People v. Western Union Telegraph Co.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1921
• Docket Number: 9522.
• Citation: 70 Colo. 90,198 P. 146
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

198 P. 146

70 Colo. 90

PEOPLE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. et al.

No. 9522.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 4, 1921

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; John H Denison, Judge.

The Western Union Telegraph Company and others were charged by information with a violation of the Anti-Coercion Act. To review a judgment discharging them and releasing their bondsmen, the People of the State bring error.

Affirmed.

William E. Foley, Dist. Atty., and T. E. McIntyre Asst. Dist. Atty., of Denver, for the People.

T. J O'Donnell, J. W. Graham, and G. W. Musser, all of Denver, for defendants in error.

Melville, Melville & Walton, Thomas H. Gibson, Horace N. Hawkins, and Harvey Riddell, all of Denver, amici curiae.

In this cause an information was filed in the trial court against the defendants, charging them with a violation of chapter 5 Session Laws of 1911, known as 'The Anti-Coercion Act,' in that as a condition to the continued employment of one Holson they required of him a contract that he sever his connection with the Commercial Telegraphers' Union of America, and upon his refusal to comply discharged him. To this information defendants demurred on the ground that 'the Anti-Coercion Act' was unconstitutional under the Bill of Rights of the state of Colorado and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. To the consideration of this issue the people objected on the ground that such consideration was prohibited by amended section 1, art. 6, of the state Constitution. (See Laws 1913, P. 678).

The objection was overruled, 'the Anti-Coercion Act' held in conflict with the federal Constitution, and final judgment entered, discharging defendants and releasing their bondsmen. To review that judgment the people bring this cause here by writ of error under the mandate of section 1997, R. S. 1908, which provides:

'Writs of error shall lie on behalf of the state * * * to review decisions of the trial court in any criminal case * * * where a statute is declared unconstitutional. And whenever any act of the Legislature, upon which has been based the indictment or information in any criminal case, shall be adjudged inoperative or unconstitutional by any district or county court, it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the judicial district within which such court making such decision is situate, to sue out a writ of error on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado from said Supreme Court to review the judgment of said district or county court in this particular. Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense.'

This cause was orally argued May 13, 1920. Two weeks prior thereto transcript of the record in cause No. 9823, People v. Max, 198 P. 150, this day decided, involving other phases of the questions herein raised, had been filed in this court. In both cases defendants had been finally discharged. No particular injury could therefore be done by a delay in the final determination hereof. Several members of the bar, who had given special study to the questions involved, were invited by the court to file briefs as amici curiae (others have since voluntarily done so), and further consideration was postponed until such time as People v. Max should be at issue and all briefs filed in both.

BURKE, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Three questions are here presented: The right of the trial court to hear and determine the federal constitutional question; the correctness of its judgment; and the date when our decision becomes effective. For convenience the second of these will be first considered.

So much of the 'Anti-Coercion Act' in question as is material here reads as follows:

'Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any corporation, company, partnership, association, individual or any employer of labor to demand as a condition of employment, or as a condition of continuing any employment, any contract, agreement or reservation, evidenced by writing or otherwise, or by condition reserved in any contract, that the person or persons so employed shall sever any present connection with or shall refrain from joining any lawful organization or society, or under any pretense whatever to prohibit, limit or restrain such employee from exercising his social, financial, fraternal or business rights in connection with or through any lawful organization or society, during his employment by any employer.

'Sec. 2. Any such contract, agreement or reservation or condition reserved shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of this act.

'Sec. 3. That any corporation, company, partnership, association, individual or any employer of labor, which or who shall violate any provision of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and as to any corporation such guilt shall extend to all the officers, directors or trustees thereof and any agent or authority by which such corporation acts, as individuals, and as to any partnership or company, all persons composing the same as individuals, and as to any person the person and his agent shall be guilty as individuals, and upon conviction of any person or persons under the provisions of this act, such person or persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars for each and every repetition of such offense or by imprisonment of not less than ninety days nor more than six months in the county jail for the county in which such offense was committed, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.' Chapter 5, p. 8, L. 1911.

That this act is a plain violation of the federal Constitution has been clearly determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C, 960. In that case a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas was reversed, and a statute of that state, in all material particulars identical with the one here under consideration, was declared a violation of the 'due process' clause of the United States Constitution.

Having determined that this cause was correctly decided below, it may be said that the constitutionality of the 'Anti- Coercion Act' has now, at least, been passed upon by a court having jurisdiction, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider the objection of the people to the hearing on the demurrer. If so, the same situation would be presented had we held the act constitutional. Since the passage of the amendment to section 1, art. 6, we have assumed the correctness of that rule. However, there has arisen such a disparity of opinion in our trial courts concerning their power to determine constitutional questions, and such a resulting confusion among members of the bar concerning the practice, that it now becomes our imperative duty, under section 2, art. 6, of our state Constitution, which vests in the Supreme Court 'a general superintending control over all inferior courts,' to construe section 1, art. 6, with reference to the power of such courts where federal constitutional questions are involved.

The jurisdiction of the district court in the premises, prior to January 22, 1913, is undisputed, and is too well settled in this country to admit of argument or require the citation of authority. On that date (if ever) said section 1 became effective. It specifies the courts in which the judicial power of the state shall be vested, and them provides:

'None of said courts except the Supreme Court shall have any power to declare or adjudicate any law of this state or any city charter or amendment thereto adopted by the people in cities acting under article XX hereof as in violation of the Constitution of this state or of the United States.'

Paragraph 2, art. 6, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

'This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'

Section 8 of article 12 of the state Constitution provides:

'Every civil officer, except members of the General Assembly and such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully perform the duties of the office upon which he is about to enter.'

It is said that, notwithstanding the provision of the federal Constitution, above cited, the trial judge was precluded by amended section 1 of article 6 of the state Constitution from passing upon the question raised by the demurrer. The answer is that the trial judge was bound by the mandate of the federal Constitution to apply that instrument upon all proper occasions and to hold it to be the supreme law of the land 'anything in ...