for two individuals who were sleeping in the restaurant and would not wake up. Her expectation was that the police would respond, rouse Harrison and A.M., admonish them about sleeping there, and ask them to leave. It "never really crossed [her] mind" that either of them was suffering from a drug or alcohol overdose

. She did not observe anything that looked like drugs or paraphernalia or any signs that were indicative of intoxication or impairment.

¶7 Corporal Payne was the first to respond. Harrison woke up after he shook her and announced himself. He could not get A.M. to wake up, and A.M. was eventually transported to a hospital via ambulance. Upon awakening, Harrison was sluggish and groggy. But soon after, she provided her identification, asked if she could eat her food, ate a hamburger, and had a brief conversation with Corporal Payne. Corporal Payne documented in his report that in response to one of his questions, Harrison indicated that she had not used drugs that day.

¶8 Officer Gonzales arrived while Corporal Payne was talking with Harrison. As he watched their interaction, he thought that she appeared to be under the influence of some substance. Corporal Payne concurred. With Harrison's permission, Corporal Payne searched her purse, where he discovered a syringe, a spoon, a butane torch, tin-foil with burn marks, and a baggie with a tar-type substance that later tested positive for heroin. Harrison also consented to a search of her backpack. Inside the backpack, Officer Gonzales found two glass pipes, a lighter, butane fluid, two butane torches, aluminum foil, and a baggie containing a powdery substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶9 Based on the items collected during the two searches, Harrison was arrested. Corporal Payne and Officer Gonzales noted that she had no trouble walking. And Harrison did not require or receive any medical assistance.

¶10 The prosecution subsequently charged Harrison with two counts of possession of a controlled substance (one alleging possession of heroin and the other alleging possession of methamphetamine) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. She pled not guilty to the three charges.

¶11 Before trial, Harrison filed a motion to dismiss, asserting immunity under section 18-1-711. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that Harrison was not immune from criminal liability because she had not suffered an "emergency drug or alcohol overdose

event," as that term is defined in section 18-1-711(5) :

"an acute condition including, but not limited to, physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, or death resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, or of alcohol, ... and that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose

that requires medical assistance." However, the court permitted her to raise an affirmative defense at trial based on section 18-1-711. The jury still found her guilty of all three charges.

¶12 Harrison appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated her judgment of conviction based on its construction of the requirement in section 18-1-711(1)(a) that a person must "report[ ] in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose

event." People v. Harrison , 2019 COA 63, ¶¶ 11, 22–25, 29, ––– P.3d ––––, –––– (quoting § 18-1-701(1)(a)). The division determined that "immunity must apply" so long as a reasonable person in the shoes of the person reporting the event would have believed that there was an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event. Id. at ¶¶ 22–25. Relying on this interpretation, the division held that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of disproving the affirmative defense because the evidence at trial "was insufficient to disprove that a reasonable person in the manager's position would have believed that an ‘emergency drug or alcohol overdose event’ may be occurring." Id. at ¶ 28.

¶13 The prosecution then sought review in our court, and we granted certiorari.¹

II. Analysis

¶14 We begin by interpreting section 18-1-711(1)(a). We then evaluate the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence vis-à-vis Harrison's affirmative defense. We conclude that the division misread section 18-1-711(1)(a) and erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence in support of Harrison's convictions.

A. Interpretation of Section 18-1-711(1)(a)

¶15 The interpretation of section 18-1-711 involves a question of law. See Isom v. People , 2017 CO 110, ¶ 5, 407 P.3d 559, 560 (noting that "[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law"). "We review questions of law de novo." Howard-Walker v. People , 2019 CO 69, ¶ 22, 443 P.3d 1007, 1011.

¶16 When construing a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislature's intent. Colo. Med. Bd. v. McLaughlin , 2019 CO 93, ¶ 22, 451 P.3d 841, 845. The first step in this endeavor is to examine the statutory language. Cowen v. People , 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d 215, 218. In the absence of a definition, we must read statutory terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at ¶ 14, 431 P.3d at 218. To ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a word in a statute, "we may consider a definition in a recognized dictionary." Id.

¶17 We are required to read the words and phrases in a statute in context. Id. at ¶ 13, 431 P.3d at 218. And we must "give consistent effect to all parts of [the] statute, and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. , 2013 CO 38, ¶ 12, 303 P.3d 558, 560–61 ). This concept goes hand-in-hand with the notion that courts must avoid constructions that render any word in a statute superfluous. Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 2020 CO 12, ¶ 36, 457 P.3d 568, 576.

¶18 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written and look no further. Cowen , ¶ 12, 431 P.3d at 218. This is so because "courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).

¶19 Here, as a prelude to our interpretation of section 18-1-711, we assume without deciding that Harrison was entitled to invoke the statute as an affirmative defense to the charges brought against her.² Thus,...