Persaud v. State
Decision Date | 23 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. SC02-2198., No. SC02-1406, No. SC02-1858 |
Citation | 838 So.2d 529 |
Parties | Floyd PERSAUD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Wardell Sanders, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Raymond Baker, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jo Ann Barone Kotzen, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner Floyd Persaud.
Wardell Sanders, Polk City, FL, Petitioner, pro se.
No appearance for Respondent.
Raymond Baker, Raiford, FL, for Petitioner, pro se.
No appearance for Respondent.
Petitioners Floyd Persaud and Wardell Sanders have filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, see art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const., seeking review of the decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Persaud v. State, 814 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Sanders v. State, 805 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Petitioner Raymond Baker has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, see art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const., seeking review of the decision of the Fifth District in Baker v. State, 820 So.2d 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). We consolidate these cases for purposes of this opinion and, for the reasons expressed below, dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdiction.
The decision from the Fourth District in Persaud's case reads in its entirety: Persaud, 814 So.2d at 1101. Persaud argues that "[h]abeas corpus is the proper remedy to challenge the denial of [his] claim in the Fourth District Court of Appeal that [he] was denied due process under the Constitution of the United States by not receiving effective assistance of trial counsel." He further states that "[i]t is from [the] affirmance [of the trial court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, by] the Fourth District [that he] seeks a writ of habeas corpus herein." Persaud indicates that he filed his petition in this Court in an effort to "exhaust his state remedies before filing a petition for federal habeas relief" as is required by the United States Supreme Court's decision in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). In an apparent effort to demonstrate why the Fourth District's affirmance of the trial court's summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion was in error, Persaud argues at length in his petition why the trial court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and ordered a new trial.1
The decision from the Fifth District in Sanders' case reads in its entirety: Sanders, 805 So.2d at 1064. Sanders argues that his sentence for the crime of lewd and lascivious assault upon a child is illegal under this Court's decision in Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). Sanders indicates that he unsuccessfully challenged the illegality of his sentence under Heggs in the trial court in a motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and on appeal from the trial court's denial of relief in the Fifth District. Sanders also asserts that "[a] complete exhaustion of judicial remedies has been thoroughly met by the Petitioner" with regard to his illegal sentence claim and that he now seeks relief from this Court. In his prayer for relief, Sanders asks this Court for an order "reversing and remanding the instant case for a guidelines sentence." These statements in Sanders' petition collectively indicate that he intends for his petition in this Court to be the next step in the review process relative to his illegal sentence claim, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.
The decision from the Fifth District in Baker's case reads in its entirety: Baker, 820 So.2d at 382. Baker asks this Court to compel the Fifth District to recall its mandate in his case, arguing that the Fifth District clearly "overlooked and or misapprehended" its duty to correct illegal sentences "whenever presented with [a] motion indicating that [a] sentence is truely [sic] illegal." Baker explains the procedural history of his case as follows:
(Citations to accompanying appendix omitted.) At the conclusion of this procedural history, Baker states that he "has no other available remedy to redress the issues presented herein thus he seeks mandamus relief." This statement, when coupled with the procedural history and arguments presented in the petition, indicates that Baker intends for this mandamus proceeding to be a review of the district court's decision in his case, as opposed to a true original writ proceeding.
This Court's decisions in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, S.A., 385 So.2d 1369 (Fla.1980), and Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981), when read together, stand for the proposition that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this Court. In Dodi Publishing, we rejected "the assertion that we should reexamine a case cited in a per curiam decision to determine if the contents of that cited case ... conflict with other appellate decisions." 385 So.2d at 1369. In Jollie, we reaffirmed that "mere citation PCA decisions ... will remain nonreviewable by this Court" and distinguished those district court PCA opinions that cite as controlling authority "a case that is pending review in or has been reversed by this Court." 405 So.2d at 421.
The decision in Dodi Publishing explicitly addressed this Court's lack of jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions from the district courts of appeal that merely cite to a case not pending on review in this Court. However, this Court has historically applied the reasoning of Dodi Publishing to other district court citation per curiam decisions, like those in Persaud's and Baker's cases, which merely cite to a statute, a rule,2 or a decision of the United States Supreme Court or this Court. See, e.g., Herrera v. State, 804 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA) (, )review dismissed, 819 So.2d 135 (Fla.2002); Colonel v. State, 756 So.2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA) (, )review dismissed, 767 So.2d 455 (Fla.2000); Anderson v. State, 748 So.2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (, )review dismissed, 753 So.2d 563 (Fla.2000).3 Our decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1988), explains why our application of the reasoning in Dodi Publishing beyond its specific facts, in each of these described circumstances, is entirely consistent with the parameters of this Court's limited discretionary review jurisdiction.
As we explained in Florida Star, this Court's discretionary review jurisdiction can be invoked only from a district court decision "that expressly addresses a question of law within the four corners of the opinion itself" by "contain[ing] a statement or citation effectively establishing a point of law upon which the decision rests." Florida Star, 530 So.2d at 288. We further explained that "there can be no actual conflict discernible in an opinion containing only a citation to other case law unless one of the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court, or has been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless the citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court or of this Court." Id. at 288 n. 3. This is true because, in those cases where the district court has not explicitly identified a conflicting decision, it is necessary for the district court to have included some facts in its decision so that the question of law addressed by the district court in its decision can be discerned by this Court. See Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Shelly v. State
... ... Gandy v. State , 846 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 2003) ("This Court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this Court." (quoting Persaud v. State , 838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003) ). Despite these oversights, given the majority's lengthy recitation of facts and legal analysis of the " Edwards rule" issue, see Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (discussing "the Edwards rule"), ... ...
-
Miles v. Weingrad
... ... Raphael, 18 So.3d at 1156. 2 Relying on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.1995), the district court posited that whether section 766.118(4) is ... Gandy v. State, 846 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.2003) (quoting Persaud v. State, 838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla.2003) ). We do not have jurisdiction to review cases that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review ... ...
-
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Data Targeting, Inc.
... ... Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So.2d 1304, 1305 (Fla.1980). In Williams v. State, 913 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla.2005), this Court emphasized that the all writs provision of the Florida Constitution “does not constitute a separate ... See Persaud v. State, 838 So.2d 529 (Fla.2003) (stating that this Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district ... ...
-
Castillo v. Florida
...ISAAC D. CASTILLO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent-Appellee.No. 12-14913UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITNovember 4, 2015 DO NOT PUBLISHD.C. Docket No ... Court has ruled that it "does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm." Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 531-32 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam). Because the Court of Appeal affirmed Castillo's case per curiam without explanation, the ... ...