People v. Vigoa
| Decision Date | 01 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92SA257,92SA257 |
| Citation | 841 P.2d 311 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Ronald J. VIGOA, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Norman S. Early, Jr., Dist. Atty., Second Judicial Dist., Nathan B. Coats, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Everett Engstrom, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, James S. Covino, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
The question in this case is whether the defendant's request for court-appointed counsel made in connection with a Crim.P. 5 proceeding, which was conducted subsequent to the defendant's arrest but prior to the actual filing of a criminal charge, constituted an invocation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel for purposes of his Miranda rights 1 and thereby served to invalidate the defendant's subsequent custodial statement made to a police officer after a Miranda advisement and the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights. The district court held that the defendant's application for court-appointed counsel triggered his Sixth Amendment right and that, because the defendant did not thereafter initiate any contact with the police for the purpose of making a statement and was not provided with counsel at the time of the custodial interrogation, the defendant's purported waiver of his Miranda rights was void and his custodial statement was constitutionally inadmissible. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's request for legal representation with respect to an as-yet unfiled criminal charge cannot reasonably be construed as a request for the presence of counsel at a pre-charging custodial interrogation initiated by the police shortly after the Crim.P. 5 proceeding.
The defendant, Ronald J. Vigoa, is presently charged in the Denver District Court with second degree forgery. § 18-5-103, 8B C.R.S. (1986). He was arrested on December 3, 1991, and the next morning, December 4, while still in custody, he appeared before a county judge to be advised of his rights pursuant to Crim.P. 5(a)(1) & (2), which provides as follows:
(1) Procedures Following Arrest. If a peace officer or any other person makes an arrest, either with or without a warrant, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available county or district court. Thereafter, a felony complaint, information, or indictment shall be filed, if it has not already been filed, without unnecessary delay in the proper court and a copy thereof given to the defendant.
(2) Appearance Before the Court. At the first appearance of the defendant in court, it is the duty of the court to inform the defendant and make certain that the defendant understands the following:
(I) The defendant need make no statement and any statement made can and may be used against the defendant;
(II) The right to counsel;
(III) If indigent, the defendant has a right to request the appointment of counsel or consult with the public defender before any further proceedings are held;
(IV) Any plea the defendant makes must be voluntary and not the result of undue influence or coercion;
(V) The right to bail, if the offense is bailable, and the amount of bail that has been set by the court;
(VI) The nature of the charges;
(VII) The right to a jury trial;
(VIII) The right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged was committed by the defendant.
The county court advised the defendant of his rights and the fact that bail had been set in the amount of $10,000. The defendant acknowledged in writing that he had been advised of his rights, and on the same day, either during or shortly after the Crim.P. 5 proceeding, he filled out a form entitled "Application for Court-Appointed Counsel." The application consisted essentially of a sworn statement of the defendant's financial status. In the application he indicated that he had no money and his only property was a 1972 Jeep valued at approximately $1500. On the same day the defendant and a deputy public defender signed a preprinted form with letterhead from the public defender's office, which stated as follows:
Ron Vigoa has stated that s/he would like to be represented by an attorney in the matter now under investigation for Two ? Forg [second degree forgery].
We have reviewed his/her application for representation by the Public Defender's Office, and we have made a preliminary determination that s/he qualifies for court-appointed counsel. We request appointment to this case as of this date.
At approximately 2:45 p.m. on December 4, before any charging document had yet been filed and before an attorney had been formally appointed by the court for the defendant, Detective Huff of the Denver Police Department contacted the defendant in jail. The detective advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant acknowledged in writing that he understood his rights and that he wished to speak to the detective. The defendant thereafter made a statement to Detective Huff which, although not part of the record before us, we assume was inculpatory.
Two days later, on December 6, 1991, a complaint/information was filed in the Denver County Court charging the defendant with second-degree forgery. On December 10, 1991, the county court formally appointed the public defender's office to represent the defendant on the charge. After the case was bound over to the district court for trial, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress the written statement that he had made to Detective Huff on December 4, 1991. The defendant contended, as pertinent here, that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to counsel when he made the statement.
The district court conducted a hearing on the suppression motion, at which both the prosecution and defense basically presented evidence of the chronology of events that occurred on December 4, 1991. The district court granted the motion to suppress. It ruled that the defendant's "Application for Court-Appointed Counsel," filed with the county court on December 4, constituted a request for counsel not only for the purpose of legal representation during any judicial proceeding but also for the purpose of dealing with the police in connection with any interrogation that might thereafter take place. The People thereafter filed this interlocutory appeal and argue that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in granting Vigoa's suppression motion.
The resolution of this case requires an analysis of the purpose and scope of two separate federal constitutional rights--the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel--in the context of a pre-charging custodial interrogation.
The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer, before questioning a suspect in custody, must warn the suspect of the following: that he has a right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in court; that he has a right to the presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to questioning if he so desires. 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1629-30. The purpose of these warnings is "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." Id. at 458, 86 S.Ct. at 1619. The part of the Miranda warning concerning the suspect's right to counsel is designed to ensure that the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process." Id. at 469-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. The suspect, of course, may waive effectuation of these rights so long as the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. If the suspect indicates at any stage of the custodial interrogation that he wishes to confer with an attorney before speaking to the police, or that he desires not to make a statement at all, then there can be no interrogation. Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627.
In several cases decided subsequent to Miranda, the Supreme Court has developed additional safeguards designed to protect a suspect against the risk of being worn down by repeated efforts of the police to conduct a custodial interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Court held that once a suspect has been advised of his Miranda rights and has invoked his right to confer with counsel, the police may not conduct any further interrogation until counsel has been made available to the suspect, unless the suspect himself "initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85.
The Edwards rule was expanded in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), where the Court applied Edwards to a custodial interrogation about a crime unrelated to the offense for which an earlier Miranda advisement had been given, even though the officer conducting the subsequent interrogation did not know of the suspect's invocation of the right to counsel at the earlier Miranda advisement. The rationale underlying Roberson is that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in contrast to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, is not offense-specific, so that a suspect's request for counsel after a Miranda advisement is tantamount to an expressed desire to deal with the police only through counsel in regard to a custodial interrogation directed to...
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People v. Grant, No. 98CA2099.
...not constitute an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167 (Colo.1987); see also People v. Vigoa, 841 P.2d 311 (Colo.1992) (defendant's request for appointment of counsel, by filling out application form, was not an invocation of the right to Defenda......
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