People v. Veling
| Decision Date | 13 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 5-6,93406,J,Nos. 93321,s. 93321,s. 5-6 |
| Citation | 443 Mich. 23,504 N.W.2d 456 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin Todd VELING, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Depree HILL, Defendant-Appellee. Calendaranuary Term. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., Oakland County, Michael J. Modelski, Chief, Appellate Div. by Thomas S. Richards, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Atty., Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, Jackson, for plaintiff.
William E. Ziem, Walled Lake, for defendant-appellant.
Mazur, Matyjaszek & Brandt, P.C., Alfred P. Brandt, Jackson, brief on appeal, for defendant-appellee.
Before the entire bench.
In 1988, the Michigan Legislature passed a package of laws that modified the manner in which courts treat the jurisdiction, adjudication, and treatment or punishment of juvenile offenders. Among the many changes was an amendment of the Revised Judicature Act giving the state's circuit courts automatic jurisdiction to hear certain offenses committed by juveniles aged fifteen or sixteen. 1 This amendment allows prosecutors to proceed automatically in circuit court against juvenile offenders charged with certain enumerated offenses without first having to obtain a waiver from the probate court. 2 The amendment, in effect, divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction over certain juvenile offenders and vests that jurisdiction in the circuit courts. See People v. Brooks, 184 Mich.App. 793, 459 N.W.2d 313 (1990).
In these cases of first impression, we are asked whether the automatic waiver statute allows a circuit court to retain jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile offender who, although charged with an enumerated offense, is convicted of a nonenumerated lesser included offense. Additionally, we are asked whether the statute confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts to try juvenile offenders for nonenumerated offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as the enumerated offense in the same trial.
Our task is not made easier by the lack of clear legislative history available. All that can be reasonably gleaned from the statute itself is the notion that the Legislature must have intended to treat juvenile offenders who engage in serious criminal activity more harshly by providing adult penalties for certain crimes. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to sentence juveniles charged with enumerated offenses but convicted of nonenumerated lesser included offenses and to try and sentence juveniles charged with both enumerated and nonenumerated offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction.
Defendant Benjamin Todd Veling was originally charged with assault with intent to commit murder. 3 Pursuant to the automatic waiver statute, defendant was tried as an adult in circuit court, although at the time of the alleged offense he was only fifteen years old. At trial, defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
After trial, defendant moved to remand his case to the probate court for disposition on the ground that his conviction for the lesser included offense divested the circuit court of its jurisdiction. Because assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is not an offense enumerated in the automatic waiver statute, defendant contended, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to sentence him for that offense. 4 The prosecutor countered that jurisdiction was not lost as a result of a conviction of a lesser included offense because the circuit judge had authority under the Criminal Procedure Code to conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult or juvenile. 5
Without agreeing with either party, the circuit judge, on her own initiative, remanded the case to the probate court for sentencing. Without citing any part of the statute, the circuit judge believed the automatic waiver statute gave her discretion to remand the case without fulfilling the hearing requirement. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's order and remanded this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with People v. Deans, 192 Mich.App. 327, 480 N.W.2d 334 (1991). On August 7, 1992, this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 440 Mich. 889.
As a result of events that allegedly occurred on October 15, 1991, defendant William Depree Hill was charged by a seven-count information with assault with intent to commit murder 6 (count I), carrying a concealed weapon, 7 carrying a concealed weapon with unlawful intent, 8 three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 9 and possession of cocaine 10 (counts II to VII). At the time of these alleged crimes, defendant was sixteen years old.
The Jackson County prosecutor elected to charge defendant under Michigan's automatic waiver statute. At the preliminary examination on October 24, 1991, defendant was bound over on all charges. Afterward, defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts II to VII on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him. The basis for the motion was the argument that only count I allowed the defendant to be tried as an adult under the automatic waiver statute.
On December 17, 1991, the circuit judge granted defendant's motion and quashed that part of the information charging him with counts II to VII on the ground that, of the crimes charged, the automatic waiver statute only applied to count I and so the court lacked jurisdiction over counts II to VII. Furthermore, the court noted that the prosecutor's proper course of action would have been to utilize the automatic waiver statute for count I and seek a traditional waiver for counts II to VII. Finally, the circuit judge adjourned the proceedings to allow the prosecutor to seek an interlocutory appeal.
