People v. Werner

• Decision Date: 17 March 1903
• Citation: 66 N.E. 667,174 N.Y. 132
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WERNER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

174 N.Y. 132

66 N.E. 667

PEOPLE

v.WERNER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 17, 1903.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Charles Werner was convicted of selling liquor to a minor, and from a judgment of the Appellate Division (66 N. Y. Supp. 1139) he appeals. Reversed.

Frank W. Brown, for appellant.

Elmer E. Charles, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The defendant kept a hotel or tavern, and was authorized to traffic in liquors. He was convicted of a violation of the act, in that he sold and delivered liquor to a minor under the age of 18 years, contrary to the provisions of section 30 of the statute. The jury would have been justified in finding that the defendant acted in good faith, supposing, from what the boy and his father had told him, that he was over 18 years of age; but the absence of any criminal intent, and the circumstance that the defendant acted in good faith, would seem to be immaterial. The law on that subject seems to be that an act malum prohibitum is not excused by ignorance or a mistake of fact, when a specific act is made by law indictable, irrespective of the defendant's motive or intent. His belief that he was right in what he did, based on a mistake of fact, is no defense. Wharton, Cr. Law (9th Ed.) § 1507; People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 321, 12 N. E. 795;Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381;Gardner v. People, 62 N. Y. 299.

The general rule that the criminal intention is the essence of the crime does not apply to such prohibited acts; but, while that is so, such statutes ought to be strictly construed, and the people required to give strict proof of the commission of the offense. On the trial of this case the defendant was entitled to give all the proof that he had that had any bearing upon the issues involved, or upon the credibility of the witnesses against him. We think this principle was violated upon the trial. The only proof given in support of the charge, so far as it was based upon the age of the boy to whom the liquor was sold, was given by his father, who testified to the date of his birth. On cross-examination this witness was asked whether he had not stated to the defendant, at a time and place mentioned, and in the presence of certain persons named, that his son was over 18 years of age at the time of the transaction. His answer was, in substance, that he did not recollect anything of that kind. After the people had rested the defendant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and was asked whether the father had not stated to him, in the presence of the persons named, and at the time stated, that his son was over 18 years of age. This question was objected to by the district attorney. The objection was sustained, and the defendant excepted. We think that the defendant was entitled to give this testimony. The age of the boy was a material issue in the case, and, although the father had testified in general terms to his age, yet the defendant had the right to contradict or impeach the father by showing that he had made a contrary statement out of court. The testimony of the father to prove that the boy was a minor under 18 years of age could be impeached or contradicted by proof that he had stated otherwise out of court.

At a subsequent stage of the trial the defendant called the witnesses that he stated were present at...