People v. Wright

• Decision Date: 04 February 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 21692
• Citation: 30 Cal.3d 705,180 Cal.Rptr. 196,639 P.2d 267
• Parties: , 639 P.2d 267 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gregory WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 196

180 Cal.Rptr. 196

30 Cal.3d 705, 639 P.2d 267

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gregory WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 21692.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Feb. 4, 1982.

Jeff Reich, Fresno, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Mark E. Cutler, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger E. Venturi and Anthony L. Dicce, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

After guilty pleas to two counts of burglary in the second degree (Pen.Code, §§ 459, 460) defendant was sentenced to prison for three years on each count, the terms to run concurrently. On this appeal he attacks the validity of California Rules of Court, rules 421 and 423, providing criteria governing aggravation and mitigation for sentencing purposes.

In the first burglary defendant obtained entry to a residence by smashing the glass in the front door. The residents were out of town at the time. He took numerous items of jewelry, clothing and personal effects along with about $200 in coins and currency. The value of the stolen items was originally estimated at $1,500 but later increased to $2,300.

In the second offense occurring six days later, defendant obtained entry to a residence by breaking a window near the front door at a time when the resident was absent. He took stereo equipment, two color televisions, radios, jewelry, silverware and coins with an estimated value of $3,250. A neighbor observed a vehicle leaving the residence, and when defendant was apprehended after a high-speed chase he admitted the first offense and cooperated with authorities by pointing out the scene of other burglaries he committed.

Defendant had nine convictions over the prior twelve years ranging in seriousness from possession of liquor by a minor, loitering, grand theft auto, and grand theft from the person. Although never sent to prison, he had served county jail terms and been committed to California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotics addict.

Defendant expressed remorse in his interview with the probation officer. He stated that his motive for the offenses was to obtain money to return to his home in Oregon. He admitted using approximately $20 of heroin per week prior to his arrest.

Addressing the question of the alternative punishments of 16 months, or two or three years for second degree burglary (Pen.Code, §§ 461, 18), the probation officer recommended the maximum. He referred to one factor in mitigation, defendant's voluntary cooperation with the authorities subsequent to arrest. (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 423, subd. (b)(3).) The report referred to seven factors in aggravation: The crimes involved (1) multiple victims, (2) premeditation, (3) the taking of property of great monetary value, and defendant (4) had numerous prior convictions, (5) had been committed to the California Rehabilitation Center, (6) was on parole when the burglaries were committed, and (7) had unsatisfactory parole performance.

Following argument, the court found the single mitigating factor and the first four aggravating factors. The court denied probation, and because of the aggravating factors sentenced defendant to three years on each conviction, the terms to run concurrently.

Defendant urges that adoption of rules 421 and 423 are contrary to powers granted the Judicial Council by article VI, section 6 of our Constitution and that the legislative direction to adopt such rules lacks proper standards and is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Prior to 1977, a system of indeterminate sentences was followed in California. In 1976, the Legislature enacted the Determinate Sentencing Act (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139) adopting a system of specification of three possible terms of imprisonment for each offense (Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(2)). In determining which term to impose, "the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." (Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (b).) The Legislature directed the Judicial Council to "promote uniformity" in sentencing by adoption of rules providing criteria for trial judge consideration regarding imposition of lower or upper prison terms. (Pen.Code, § 1170.3, subd. (a).) ¹ The statutory authorization permits the council to adopt rules establishing circumstances in aggravation and mitigation relating to the crime and to the defendant. (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758, 159 Cal.Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396; People v. Cheatham (1979) 23 Cal.3d 829, 833, 153 Cal.Rptr. 585, 591 P.2d 1237 et seq.)

The Judicial Council adopted Sentencing Rules for the Superior Courts. (Cal.Rules of Court, rules 401-453.) The trial court must consider the criteria enumerated in the rules and may also consider additional criteria reasonably related to the decision and stated on the record. (Id. rules 408, 409.) Selection of the upper term is justified only if circumstances in aggravation are established by a preponderance of evidence and outweigh circumstances in mitigation. Similarly, selection of the lower term is justified only if circumstances in mitigation are established by a preponderance of the evidence and outweigh circumstances in aggravation.

Rule 421 lists circumstances in aggravation, ² rule 423 circumstances in mitigation. ³

Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution provides in part: "To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicial business and make recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute and perform other functions prescribed by statute."

The constitutional provision empowers the council without further legislative authorization to "adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute". The additional provision permitting the council to "perform other functions prescribed by statute" establishes that the council may perform additional functions when authorized by the Legislature.

The fact that the direct grant of power to adopt "rules" is limited to "court administration, practice and procedure" does not mean that the Legislature may not grant to the council additional power to adopt rules, including rules governing substantive matters. This section is phrased in terms of a grant of power to the council, not limitation, and the concluding phrase is a general grant of power to the Legislature to authorize the council to perform additional functions. Because the express provision authorizing the council to adopt rules for court "administration, practice and procedure" permits rule adoption without express legislative authorization, the quoted words should be read as limiting the council's power to act in the absence of legislative authorization, and not a limitation on the Legislature's general authority to confer power on state agencies expressly confirmed by the concluding phrase to "perform other functions prescribed by statute."

The authority of the Legislature to grant to the council power to adopt rules in addition to those directly authorized by article VI, section 6 has been recognized in prior cases. Under section 6, the direct authorization to adopt procedural rules is limited to rules "not inconsistent with statute", and in In re Marriage of McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 678, footnote 4, 100 Cal.Rptr. 140, 493 P.2d 868, the court recognized that the Legislature by adoption of statute had authorized the council to adopt rules superseding other statutes. (See also In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 233, 150 Cal.Rptr. 63; In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 365, fn. 4, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626; In re Marriage of Dover (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 675, fn. 3, 93 Cal.Rptr. 384.) We conclude there is no violation of article VI, section 6.

An unconstitutional delegation of legislative power occurs when the Legislature confers upon an administrative agency unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy decisions. (Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 816, 114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d 617; Kugler v. Yokum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 376, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.) "This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions." (Kugler v. Yokum, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 376-377, 71 Cal.Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d 303.)

The doctrine prohibiting delegations of legislative power does not invalidate reasonable grants of power to an administrative agency, when suitable safeguards are established to guide the power's use and to protect against misuse. (Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 308, 313, 134 Cal.Rptr. 189, 556 P.2d 289; Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., supra, 11 Cal.3d 801, 817, 114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d 617; People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dor ado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 507, 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193.) The Legislature must make the fundamental policy determinations, but after declaring the legislative goals and establishing a yardstick guiding the administrator, it may authorize the administrator to adopt rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 201, 172 Cal.Rptr. 487, 624 P.2d 1215; Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., supra, 11 Cal.3d 801, 817, 114 Cal.Rptr. 577, 523 P.2d...