People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Citation: 762 N.Y.S.2d 644,306 A.D.2d 691
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>EVERETT WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

306 A.D.2d 691

762 N.Y.S.2d 644

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,

v.EVERETT WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Mercure, J.P.

Decided June 19, 2003.

Crew III, Peters, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

Mercure, J.P.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with the crimes of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and petit larceny after depositing into his bank account a personal check drawn on the account of Janet Brennan and subsequently withdrawing those funds. Defendant claims that the check was given to him by Brennan in payment for remodeling work that he did on her apartment. Brennan denied giving defendant the check or that he did any repairs.

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate prison term of 3½ to 7 years on the conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and a concurrent term of one year on the petit larceny conviction. Defendant appeals, arguing that Supreme Court committed a number of errors in its procedural and evidentiary rulings. We disagree.

Initially, we reject defendant's argument that Supreme Court misapplied the Batson test in determining whether the People used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on the basis of race (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 94-98 [1986]).^[*] In objecting to the peremptory challenge, defense counsel relied solely on the fact that the only African American among the first 21 members of the venire panel was challenged. As the People argue, on the record before us, this contention alone was insufficient to "make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the [People] excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason" (People v Smocum, 99 NY2d 418, 421 [2003]; see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 508 [2002]; People v Jenkins, 84 NY2d 1001, 1003 [1994]; People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 268 [1993]). Nevertheless, the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination became "moot" when Supreme Court, instead of deciding whether defendant met his step-one burden under Batson, asked the People to state their reasons for striking the challenged juror (see People v Smocum, supra at 423). We conclude that the People then met their burden under step two of the Batson inquiry when they proffered a race-neutral reason for their challenge, explaining that the juror stated that she would have difficulty making a decision if the matter turned on the credibility of one witness over another (see generally People v King, 277 AD2d 708, 709-710 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 802 [2001]; People v Williamson [Maleek], 267 AD2d 487, 488-489 [1999], lvs denied 94 NY2d 882, 886 [2000]). Defense counsel's response, that the juror stated that she could make such an assessment, is not supported by the record and, thus, defendant did not meet his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the People's race-neutral explanation was pretextual (see People v Smocum, supra at 422; People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101, 111 [1995]).

Defendant further argues that Supreme Court erred by permitting Brennan to testify that, in addition to a personal check, defendant took jewelry from her apartment. "Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if it relates to a material issue of fact pertaining to the crime charged and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect" (People v Bolarinwa, 258 AD2d 827, 829 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1014 [1999] [citations omitted]). While evidence of uncharged crimes may not be admitted to establish a defendant's bad character or criminal propensity (see People v Blair, 90 NY2d 1003, 1004-1005 [1997]), it is admissible if relevant to other issues, including but not limited to "(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial" (People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; see People v Toland, 284 AD2d 798, 803 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 942 [2001]; People v Bolarinwa, supra at 829). Here, any prejudice to defendant was outweighed by the probative value of the testimony regarding missing jewelry, which was relevant to defendant's scheme or plan to take property from Brennan while staying at her apartment.

Defendant's argument that Supreme Court's Allen charge (Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]) coerced the jury into reaching a verdict is also unavailing. The court gave the charge in response to a note from the jury indicating that it was deadlocked after five hours of deliberations. The charge urged the jurors to reexamine the evidence and consider each other's points of view with open minds. The court stressed that the jurors should not surrender their honest convictions for the purpose of...