The prosecutor sought the Court of Appeals review, but, relying on People v. Deans, supra, the Court denied leave to appeal. On August 7, 1992, however, this Court granted the prosecutor's motion for interlocutory leave to appeal and the case was considered with that of defendant Veling. 440 Mich. 889, 487 N.W.2d 763.
Before the enactment of the automatic waiver statute, the juvenile division of the probate court had "[e]xclusive original jurisdiction superior to and regardless of the jurisdiction of any other court in proceedings concerning a child under 17 years of age...." M.C.L. § 712A.2(a); M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.2)(a). In 1988, however, along with the creation of the automatic waiver statute, this section of the Revised Judicature Act was amended so that the probate court no longer had exclusive jurisdiction over all juveniles. Rather, "[t]he juvenile division of the probate court shall have jurisdiction over a child 15 years of age or older who is charged with a violation of [certain enumerated offenses], if the prosecuting attorney files a petition in juvenile court instead of authorizing a complaint and warrant." M.C.L. § 712A.2(a)(1); M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.2)(a)(1) (emphasis added). The prosecuting attorney may authorize the filing of a complaint and warrant against that juvenile if he has "reason to believe" that the juvenile has committed certain enumerated offenses. M.C.L. § 764.1f; M.S.A. § 28.860(6). In essence, then, the 1988 changes divested the probate court of its exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles and vested in the circuit courts personal jurisdiction over those juveniles charged with enumerated life offenses. Assuming the prosecutor authorizes a complaint and warrant in the circuit court, the circuit court has personal jurisdiction over juveniles charged with enumerated life offenses.
Once personal jurisdiction is established, the magistrate must have probable cause to believe, as part of the preliminary examination, that the juvenile committed the charged enumerated offense. See M.C.L. § 766.14(2); M.S.A. § 28.932(2). 11 If this belief is not sustained by probable cause, the magistrate must transfer the case back to the probate court, and the circuit court loses jurisdiction over the juvenile. Id. 12 If probable cause is established, the circuit court has both personal jurisdiction over the juvenile and, of course, subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged enumerated offense.
As noted above, the Code of Criminal Procedure is very specific; if at the preliminary examination the magistrate finds that an enumerated offense has not been committed, the magistrate must send the case back to the probate court. The code is noticeably silent, however, concerning the proper procedure following a conviction for a lesser included offense or the procedure to be used for juveniles charged with nonenumerated offenses arising out of the same transaction as the enumerated offense. Defendants Veling and Hill would have us construe this silence as a requirement to remand these cases to the probate court for disposition. For the reasons that follow, we find such a statutory construction to be untenable.
In the exercise of circuit court jurisdiction over adult offenders, there is a presumption against divesting a court of its jurisdiction once it has properly attached, and any doubt is resolved in favor of retaining jurisdiction. 13 In People v. Schoeneth, 44 Mich. 489, 7 N.W. 70 (1880), this Court established the longstanding rule that where the circuit court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant because of a felony charge, that jurisdiction is not lost because of a subsequent conviction of a lesser included misdemeanor. The Court reasoned that it would be absurd to force the court to go to trial on the merits of the charge only to determine when the verdict was rendered whether ...
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People v. Washington
...of its jurisdiction once it has properly attached, and any doubt is resolved in favor of retaining jurisdiction," People v Veling , 443 Mich. 23, 32, 504 N.W.2d 456 (1993), the trial court maintains subject-matter jurisdiction over a case as it proceeds to appeal. Even if this position woul......
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...grounds sub nom People v. Rush, 443 Mich. 870, 504 N.W.2d 185 (1993), overruled in part on unrelated grounds People v. Veling, 443 Mich. 23, 43, 504 N.W.2d 456 (1993). The prosecution must do more than demonstrate that the defendant is guilty of a serious offense for which adult punishment ......
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...the state failed to allege sufficient mens rea that the detrimental effects of his actions would occur in Michigan); People v. Veling, 443 Mich. 23, 504 N.W.2d 456 (1993) (noting that the circuit court has only limited jurisdiction to hear certain offenses committed by juveniles).5 See, e.g......
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