People v. Zelaya

• Decision Date: 27 March 2019
• Docket Number: Ind.No. 770–13,2013–06915
• Citation: 170 A.D.3d 1206,96 N.Y.S.3d 683
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Juan Pablo ZELAYA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

170 A.D.3d 1206
96 N.Y.S.3d 683

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,
v.
Juan Pablo ZELAYA, Appellant.

2013–06915
Ind.No. 770–13

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted - December 7, 2018
March 27, 2019

Carol E. Castillo, East Setauket, NY, for appellant.

Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Caren C. Manzello of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

170 A.D.3d 1206

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The evidence at the suppression hearing demonstrated that when a police officer arrived at the complainant's home in response to a report of a domestic incident, the officer asked the defendant if he knew why the police had been called, and the defendant gave an inculpatory response. Subsequently, after being taken to the police precinct and advised of his Miranda rights, (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), the defendant gave oral and written statements to the police. We agree with the County Court's determination that the defendant's initial pre- Miranda statement to the officer was not the product

170 A.D.3d 1207

of a custodial interrogation (see People v. Paulman , 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239 ; People v. Huffman , 41 N.Y.2d 29, 33–34, 390 N.Y.S.2d 843, 359 N.E.2d 353 ; People v. Valentin , 118 A.D.3d 823, 824, 987 N.Y.S.2d 227 ; People v. Hardy , 77 A.D.3d 133, 141, 907 N.Y.S.2d 244 ). We also agree with the court's determination that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them at the precinct prior to giving his subsequent statements (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ; People v. Hall , 145 A.D.3d 915, 916, 44 N.Y.S.3d 102 ;

96 N.Y.S.3d 685

People v. Brown , 113 A.D.3d 785, 785, 978 N.Y.S.2d 862 ). The evidence at the suppression hearing further demonstrated that an officer translated the Miranda rights into Spanish for the Spanish-speaking defendant and that the defendant's written statement was read back to him in Spanish before he signed and adopted the statement as his own (see People v. Mora , 57 A.D.3d 571, 572, 868 N.Y.S.2d 722 ; People v. Fabricio , 307 A.D.2d 882, 883, 763 N.Y.S.2d 619, affd 3 N.Y.3d 402, 787 N.Y.S.2d 219, 820 N.E.2d 863 ). Consequently, we agree with the court's determination to deny that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial based upon a prospective juror's comments and the testimony of two witnesses indicating that the defendant was incarcerated pending trial is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Brehon , 267 A.D.2d 318, 318, 699 N.Y.S.2d 897 ; People v. Jackson , 239 A.D.2d 433, 433). In any event, this contention is without merit. Evidence indicating that a defendant was incarcerated pending trial may impair a defendant's presumption of innocence (see People v. Jenkins , 88 N.Y.2d 948, 951, 647 N.Y.S.2d 157, 670 N.E.2d 441 ; People v. Fabregas , 130 A.D.3d 939, 940, 15 N.Y.S.3d 794 ; People v. Machicote , 251 A.D.2d 684, 684, 676 N.Y.S.2d 472 ; People v. Connor , 137 A.D.2d 546, 550, 524 N.Y.S.2d 287 ). Here, however, neither the prospective juror nor the two witnesses specifically indicated that the defendant had been incarcerated pending or during trial. Given that the jury was aware that...