People v. Wilson

• Citation: 69 Cal.App.3d 631,138 Cal.Rptr. 259
• Decision Date: 11 May 1977
• Docket Number: Cr. 15668
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Randall Kyle WILSON, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 259

138 Cal.Rptr. 259

69 Cal.App.3d 631

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Randall Kyle WILSON, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 15668.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

May 11, 1977.

Hearing Denied July 6, 1977.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

Charles Morrone, Deputy Public Defender, San Jose, for defendant and respondent.

THE COURT: ^*

Respondent, Randall Wilson, was charged with robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) by an indictment filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court April 20, 1975. Following his arraignment and plea of not guilty, a hearing to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Penal Code section 1389 et seq. (Agreement on Detainers, hereafter referred to as the Agreement) was held. The motion was granted and the People have appealed.

The mandatory dismissal provision of the Agreement has never been construed by the California courts; therefore, it is necessary to review the chronology of events and statutory provisions in some detail.

On May 19, 1975, a complaint was filed in Santa Clara County Municipal Court alleging Court alleging that the respondent was guilty of a violation of Penal Code section 211. On August 28, 1975, respondent was serving a sentence of one to five years for breaking and entering at the central prison unit of the North Carolina Department of Corrections. On that date he received a notice entitled 'Agreement on Detainers: Form 1, NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT AND OF RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION.' The notice advised him of the complaint lodged in Santa Clara County. The notice also informed Wilson to notify the superintendent of the institution in which he was confined in the event he wished to request a final disposition of the matter.

On September 3, 1975, Wilson requested the legal department of the North Carolina Department of Corrections to file the necessary papers to dispose of the pending case. He was advised by the authorities that it would take one to two months to process his request. Wilson apparently felt such a delay was unwarranted and prepared his own request for a trial. The request was sent by registered mail and was received by the Santa Clara County Superior Court and district attorney's office on September 26, 1975.

On November 4, 1975, the district attorney's office received respondent's request for a trial and the formal certificate from the North Carolina Department of Corrections.

On March 30, 1976, the Santa Clara County Superior Court received respondent's motion for dismissal.

On April 22, 1976, Wilson was delivered to the sheriff of Santa Clara by the North Carolina prison authorities. Respondent's case was originally set for trial on April 27, 1976.

Penal Code section 1389 et seq. codifies an agreement between this state, forty-three other states and the federal government for disposing of charges lodged against persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions. In enacting the statute the Legislature stated, '. . . it is . . . the purpose of this agreement to encourage the Expeditious and Orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.' (Pen.Code, § 1389, art. I; emphasis added.) The Legislature further required that: 'This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.' (Pen.Code, § 1389, art. IX.)

The Agreement provides in parts pertinent to this appeal that: 'Article III(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: . . . The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.

'(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. . . .

'Article V(c) . . . in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction whether the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.' (Pen.Code, § 1389.)

The People contend the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment because the 180-day period should not have begun to run until November 4, 1975, when the district attorney's office received the certificate and respondent's request for final disposition from the North Carolina prison officials. This was approximately 174 days prior to the original trial date. The court below accepted respondent's position that the 180-day period commenced running on September 26, 1975, 213 days prior to the trial date, upon the receipt of respondent's unofficial request for a trial on the charges. In construing the statute we find that the determinative issue is not whether the unofficial request constituted substantial compliance with the Agreement; but rather, whether the two-month delay between respondent's original request for final disposition to the warden and the district attorney's receipt of the same from the North Carolina authorities was reasonable. The present record is inadequate to determine this issue and therefore the cause must be remanded.

The Agreement contains no provision by which the prisoner can informally notify the appropriate prosecuting official of the state lodging the detainer of his request for a trial. This is understandable in view of the purpose of the Agreement to provide an orderly disposition of detainers. That goal is achieved in part by the obligation placed on the warden of the prison in the sending state to forward, along with the prisoner's request for final disposition, the information set out in article III(a) regarding the prisoner's release date. This information is often necessary before the prosecuting officials can make an intelligent decision as to whether the person shall be returned for trial. (See Beebe v. State (Del.1975) 346 A.2d 169, 171.)

Respondent's self-help effort...