Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Company
| Decision Date | 25 January 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,466 - (225) |
| Citation | 77 N.W. 985,75 Minn. 368 |
| Parties | SAMUEL D. PETERSON v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action for libel in the district court for Brown county. The case was tried before Webber, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $2,000. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed on conditions.
Libelous Telegram -- Liability of Company -- Punitive Damages.
Where the station agent of a telegraph company, acting within the scope of his employment, maliciously transmits a libelous message over the wires of said company to another of its station agents, addressed for delivery to a third person which is done accordingly, the company is liable in punitive damages.
Verdict Excessive.
The verdict of the jury on behalf of plaintiff for the sum of $2,000 held excessive, and that a new trial should be granted, unless the plaintiff consent to remit all of the same in excess of $1,000.
Ferguson & Kneeland, for appellant.
The submission of the question of punitive damages was error. The infliction of such damages in this jurisdiction rests on the theory that they are for punishment and example. Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; North v Johnson, 58 Minn. 242. A corporation is not liable in punitive damages for wantonness or oppression on the part of its servant, not actually participated in by it. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101; Staples v. Schmid, 18 R.I. 224. See also Ricketts v. Chesapeake, 33 W.Va. 433; Downey v. Chesapeake, 28 W.Va. 732; Talbott v. West Virginia, 42 W.Va. 560; Robinson v. Superior, 94 Wis. 345; Hagan v. Providence, 3 R.I. 88; Cleghorn v. New York, 56 N.Y. 44; Murphy v. Central, 48 N.Y.S. 96; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570; International v. Garcia, 70 Tex. 207; Dillingham v. Russell, 73 Tex. 47; Gulf v. Holzheuser (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S.W. 188; Kiel v. Chartiers, 131 Pa. St. 466; Sullivan v. Oregon, 12 Ore. 392; Ackerson v. Erie, 32 N.J.L. 254; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N.J.L. 481; Great Western v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; McCoy v. Philadelphia, 5 Houst. 599; Mendelsohn v. Anaheim, 40 Cal. 657; City v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183; Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387; Kutner v. Fargo, 20 Misc. 207; Warner v. Southern, 113 Cal. 105. The act of sending the message was not subject to adoption or repudiation by defendant, so as to affect its responsibility for an actual injury caused by it, if wrongful. There can be no ratification without both knowledge of the fact to be ratified and intention to ratify it. Edwards v. London, L.R. 5 C.P. 445, 447. Mere retention of a servant is not evidence of ratification. Dillingham v. Russell, supra; Gulf v. Holzheuser, supra; Williams v. Pullman, 40 La. An. 87. For those aggravations which may arise out of the servant's wantonness and malice, the employer is not on the same footing as the agent. Great Western v. Miller, supra; Hagan v. Providence, supra.
Even including punitive damages, the verdict is excessive. It is the duty of the court to set aside an excessive verdict, no matter how many verdicts have been returned. Peterson v. W.U. Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18. See Woodward v. Glidden, 33 Minn. 108; Dillon, L. & J. Eng. & Am. 130; 1 Sedgwick, Dam. §§ 358-368; Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 32 Minn. 217, 35 Minn. 251; Bridge v. City, 71 Wis. 363; McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90; Dennis v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 301.
S. L. Pierce, for respondent.
By weight of authority and on principle, when the act of the agent is malicious or grossly negligent, the principal may, in the discretion of the jury, be punished, though the act may not have been authorized or directed by the principal, provided it was done in the authorized employment of the agent. Everywhere it is conceded that, when the function of the agent is that of superintendent, the principal may be held liable in punitive damages, if the agent could have been held had he been acting in his own business. 2 Shearman & R. Neg. § 749; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 381. McHale was such a servant as is included in the term superintendent. See Goddard v. Grand Trunk, 57 Me. 202; Wood, Mast. & S. § 323, and cases cited; 2 Shearman & R. Neg. § 479, and cases cited; Francis v. W.U. Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 262. The verdict was not excessive. Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 32 Minn. 217, 221. After two successive verdicts have been set aside as excessive, the court will hesitate to set aside a third on that ground. Clerk v. Udall, 2 Salk. 649; Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Strange, 691; Shaw v. Boston, 8 Gray, 45; Wilcox v. Landberg, 30 Minn. 93; Harrigan v. Savannah, 84 Ga. 793; McDonald v. Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244, note; Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 10 U.S. App. 640, 645. The damages were not unreasonable. In libel, the better the reputation, the heavier should be the damages. See Malloy v. Bennett, 15 F. 371; Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle, 72 Mo.App. 462; Alabama v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9; Marble v. Chapin, 132 Mass. 225; Williamson v. Frere, 43 L.J.C.P. 161; Young v. Fox, 49 N.Y.S. 634.
