Peterson v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 08 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. LA,LA
• Citation: 642 P.2d 1305,181 Cal.Rptr. 784,31 Cal.3d 147
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 642 P.2d 1305 Donald R. PETERSON et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY, Respondent; Norman THOMPSON, Real Party in Interest. Civ.31439.

Page 784

181 Cal.Rptr. 784

31 Cal.3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305

Donald R. PETERSON et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY, Respondent;

Norman THOMPSON, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. No. LA 31439.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 8, 1982.

Heily, Blase, Ellison & Wellcome, and Jay H. Sorensen, Ventura, for petitioners.

Leonard Sacks, Northridge, Harvey R. Levine, San Diego, Edward I. Pollock, Los Angeles, Robert E. Cartwright, San Diego, William M. Shernoff, Stephen I. Zetterberg, Claremont, Sanford M. Gage, Beverly Hills, Arne Werchick, San Francisco, Ian Herzog Los Angeles, Glen T. Bashore, North Fork, Wylie Aitken, Santa Ana, Victoria J. De Goff, Berkeley, and James R. McGrath, Glendale, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Archbald & Spray, Robert F. Harris, Santa Barbara, and Heather Scott Cissna, Crestline, for real party in interest.

Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett, Patrick A. Mesisca, Jr., Los Angeles, Clifford H. Woosley, La Puente, and Peter J. Godfrey, South Pasadena, as amici curiae on behalf of real party in interest.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

Petitioners (hereafter plaintiffs) seek a writ of mandate to command respondent court to grant their motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Their petition presents the question whether the rule announced in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854, that punitive damages are recoverable from an intoxicated driver who causes personal injury, should apply retroactively to accidents that occurred or complaints filed before this court decided Taylor on August 21, 1979. Assessing the considerations governing retroactive application of overruling decisions, we conclude that the Taylor rule should be applied retroactively.

Plaintiff Donald Peterson was a passenger in a car driven by defendant/real party in interest Thompson. The original complaint seeks recovery of damages for personal injuries to Donald Peterson and by plaintiff Doris Peterson for loss of services of Donald as husband and provider. Plaintiffs seek to allege that defendant drove with excessive speed after consuming alcohol, and that defendant lost control of the vehicle causing personal injury to plaintiff Donald Peterson. The proposed complaint further alleges that defendant acted with knowledge that probable serious injury to others would result and in conscious disregard of the safety of plaintiff and others. If allowed, such allegations could support a finding of malice within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294 ¹ as interpreted by Taylor, and thus an award of punitive damages.

The automobile accident occurred on April 24, 1979. Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on April 11, 1980. On August 21, 1979, between the two cited dates, this court decided Taylor, supra, holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action against an intoxicated driver who causes personal injury.

In July 1980, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint in accordance with Taylor. The trial court denied the motion, relying on Mau v. Superior Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 875, 161 Cal.Rptr. 895, which held that Taylor was to be prospectively applied. In December 1980, plaintiffs again moved to amend their complaint to include punitive damages, relying that time on Busboom v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 550, 169 Cal.Rptr. 886, which declined to follow Mau and held that Taylor was to be retroactively applied. The trial court again denied the motion.

Our discussion begins with a review of the general considerations regarding the retroactivity of overruling decisions. We start with the general rule that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation. ² (County of Los Angeles v Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 680-681, 312 P.2d 680.) We have recognized exceptions to that rule when considerations of fairness and public policy preclude full retroactivity. (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 850, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) For example, where a constitutional provision or statute has received a given construction by a court of last resort, and contracts have been made or property rights acquired in accordance with the prior decision, neither will the contracts be invalidated nor will vested rights be impaired by applying the new rule retroactively. (See County of Los Angeles v. Faus, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 681, 312 P.2d 680.) The present case, however, involves neither contract nor vested property rights, and as we shall see, weighing considerations of fairness and public policy, no compelling reason exists for excepting Taylor from the general rule that overruling decisions are to be retroactively applied.

Defendant asserts that the criteria articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the criminal area comprise the proper guide for deciding whether to apply an overruling decision retroactively, and that as to this case, a prospective application of the Taylor rule is warranted. Those criteria implicate "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.) The primary consideration is the purpose to be served by the new rule. (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 511, 165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927; Desist v. U. S. (1968) 394 U.S. 244, 249, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 1033, 22 L.Ed.2d 248.)

The rule established by this court in the context of civil actions is not inconsistent with the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court. As we have noted, in the civil context, the question of retroactivity depends upon considerations of fairness and public policy. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 333, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441; Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61, 74, 145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188; Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.) In Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 193, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421, this court characterized the issue of prospective application as turning "primarily upon the extent of the public reliance upon the former rule [citation], and upon the ability of litigants to foresee the coming change in the law. [Citation.]" ³

Considerations of fairness and public policy comprehend the more specific factors enunciated by the court in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 297, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1970. Public policy considerations include the purpose to be served by the new rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application. Considerations of fairness would measure the reliance on the old standards by the parties or others similarly affected, as well as "the ability of litigants to foresee the coming change in the law ...." (Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 193, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421.)

In Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, this court gave limited retroactive effect to the rule of "pure" comparative negligence, in view of the substantial number of cases involving that matter then pending in the trial and appellate courts, and particularly considering the "reliance applicable to individual cases according to the stage of litigation which they have reached...." (Id., at p. 829, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.) Thus the court gave consideration to the reliance of the parties within the context of the lawsuits themselves, as well as impliedly recognizing the impact of the retroactivity decision on the administration of the judicial system. Similarly, in Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d 61, 145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188, we gave limited retroactive application to our decision declaring the California confession of judgment procedure unconstitutional. Applying fairness and public policy considerations, the court allowed the plaintiffs the benefit of the decision, as well as providing that any judgment debtor could apply for a hearing to challenge the validity of the waiver on his confession of judgment. (Id., at p. 75, 145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188.)

In other cases, considerations of fairness and public policy have led us to give full retroactive effect to overruling decisions. In Safeway Stores Inc. v. Nest-Kart, supra, 21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441, we applied retroactively the rule adopted in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899, permitting partial indemnity among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Safeway applied the doctrine to a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant, in a case tried before this court's decision in American Motorcycle. In view of the foreshadowing of the rule by Li, supra, this court concluded that no undue surprise or unfairness would result in applying the American Motorcycle decision to the Safeway parties and those in other cases in which the issue of comparative indemnity had been properly preserved. (21 Cal.3d at p. 333, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441.) Anticipating that a substantial number of trial courts probably had utilized special findings allocating responsibility among multiple defendants, this court concluded that applying American Motorcycle retroactively to extend the benefit of the rule to those defendants who had diligently pursued the issue would not result in a serious disruption of the administration of justice. (21 Cal.3d at p. 334, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441).

Similarly, in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, supra, 6 Cal.3d 176, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421, this court...