Perkinson v. Perkinson, 49
| Decision Date | 31 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 49,49 |
| Citation | 802 S.W.2d 600 |
| Parties | Gloria June Houser Tarver PERKINSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Franklin Dean PERKINSON, Defendant-Appellant. 802 S.W.2d 600 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Selma Cash Paty, Paty, Rymer & Ulin, P.C., Chattanooga, for defendant-appellant.
Roger E. Jenne, Jenne, Scott & Sellers, Cleveland, for plaintiff-appellee.
This divorce case presents an appeal by the husband from the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the Chancery Court of Bradley County's refusal to award him $150,000 pursuant to the terms of an antenuptial agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The husband, 47, and the wife, 46, were married in 1986. The trial court found the wife to be the wealthy widow of a beer distributor and the husband a not-so-wealthy pipe fitter, since retired. Prior to their marriage, they entered into an antenuptial agreement, prepared by the wife's attorney.
After eighteen months of marriage, the wife filed suit for divorce, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. The complaint recites, "Prior to the marriage of these parties, they entered into an antenuptial agreement, disposing of their rights and interest in assets, in the event of a divorce." The husband's answer denied he was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment but admitted the parties had entered into an antenuptial agreement. Subsequently, the husband filed a counter-complaint alleging cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences and praying for alimony and specific performance of the antenuptial agreement.
The Chancellor granted the wife a divorce and held, erroneously as found by the Court of Appeals, that granting the wife a divorce "eliminates the question of alimony" to the husband. The Court further held that enforcement of the antenuptial agreement would be "against public policy." Enforcement of the antenuptial agreement is the only issue presented on appeal to this Court.
In affirming the trial court's refusal to enforce the antenuptial agreement, the Court of Appeals stated only, "We agree with the conclusion of the Chancellor that the Appellant was not entitled to a share of the Plaintiff's separate estate."
Antenuptial agreements regarding marital property do not violate public policy. Even before the enactment of T.C.A. Sec. 36-3-501, which is not mentioned by the trial court or the Court of Appeals, the courts had declared that the public policy of Tennessee favors antenuptial agreements. The decision of Spurlock v. Brown, 91 Tenn. 241, 18 S.W. 868 (1892), recognized the validity of antenuptial agreements, and the Court in Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213 Tenn. 117, 372 S.W.2d 300, 303 (1963), stated, "Antenuptial property settlements are favored by public policy." Tennessee Code Annotated Sec. 36-4-121(g) contains the provision, "Nothing in this section shall affect validity of an antenuptial agreement which is enforceable under Sec. 36-3-501." Section 36-3-501 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary except as provided in Sec. 36-3-502, any antenuptial or prenuptial agreement entered into by spouses concerning property owned by either spouse before the marriage which is the subject of such agreement shall be binding upon any court having jurisdiction over such spouses and/or such agreement if such agreement is determined in the discretion of such court that it was entered into by such spouses freely, knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion of duress or undue influence upon either spouse. The terms of such agreement shall be enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of contract terms.
The antenuptial agreement in this case was executed three years after the enactment of the statute codified as T.C.A. Sec. 36-4-121, pertinent provisions of which include the following:
(a) In all actions for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court having jurisdiction thereof may, upon request of either party, and prior to any determination as to whether it is appropriate to order the support and maintenance of one party by the other, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just....
(b) For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Marital property" means all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce, ... including income from, and any increase in value during the marriage, of property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.... As used in this definition, "substantial contribution" may include, but not be limited to, the direct or indirect contribution of a spouse as homemaker, wage earner, parent, or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court having jurisdiction thereof may determine. Property shall be considered marital property as defined by this subsection for the sole purpose of dividing assets upon divorce and for no other purpose; and
(2) "Separate property" means all real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage; property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage; income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before marriage except when characterized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1); and property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent.
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(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties regarding the division of property. Nothing in this section shall affect validity of an antenuptial agreement which is enforceable under Sec. 36-3-501. (Emphasis added.)
The pertinent provisions of the antenuptial agreement in this case are as follows:
SECOND ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
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F. The parties understand if their marriage were to end in a divorce, Tennessee is an equitable distribution state which means generally the parties [sic] marital property, which can include separate properties brought to the marriage by each spouse, will be divided approximately equally between the parties. The parties are also aware of the case of Duncan vs. Duncan, 652 SW2d 913, holding that provisions of an...
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