Peterson v. Stafford, C6-92-1658
| Decision Date | 09 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. C6-92-1658,C6-92-1658 |
| Citation | 490 N.W.2d 418 |
| Parties | Roger A. PETERSON, Petitioner, v. R.H. STAFFORD, Washington County Auditor, Joan Anderson Growe, Secretary of State, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.36, subd. 4 (1990), prescribing the form of the ballot used in judicial elections, and Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.36, subd. 5 (1990), mandating the "incumbency" designation on the ballot, do not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. 1, Sec. 2. Gustafson v. Holm, 232 Minn. 118, 44 N.W.2d 443 (1950), reaffirmed.
Roger A. Peterson, Theresa M. Dosch, Minneapolis, for petitioner.
Jocelyn F. Olson, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Secretary of State.
Richard D. Hodsdon, Washington County Atty.'s Office, Stillwater, for Washington County Auditor.
John E. Grzybek, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Deborah Gilman, Civil Liberties Union, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Minnesota Civil Liberties Union.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
On September 1, 1992, Roger A. Peterson, a candidate for the office of Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, filed a petition pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.44 (1990) invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court 1 and seeking a judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.36, subds. 4, 5 (1990). This opinion confirms the order filed on September 23, 1992 denying the petition.
On July 15, 1992, petitioner filed an affidavit of candidacy, identifying the office of associate justice now held by Associate Justice Sandra S. Gardebring as the particular office for which he is a candidate. Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.06, subd. 6 (1990). 2 The gravamen of this petition, filed 48 days later, is that the form of the ballot used in judicial elections, as defined by Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.36, subd. 4, 3 and the incumbency designation mandated by Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.36, subd. 5 4 operate individually and in concert to create an unfair advantage for the judicial incumbent. This advantage, petitioner contends, is not only inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Minn.Stat. Sec. 204B.35, subd. 2, 5 but also is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and Minn. Const. art. 1, Sec. 2. 6
The petitioner's challenge is to the essence of the traditional judicial election process and, while he is now a candidate for judicial office, the claims asserted have no specific relation to his candidacy. In that context and upon a contention by the respondent secretary of state, we first address the timeliness of the petition.
The very nature of matters implicating election laws and proceedings routinely requires expeditious consideration and disposition by courts facing considerable time constraints imposed by the ballot preparation and distribution process. As a result, we have examined applications for relief not only on their merits, but also from the perspective of whether the applicant acted promptly in initiating proceedings. See Mattson v. McKenna, 301 Minn. 103, 222 N.W.2d 273 (1974). 7
The petitioner claims to have been unaware of the fact that the ballot form would include an incumbency designation until he received his absentee ballot in late August 1992; yet, that designation has appeared on every judicial election ballot on which a sitting judge has sought reelection since 1949. 8 Moreover, issues substantially similar to those raised herein were addressed and decided in 1950 in Gustafson v. Holm, 232 Minn. 118, 44 N.W.2d 443 (1950). Under those circumstances, we are not persuaded that petitioner, who allowed 48 days to elapse from the time of filing his affidavit of candidacy to the filing of his petition, acted with dispatch in asserting a challenge to legislation which has existed in various forms but in substantially similar design for over 40 years.
Nevertheless, because of the nature of these proceedings, we have chosen to address the merits of this broad challenge to the traditional judicial election process. Specifically, petitioner contends that the designation on the ballot by entitlement as the "(name of incumbent) seat," coupled with the descriptive word after the incumbent candidate's name, violates equal protection constitutional guarantees by creating and preserving to the incumbent an unfair advantage. Further, he urges the court to invalidate statutes which purport to treat judicial incumbent candidates differently from any other candidates for public office in the State of Minnesota. In our analysis of this focal issue, we take the opportunity to identify the historical underpinnings and to trace briefly the evolution of this judicial election process.
The methods by which the federal system and other states initially select and then elect or retain judges are varied, yet the explicit or implicit goal of the constitutional provisions and enabling legislation is the same: to create and maintain an independent judiciary as free from political, economic and social pressure as possible so judges can decide cases without those influences. That that goal guided the framers of the federal Constitution to grant life tenure to judges is evidenced by the writings of Alexander Hamilton 9 which expressed his concern that life tenure would provide judges sufficient security to allow them to rule with their consciences and according to the Constitution, rather than to bow to political notions. While the framers of our state constitution have developed a system of selection and election quite different from that federal scheme, they too designed a plan to recognize the uniqueness and independence of the state judiciary.
As early as 1857, those who attended the two separate state constitutional conventions 10 devoted considerable debate to the process by which the judiciary was to be selected and concluded that the now-recognized goal of distinguishing judicial elections from elections for other offices could best be accomplished by providing judges with 7-year terms. 11 In practical effect, because the length of term differed from that of other elective offices, judicial elections were held at times other than those routinely scheduled for those other offices. However, after 1883, when the term was reduced to 6 years, 12 the difficulties associated with partisan judicial elections became more evident. Thus, the selection debate resurfaced in significant respects in 1912 when the legislature enacted separate, nonpartisan ballot legislation; 13 in 1948 when a special constitutional convention composed of public and legislative members recommended wholesale revisions to the judicial article of the state constitution, detailing, among other practices dealing with regulation of the judiciary, a comprehensive scheme for elections when an incumbent is seeking reelection; 14 in the 1949 statutory amendments involving the forerunner of the statutory provisions here at issue; 15 again in the 1956 constitutional amendments to article 6, sections 8, 10 and 11; 16 and, finally, in 1972 in a report in which a newly convened constitutional study commission subcommittee recommended the implementation of a "Missouri plan" in addition to a change in the basic structure of the judiciary. 17
Reflected in the considerable memorials to the recurring debates is the common thread of both public and legislative recognition that judicial elections are unique in this state's comprehensive elective scheme, demonstrating the fact that the powers conferred on the judicial branch differ markedly from those exercised by the other two branches of government.
Article 6 of our constitution vests "[t]he judicial power of the state in a supreme court * * * a court of appeals, a district court, and such other courts * * * as the legislature may establish." To assure competence in the exercise of the judicial power, the constitution specifies that holders of a judicial office must be "learned in the law." Minn. Const. art. 6, Sec. 5. Implicit in this requirement is recognition that those elected as judges will be subject to the restrictive canons of conduct governing the profession of law. 18
The need for a competent, impartial, and independent judiciary creates, however, the potential for conflicts of interest when the judicial office is an elective office. These potential conflicts arise between the demands of an election process and the judicial impartiality required to decide cases free from political maneuvering. To counter this potential conflict, the 1912 Legislature decreed that elections for judicial office be nonpartisan.
This inherent tension in the judicial election process was again recognized in a committee report to the 1972 Constitutional Study Commission, which urged the adoption of a retention-type election for incumbent judges. The report stated:
The committee also believes that additional qualified lawyers will seek appointment to judicial office under such a method of selection. Under the present system, too many qualified and competent lawyers who are successful practitioners decline to be considered for fear they will give up their practice only to be defeated by a politician with a popular name at some future election.
Judicial Branch Committee Report, Minnesota Constitutional Study Commission, at 24-25 (1972). In its report, the committee testified to the difficulties facing judges who seek reelection and the restrictions placed on their candidacy:
No one debates the desirability of having judges responsive to the people. Nevertheless, the public finds it distasteful for judges to become embroiled in politics. They have no platform, they can make no promises, and they must remain completely uncommitted to other persons in politics or any other area of civic activity. It is unbecoming for judges to become so deeply...
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