People v. Walden
| Decision Date | 10 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Ind. No. 10-124 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. ANDREW J. WALDEN, Defendant |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
At a term of the County Court held in and for the County of Wayne at the Hall of Justice in Lyons, New York on the 19th day of December, 2010.
Appearances: Assistant District Attorney - Christopher Bokelman, Esq. Public Defender - James Kernan, Esq.
Defense having filed a Notice of Motion requesting various relief. Oral argument having been had on the above date. The Court having reserved on the motion and sets forth below its decision.
Defense seeks the discovery of certain items. Included in that request are photographs and any forensic analysis of the Defendant's two cell phones. The People having provided the photographs to the defense attorney in Court. In regard to the forensic analysis of the cell phones, People having advised there is no such analysis. However, Mr. Bokelman having stated on the record that if any analysis was done in the future that said analysis would be provided to defense counsel.
Defense counsel seeks to receive a copy of Vickie Winners medicalrecords and a copy of the Grand Jury testimony of Payton Winner. People having argued that the medical records could be viewed at the District Attorney's Office by the defense and that secondly the release of the Grand Jury testimony of Payton Winner is not appropriate based on current case law.
Defense also requests a Bill of Particulars and the People having argued that the request for the same was untimely.
Defense also seeking the Court to inspect the Grand Jury Minutes and dismiss the felony counts: Count 6 - Assault 1st; Count 7 - Assault 2nd; Count 8 - Reckless Endangerment 1st; Count 9 - Criminally Negligent Homicide; and Court 10 - Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
With regard to the defense requests pursuant to paragraphs 5,6 and 7 of Defendant's Motion, the Court finds said requests either to be premature or duplicative pursuant to Brady, Rosario, and Ventimiglia.
With regard to request made pursuant to paragraph 8. the Court will grant a Huntley and Wade hearing.
With regard to paragraph 9, there are no statements attributed to the Defendant that are not noticed pursuant to CPL 710.30. The Court will allow re-argument pursuant to this request if any statements are noticed by the People to be admitted at tria that are not pursuant to the CPL 710.30 notice.
Defense seeks pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Motion, additional discovery under a Motion depending on information provided. The Courtwill reserve any further requests made at the appropriate time.
The Court has examined the Grand Jury Minutes as weli as Exhibits admitted pursuant to said testimony. The Court will first discuss Count 6, Assault in the 1st Degree pursuant to PL 120.10(3). Count 6 provides that Defendant on or about May 4, 2010 under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person and thereby caused serious physical injury to another person. The key phrase in said charge is "depraved indifference to human life."
To establish depraved indifference for the purposes of Assault 1st, it must be shown that the Defendant's reckless conduct is imminently dangerous, presents grave risk of death, People v. Parrotte, 267 A.D. 2d 884, 3rd Department, 1999, leave to appeal denied, 95 N.Y. 2d 801.
Depraved indifference to human life as used in the first degree Assault statute refers to wantonness of Defendant's conduct, and focuses upon objective assessment of degree of risk presented by Defendant's reckless conduct, People v. Lucchese, 127 A.D. 2d 699, 2nd Department 1987, appeal denied 69 N.Y. 2d 1006.
Where Defendant's conduct endangers only a single person, to sustain a charge of depraved indifference, there must be proof of wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target of the perpetrators inexcusable acts, People v. Coon, 34 A.D. 3d 869. That case goes on to state that depraved indifference required for a conviction of Assault 1st Degree is a culpable mental state, and thiselement is not established merely by proof of reckless conduct.
In this particular case testimony reasonably indicates that the Defendant who is a patient of a methadone clinic on May 4, 2010 obtained a dose of methadone which he took and brought a dose home in a special case provided to him by the clinic at Strong Memorial Hospital. Defendant, who was familiar with the victim, Vickie Winner, went to her home and dropped an amount of the methadone off with Vickie Winner's daughter, Payton Winner advising Payton Winner that this would help her mother sleep.
Defendant returned to the residence of the victim and brought the remaining dose of his methadone into the house. At some point the victim asked for additional methadone and Defendant offered to measure an additional amount for her. Testimony is clear and consistent that the victim simply grabbed the bottle of methadone and drank the remaining amount.
Taking into account the standards for inspection of Grand Jury Minutes and viewing the evidence in the most favorable light to the People, there is no testimony and/or Exhibits that show any amount of depraved indifference by the Defendant. Although his conduct may have been reckless and/or abhorrent, it does not rise to the level of depraved indifference. Therefore, the charge of Assault 1st Degree is hereby dismissed.
With regard to Count 7, Assault 2nd Degree, PL 120.05(4), the Defendant is accused of recklessly causing physical injury to Vickie Winner by means of a dangerous instrument, to wit, methadone.
Under the case law the Defendant must be aware and consciously disregard substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions would result in serious physical injury.
In reviewing the evidence as required by review of the Grand Jury testimony, the Court finds that the Grand Jury could reasonably find there was reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant engaged in conduct resulting in Assault in the 2nd Degree. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Count 7 is hereby denied.
With regard to Count 8, Reckless Endangerment 1st Degree, PL 120.25 Defendant is charged that he evinced a depraved indifference to human life and recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk to another person.
Without belaboring the point, the Court has previously discussed standards for depraved indifference to human life.
First degree Reckless Endangerment differs from second degree Reckless Endangerment in two critical respects. Firstly, the Defendant's conduct must create not merely a substantial risk of serious physical injury but a grave risk of death. Secondly, the Defendant must act not only with mens reas of recklessness, but with an additional mens reas of depraved indifference to human life. To establish the later of mens reas, his conduct must reflect an utter disregard to the value of human life and reflect wickedness, evil or inhumanity as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts. As in the depraved indifference murder and assault context, prosecutions for first degree Reckless Endangerment should now be relatively rare. Statute will apply primarily to conduct that endangerspeople indiscriminately, such as firing a gun into a crowd, causing a fire or explosion, or driving with extraordinary recklessness, see People v. Fineaold, 7 N.Y. 3rd 288, People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y. 3d 202, People v. Coon, 34 AD. 3d 869 and see 6 N.Y. Pr...
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