People v. Yazum

• Decision Date: 30 December 1963
• Parties: , 196 N.E.2d 263 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John J. YAZUM, Also Known as Larry Jamison, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 626

246 N.Y.S.2d 626

13 N.Y.2d 302, 196 N.E.2d 263

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John J. YAZUM, Also Known as Larry Jamison, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 30, 1963.

John T. Casey, Dist. Atty. (Pierce H. Russell, Troy, of counsel), for appellant.

Francis Warren Travers, Troy, for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

This appeal concerns the admissibility of evidence of flight in a criminal prosecution. Defendant's conviction for robbery rested, in part, upon testimony that he attempted to escape from custody. After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, defense counsel moved to set aside the verdict on the ground that the evidence of flight was inadmissible because, at the time of the attempted escape, defendant was also detained under an Ohio warrant for parole violation. It was urged that, when a person is detained for two or more crimes, flight is not relevant to show guilt of either. The trial court denied the motion but the Appellate Division has reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that flight, while generally admissible as evidencing a consciousness of guilt, cannot be admitted where it is 'impossible to tell to which, if either, of the charges the inference of guilt should be attributed.' (18 A.D.2d 409, 411, 239 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688.)

It is our opinion that the evidence of defendant's attempted escape was properly admitted. It is quite true that the attempted escape might have been motivated by a consciousness of guilt of the Ohio parole violation as well as by guilt feelings over the crime involved here. Indeed the defendant may have fled because of guilt of both, or for some other innocent reason. This spectrum of possibilities, however, does not differ materially from that present in any case in which a defendant's flight is introduced in evidence. This court has always recognized the ambiguity of evidence of flight and insisted that the jury be closely instructed as to its weakness as an indication of guilt of the crime charged. (Ryan v. People, 79 N.Y. 593; People v. Fiorentino, 197 N.Y. 560, 91 N.E. 195; People v. Leyra, 1 N.Y.2d 199, 151 N.Y.S.2d 658, 134 N.E.2d 475.) Such instructions were given here.

The limited probative force of flight evidence, however, is no reason for its exclusion. The distinction between admissibility and sufficiency must be borne in mind. Flight is a form of circumstantial evidence; and any circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction, must be inconsistent with all reasonable hypotheses of innocence (People v. Razezicz, 206 N.Y. 249, 269-270, 99 N.E. 557, 564-565; People v. Taddio, 292 N.Y. 488, 55 N.E.2d 749; People v. Carpenito, 292 N.Y. 498, 55 N.E.2d 754). But the admissibility of each piece of circumstantial evidence is subject to no such rule. Generally speaking, all that is necessary is that the evidence have relevance, that in tend to convince that the fact sought to be established is so. That it is equivocal or that it is consistent with suppositions other than guilt does not render it inadmissible (1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), §§ 31, 32). Evidence of flight as indicative of a consciousness of guilt is a classic example of the admissibility of equivocal circumstantial evidence; and unless we are to overrule a very long line of cases upholding its admissibility under proper instructions, the correctness of the judgment appealed from must depend on the validity of the distinction drawn between the sort of flight evidence that is concededly admissible and that involved here. We believe that no such distinction should be made. It is common in cases of attempted flight to find that the defendant is charged with several crimes, or, at the time of flight,...