Peterson v. State
| Decision Date | 28 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 0686, Sept. Term, 2009.,0686, Sept. Term, 2009. |
| Citation | 10 A.3d 838,196 Md.App. 563 |
| Parties | Lionel Lamont PETERSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Allison P. Brasseaux (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Jawor (Douglas Gansler, Attorney General, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, KEHOE, PAUL E. ALPERT, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Following a March 25, 2009 trial, appellant Lionel Lamont Peterson was convicted, by a jury sitting in the Circuit Courtfor Wicomico County, of second degree assault, second degree assault on a law enforcement officer, theft under $500, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, failure to return or remain at the scene of an accident, failure of a driver involved in an accident to render reasonable assistance, and failure of a driver involved in an accident to report an injury.1 On May 13, 2009, the trial court sentenced him to a total of three years in prison. 2 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant presents three questions for our consideration:
For the following reasons, finding neither error nor abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm the judgments.
On July 13, 2008, off-duty Wicomico County Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Robin Roberts and his wife went to a Wal-Mart store to purchase a toaster. As Roberts and his wife entered the store, they heard its anti-theft alarm, and Roberts observed an African-American male, later identified as appellant'sbrother, Howard Peterson, running through the lobby while pushing an empty shopping cart.
Roberts watched the man exit the store and proceed to a black Cadillac; upon his arrival at the car, the man unfastened his pants and pulled out a large package of what Roberts believed to be stolen meat. Roberts walked to the car, identified himselfas a police officer, and showed the man his credentials. He asked the man to retrieve what he had placed in the car and return to the Wal-Mart store. The man placed the large package of meat in the shopping cart and slammed the cart into Roberts. He then fled toward the Wal-Mart store.
While pushing the shopping cart away, Roberts noticed a second man, whom he identified at trial as appellant, walk around the Cadillac and get into the driver's seat. Placing his hand on the driver's side exterior mirror, Roberts again identified himself as a police officer and advised appellant to stop the vehicle. Appellant said nothing, but he backed the vehicle up, running over Roberts' foot. Roberts advised appellant he was under arrest, but appellant backed up farther and turned the steering wheel to the left, striking Roberts on his left knee and knocking him to the ground.3 Without alerting police or rendering any assistance to Roberts, appellant exited the Wal-Mart parking lot in the Cadillac.
Salisbury City Police Department Officer Tom Funk was dispatched to the Wal-Mart following a report that someone had struck a law enforcement officer with a vehicle. En route to the Wal-Mart store, Funk saw a vehicle fitting the broadcast description of the suspect vehicle driving in the opposite direction at a high rate of speed. Funk turned around and attempted to stop the vehicle; after reaching speeds of almost 100 miles per hour, Funk caught up to the vehicle and instigated a traffic stop. He observed two African-Americanmales in the vehicle and saw one of them reach into the back seat and attempt to cover with a shirt a "very large pile of meat and shrimp."
Upon approaching the driver's side of the vehicle and identifying himself as a police officer, Funk advised that he had stopped the vehicle because it matched the description of a vehicle involved in a suspected crime and because it had been traveling at a high rate of speed. Shortly thereafter, Officer John Dimare arrived at the scene, and the officers separated the two men and read them their Miranda 4 rights.
Before Funk could ask the driver, whom he identified at trial as appellant, any questions, appellant told Funk that "he didn't hit no one." When Funk asked him what he meant by that, appellant told him that "some guy at Wal-Mart tried talking to him," but that appellant did not do anything wrong. Appellant told Funk that he believed the man at the Wal-Mart to be a police officer.
After first denying to Funk that he had struck anyone with his vehicle, appellant admitted that Roberts "had made contact with his vehicle" and that he had seen Roberts fall. To Funk, the vehicle's passenger, appellant's brother, Howard Peterson, also admitted to having been at the Wal-Mart and to having had contact with a man he believed to be a police officer.
While interviewing the brothers, Funk was alerted to a report of a theft or shoplifting incident from a Food Lion supermarket in Delmar. After Funk and Dimare reported their observation of packages of meat labeled with Food Lion stickers in the stopped vehicle, another officer transported Debbie Damico, a witness from Food Lion, to the location ofthe traffic stop; she identified appellant—with "100 percent" certainty—as a suspect in a theft of meat and seafood from the Food Lion store.5 Appellant was then placed under arrest for assault and theft charges.
After the State rested its case, appellant, representing himself, 6 called his brother, Howard Peterson, to testify on his behalf. Howard testified that as he exited the Wal-Mart store and proceeded to the Cadillac on the date in question, he saw Roberts "just standing there" by Howard's car. Roberts said he was a police officer and told Howard to "give me what you got." Howard said that in response to Roberts' demand, he went to his car and placed a piece of meat that had come from Food Lion into a shopping cart. Then, Roberts "shot by" him and may have tripped over a concrete pillar, falling to the ground. Appellant then backed up the car. Howard saw Roberts " just sitting" on the ground, and Howard got into the car, which left the area.
The jury found appellant guilty of all charges, save for first degree assault, and he was sentenced, as noted above.
Additional relevant facts will be set forth as necessary.
As his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred, by failing to comply with the mandates of Maryland Rule 4-215, when ruling that appellant waived his right to counsel by inaction and requiring him to go to trial without an attorney. The State disagrees, arguing that the trial court met all the requirements of Rule 4-215 and correctly determined that appellant waived his right to counsel by his own inaction in failing to secure an attorney.
The right to counsel is " 'basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, and ... is guaranteed by the federal and Maryland constitutions to every defendant in all criminal prosecutions.' " Grant v. State, 414 Md. 483, 489, 995 A.2d 975 (2010) (quoting Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 281-82, 523 A.2d 597 (1987)). To protect the fundamental right to counsel, aswell as the correlative right to self-representation, Maryland Rule 4-215 7 wasadopted; the Rule, which sets forth the "mechanisms by which a defendant can waive [his] right to counsel, establishes fixed and stringent procedures governing waiver in order to ensure that this right is protected." Grant, 414 Md. at 489, 995 A.2d 975. The Rule provides a checklist of requirements to be completed before a judge may consider a defendant's waiver of counsel valid. The requirements of Rule 4-215 are mandatory, and a court's failure to complystrictly with the Rule constitutes reversible error. State v. Camper, 415 Md. 44, 55, 998 A.2d 352 (2010).
For a criminal defendant to waive his right to counsel effectively, he must " 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those relinquished benefits." Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634, 980 A.2d 435 (2009) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Not all waivers of the right to counsel, however, require an affirmative act on the part of a defendant. A defendant may waive his right to counsel through inaction. Grant, 414 Md. at 490, 995 A.2d 975.
Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 204, 931 A.2d 1098 (2007) (quoting McCracken v. State, 150 Md.App. 330, 356-57, 820 A.2d 593 (200...
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