People v. Whitley, 97CA1096.
Decision Date | 10 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 97CA1096.,97CA1096. |
Citation | 998 P.2d 31 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry L. WHITLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado (On the Briefs); Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Michael E. McClachlan, Solicitor General, Robert M. Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Heidi L. Beeson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Anne Stockham, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.
Defendant, Henry L. Whitley, appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of one count of possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute and one count of distribution or sale of a schedule II controlled substance. We affirm.
The evidence at trial established that defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer. Defendant was sentenced as a prior offender under § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), C.R.S. 1998.
I.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain the jury's verdict because, under § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), the question whether he had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell was an issue which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and decided by the jury. We disagree and conclude that § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II) is a sentence enhancement provision which was properly determined by the trial court.
Section 18-18-405(1)(a), C.R.S.1998, provides that it is unlawful for any person knowingly to distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute, any controlled substance. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, § 18-18-405(2)(a)(I), C.R.S.1998, provides that the offense is a class four felony. However, § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II) provides that the offense is a class two felony if the violation is committed subsequent to a prior conviction for a violation of § 18-18-405(1)(a).
This statutory provision establishes a sentencing enhancer, and not a substantive offense, because: (1) the defendant may be convicted of the underlying offense without any proof regarding the sentencing enhancer; and (2) the sentencing enhancement provision increases the potential punishment. Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107 (Colo.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889, 116 S.Ct. 233, 133 L.Ed.2d 161 (1995).
There are three types of sentence enhancing provisions in Colorado.
The first includes those which increase the level of punishment based on the existence of statutorily specified factual circumstances that are connected to the commission of the crime itself. Although such sentence enhancement factors are not elements of the offense, they nevertheless must be determined by a jury and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo.1998)
( ); Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576 (Colo.1993) ( ); People v. Bowring, 902 P.2d 911 (Colo.App.1995) ( ); § 16-11-309(5), C.R.S.1998 ( ); see also Vega v. People, supra ( ).
The second type of sentence enhancing provision is that which requires that a convicted defendant's punishment be increased based on prior convictions and that those prior convictions, pursuant to statute, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See § 16-13-103(4)(b), C.R.S.1998 ( ); § 18-4-202.1(5) ( ).
The third type of sentence enhancement provision is that which increases the punishment based on a defendant's criminal history but which does not have a statutory burden of proof or hearing procedure applicable to the determination of the prior criminal conduct. See People v. Lacey, 723 P.2d 111 (Colo.1986)
( ); People v. Henderson, 729 P.2d 1028 (Colo.App.1986) ( ).
For this third type of enhancement provision, due process is satisfied so long as the defendant receives reasonable notice of the potential for an increased sentence and the prosecution meets its burden of proving the prior criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Lacey, supra; see Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) ( ).
The provision at issue here, § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II), increases the level of a defendant's punishment based on a prior conviction but does not prescribe a burden of proof. And, nothing in the language of the statute indicates by what means the existence of a prior conviction is to be determined. Thus, we conclude it is a sentence enhancer of the third type set forth above.
As such, the prosecution was only required to prove the existence of defendant's prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence and the issue was properly determinable by the trial court. See People v. Vega, 870 P.2d 549 (Colo.App.1993)
( aff'd on other grounds, )Vega v. People, supra.
Arguing for a contrary interpretation, defendant notes that at least one trial court has submitted to a jury the determination of a defendant's prior conviction under § 18-18-405(2)(a)(II). See People v. Saint-Veltri, 945 P.2d 1339 (Colo.1997)
(. ) However, the fact that a single trial court may have acted out of an abundance of caution does not establish that such a procedure is required. See People v. Vega, supra ( ).
In summary, we reject defendant's claim that the prosecution was required to prove the existence of his prior conviction to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that there is insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict with respect to the sentence enhancement provision. And, because defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction at sentencing, we conclude the absence of a hearing on that issue did not violate his rights to due process.
II.
Defendant next argues that his waiver of his right to testify was not knowingly or voluntarily entered because the trial court neglected to advise him that, if he elected to testify, evidence of his prior felony conviction could be introduced only to impeach his testimony. We conclude this omission was not reversible error.
In People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), the supreme court outlined those elements that must be present in an on-the-record advisement in order to ensure defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of his or her right to testify. However, in People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787, 790 (Colo.1996), the supreme court reaffirmed that Curtis did not require a "prescribed litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify." The court explained that:
A satisfactory Curtis advisement should inform the defendant that the defendant has the right to testify or not to testify; the decision to testify is personal; the prosecution would be able to cross-examine the defendant and thus prior felony convictions could be disclosed to the jury; the limited purpose for which such prior felony convictions would be admitted; and, the consequences of testifying.
People v. Gray, supra, 920 P.2d at 791.
In Gray, the supreme court concluded that the defendant was adequately advised concerning the limited admissibility of his prior felonies because the trial court had explained that, if he chose to testify, the district attorney...
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