Action for libel. Verdict for plaintiff for $2,000 damages, motion for new trial on part of defendant, which was denied, and it appeals. The plaintiff was a state senator, whose home was at New Ulm, but, the senate being in session, and while the plaintiff was attending the same at St. Paul, the defendant, through its station agent P. R. McHale, at New Ulm, sent to the plaintiff the following telegraphic message:
"S. D. Peterson, care Windsor:
Slippery Sam: Your name is pants.
Many Republicans."
This case has been before us on two former occasions. 65 Minn. 18, 67 N.W. 646, and 72 Minn. 41, 74 N.W. 1022. Upon the first appeal this court construed the message as susceptible of a libelous meaning on its face, but held that the verdict of $5,000 damages against the defendant was so excessive as to justify the conclusion that it was the result of passion and prejudice. Upon the second appeal the order of the trial court denying a new trial was reversed for errors of law occurring at the trial. The case has been tried four times, the verdicts each time varying in amount.
The more distinct and important errors assigned by the appellant are: First, that the plaintiff is not in any event entitled to recover, under the evidence in this case, anything more than actual damages, and not entitled to punitive damages or smart money; second, that the court erred in charging the jury that McHale, the agent of the defendant in receiving and transmitting the message in question, represented and stood in the place of the telegraph company, and that the defendant is liable and responsible for his acts and conduct in receiving and transmitting the message to the same extent that McHale would have been personally responsible had he been the owner and operator of the telegraph line; third, that the damages awarded by the jury are excessive, and appear to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
Upon the first proposition we do not agree with the contention of counsel, unless his second proposition is sound as to the acts of the agent and as to the want of liability of the company for his acts. The trial court charged the jury that, if they found from the evidence that the defendant or its agent maliciously published the libel as charged, it was their duty to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for such damages as he had sustained to his reputation by reason of the publication, and also gave as part of his charge the language used in the second assignment of error. This, of course, involves the question of the liability of the defendant for the act of the agent if he was actuated by malice or bad faith, and upon this question the jury found in favor of the plaintiff; that is, under this instruction the jury returned a verdict against the defendant for $2,000. Of course, if the action had been against McHale personally for his malicious publication of the libel, and the jury had found him guilty, they could have awarded punitive, vindictive or exemplary damages. It is clearly competent for a jury to find vindictive damages in an action for libel, where the publication was done maliciously. Newell, Defam., Sland. & L. 842; Bergmann v. Jones, 94 N.Y. 51. In the last case cited it is said that, when the falseness of the libel is proven, as a general rule it is sufficient to warrant the jury in giving exemplary damages.
But the important question in the case at bar is this, is the company itself liable for exemplary damages by reason of the act of the agent McHale, although it did not know, direct or authorize it? The answer to this is reached by considering and determining the powers and duties of the agent, and whether he was acting within the scope of his employment.
The defendant maintained a general telegraph office at New Ulm and there McHale had the entire management of the business. Under this power and duty his business required him, as such agent, to examine writings, messages and communications, and transmit them to persons to whom they were addressed. From the very nature of the business, his position required him to do this. The company cannot well act in the numerous telegraph stations throughout the country except through agents. While these branch offices in general are under the management and control of a superintendent, manager or the corporation itself, yet this agent is almost universally recognized, as he must necessarily be, as the representative of the corporation itself. In the absence of the master the agent is the vice principal, superintending and controlling the business there transacted, and of course stands in the place of the master for the time being. It is...
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