People v. Winston, No. 283055 (Mich. App. 5/21/2009)
| Decision Date | 21 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 283055,283055 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN DEMAR WINSTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Appeal from Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 07-010174-FC
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Owens and Donofrio, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of torture, MCL 750.85, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2). He was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 40 years for the torture conviction and 15 to 20 years for the assault conviction, and a jail term of three months for the domestic violence conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm in part and remand for entry of an amended judgment of sentence.
Defendant's convictions arose from an incident at a home shared by defendant and the victim, who had lived together in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship for three years. While in bed on April 22, 2007, the victim woke up and found defendant standing over her. Defendant hit the victim with an open hand and with a table leg that had been broken off an end table. He forced the victim to perform oral sex on him and used a butcher knife to cut her hair. He also had the victim cut her fingernails and toenails with a pair of nail clippers. Defendant told the victim that she needed to repent for her sins and called her derogatory names. The victim estimated that defendant's abuse lasted for over four hours. After the victim went to work in the morning, she was taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment. She made a police report later in the day while at a relative's house.
Defendant presented an insanity defense, but also challenged the victim's credibility and claimed that she gave an exaggerated account of the incident. The trial court found that defendant tortured and assaulted the victim but, upon considering the victim's failure to report that she was forced to perform oral sex to the police or anyone else, determined that the prosecutor failed to prove an additional charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his previous jury waiver denied him his constitutional right to a jury trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a jury waiver for an abuse of discretion. Wagner, supra at 559. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003); People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).
A valid waiver of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial requires a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. People v Mosly, 259 Mich App 90, 95-96; 672 NW2d 897 (2003). A trial court's compliance with MCR 6.402(B) creates a presumption of a valid waiver. Id. at 96. The rule requires that before accepting a jury waiver, a trial court must advise the defendant of the right and "ascertain, by addressing the defendant personally, that the defendant understands the right and that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up that right and to be tried by the court." See People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 595; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). Pursuant to MCL 763.3, the prosecutor's consent and the court's approval are also required for a defendant to be tried by the court without a jury. See People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 495; 487 NW2d 404 (1992) (); see also MCR 6.401.
Once the right to a jury trial is validly waived, a defendant has no constitutional right to withdraw the waiver. State v Morton, 648 SW2d 642, 643 (Mo App, 1983); Sharpe v State, 174 Ind App 652, 658; 369 NE2d 683 (1977). Rather, whether the waiver may be withdrawn is within the discretion of the trial court. People v Wagner, 114 Mich App 541, 558-559; 320 NW2d 251 (1982); Woodson v State, 501 NE2d 409 (Ind, 1986); Morton, supra at 643. "Because of a public policy favoring the orderly process of the administration of justice there are restrictions placed on the withdrawal of such waiver of jury before trial." People v Serr, 73 Mich App 19, 29; 250 NW2d 535 (1976).
The record does not support defendant's argument that the trial court denied his motion solely because of its prior reliance on the waiver to reschedule the trial date. To the contrary, as defendant acknowledges, after denying the motion, the trial court proceeded to again reschedule the trial in order to afford defense counsel an opportunity to investigate whether defendant could establish a defense based on lack of criminal responsibility. It is apparent that the trial court also considered defendant's letter expressing his desire to keep his original choice of a jury trial, the prosecutor's position that he was still amenable to a bench trial, and the waiver proceeding itself at which the court found that defendant knowingly and voluntary waived his right to a jury trial. According to the record of the waiver proceeding, defendant had an opportunity to speak with defense counsel before placing his oral waiver on the record and executing the written waiver form. The trial court advised defendant of his right to have a jury decide the case and ascertained, from direct questioning of defendant, that he was not threatened or promised anything for waiving his right to a jury trial.
Considering that the prosecutor was still amenable to a bench trial and defendant's failure to show any cause for withdrawing the waiver other than a change of heart, the trial court's decision does not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Defendant next challenges the trial court's findings regarding his insanity defense. Defendant argues that he should be granted a new trial or a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity because the opinion of the prosecutor's expert, Dr. Priya Rao, was insufficient to rebut the opinion of his expert, Dr. Firoza Van Horn, that he was not criminally responsible at the time of the incident. We disagree.
When considering a bench trial verdict, we review a trial court's resolution of questions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. People v Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich App 470, 473; 726 NW2d 746 (2006). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. "This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses." People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005).
Legal insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. MCL 768.21a(1) and (3); People v Stephan, 241 Mich App 482, 489; 616 NW2d 188 (2000). The insanity defense requires proof that the person, as a result of mental illness or being mentally retarded, "lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law." MCL 768.21a(1). "Mental illness" is defined in the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1400(g), as "a substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." See People v Mette, 243 Mich App 318, 325; 621 NW2d 713 (2000).
Here, the trial court was presented with testimony from two experts to determine if defendant met his burden of proof. Defendant's expert, Dr. Van Horn, testified that she formed her opinion based on interviews of defendant and family members, an examination of a transcript of the preliminary examination, and a review of the victim's medical records. Dr. Van Horn did not have an opportunity to review defendant's past medical records, but concluded from the history provided by defendant and his mother that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, with chronic paranoid ideation, at the time of the incident. Dr. Van Horn also testified about her understanding of the charged incident, as reported to her by defendant, which was that the victim threatened defendant with a knife during an argument and that this caused the situation to become out of control. Dr. Van Horn opined that defendant had an "intense irrational rage at the time of the incident . . . where he believe [sic] that he was in danger."
Dr. Rao's evaluation of defendant preceded Dr. Van Horn's evaluation. Like Dr. Van Horn, Dr. Rao did not have an opportunity to review defendant's medical records, but received information regarding defendant's history and his account of the incident from defendant. Although Dr. Rao testified that she found no reason to doubt defendant's report that he had a past diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, she opined that the incident was not the product of mental illness. Based on what defendant reported regarding his recent history, she found that From what defendant reported about becoming upset with the victim at the time of the incident, Dr. Rao opined that defendant became angry and had a "rage reaction."
In general, apart from its role as the trier of fact at the bench trial, the trial court had a duty under MRE 702 to ensure that the expert opinions, including the underlying data, were reliable....
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