Phillips v. Fallen

• Decision Date: 09 November 1999
• Citation: 6 S.W.3d 862
• Parties: (Mo.banc 1999) . Daniel D. Phillips, Appellant, v. Lynn F. Fallen, Director of Division of Child Support Enforcement, Respondent. Case Number: SC81490 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date:
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

6 S.W.3d 862 (Mo.banc 1999)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

Daniel D. Phillips, Appellant, v. Lynn F. Fallen, Director of Division of Child Support Enforcement, Respondent.

Case Number: SC81490

Supreme Court of Missouri

Handdown Date: 11/09/99

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. John R. Gray

Counsel for Appellant: Ronald K. Barker

Counsel for Respondent: Michael S. Kisling and Melanie G. Moffat

Opinion Summary:

Phillips and Owen dissolved their marriage and made custody and support arrangements in Kansas. Phillips moved to Missouri, and Owen and the child live in Washington. Owen sought to modify the child support order in Washington. The Missouri director of the division of child support enforcement's gave effect to the Washington court order modifying child support and calculating back support. The trial court's affirmed the director's enforcement order, and Phillips appealed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Court en banc holds:

1. The director improperly included the Washington court's modified child support amount as a factor in the enforcement order but properly considered the arrearage and interest.

2. Missouri is obligated to give full faith and credit to a judgment of a sister state unless that judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the person or over the subject matter, or is obtained by fraud.

3. The Washington court had no subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Kansas child support amount. Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), adopted by Washington, the Washington court had no authority to modify a foreign judgment because the statutory criteria for modification did not exist. Washington statute required that an action to modify child support be initiated in the state of the obligor's residence unless the obligor consents to Washington's jurisdiction. To the extent the director enforced the increased child support order, the director's enforcement order is erroneous.

4. The Washington court did have subject matter and personal jurisdiction to determine the amount of the arrearage and interest. This judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. A court exercising long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident must satisfy both the provisions of the state code and provide sufficient due process. To establish jurisdiction in a Washington court, a petitioner need only demonstrate by prima facie evidence that a nonresident respondent commits one of the acts enumerated in the long-arm statute, and the Washington courts deem the petitioner's averments to be true for purposes of determining jurisdiction. Phillips was served and had actual notice of the proceeding to modify his support obligation, and the child support action arose as a result of his obligation to support his son. He did not overcome Owen's averment that the couple may have conceived the child in Washington. While Phillips' seeking affirmative relief in the visitation/parenting plan in a separate suit may not have waived personal jurisdiction in the support proceeding, it is sufficient evidence of his additional contact with the forum state to support the finding satisfying due process analysis. Because Phillips failed to contest the listed bases of jurisdiction in Washington, and because the child may have been conceived in Washington and Phillips had other contacts with the state that did not offend due process, Phillips failed to rebut the presumption of the Washington order's validity as to the arrearage and interest.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. All concur.

Opinion:

PER CURIAM¹

A Washington state child support enforcement agency sent a child support order entered by a Washington state court to Missouri for enforcement. The director of the division of child support enforcement entered an administrative order in accordance with the court order. Section 454.467.1.² Daniel Phillips contested the order, and a hearing was held. Section 454.467.4. The hearing officer affirmed the director's decision and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are treated as the director's decision. Id. Phillips sought judicial review of the administrative decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the director. That judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

Phillips and Kimbra Owen were married in 1983. A son was born during the marriage. The couple divorced in Kansas in 1989. As a part of the divorce decree, Phillips was ordered to pay child support of $750 per month. The Kansas court later changed this amount to $403 per month. In 1995, Owen filed a petition in Washington to register and modify the Kansas child support order. A default judgment was entered. The judgment found four bases for the court's jurisdiction over Phillips:

(a) Pursuant to [Wash. Rev. Code sec.] 26.21.075(6), [Owen]³ asserts jurisdiction is appropriate in that the parties engaged in sexual intercourse in this state, during a family visit to Wenatchee and Seattle in November 1982, and the child . . . (d.o.b. 8/23/83) may have been conceived as a result of that act;

(b) [Phillips] has consented to jurisdiction by entering into a Washington State Parenting Plan; and

(c) State of Kansas issued original order, but has since closed its case, finding that as both parties have moved out of the state, jurisdiction is no longer with the Kansas court.⁴ . . .

(d) [Owen] and child are residents of the state of Washington, and have been for three years.

The judgment also found back support amount due of $5,871 and interest of $483. The judgment increased the amount of child support ordered to $2,108 per month.

Washington filed its request for enforcement with the director. Once the Washington request was acted upon by the Missouri director, Phillips was limited in his defense to asserting an error in the amount of arrearages or the identity of the obligor. Section 454.467.4. Phillips contends that the amount of the arrearage is in error because the Washington court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him. The director contends the Washington judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.

This Court reviews the director's decision - not the judgment of the circuit court. In reviewing the director's decision, the Court may not determine the weight of the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the administrative body; the Court's function is to determine primarily whether competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record supports the decision, whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and whether the director abused discretion. Questions of law are matters for the independent judgment of this Court. Psychcare Mgt. v. Dept. of Social Services, 980 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Mo. banc 1998) (citations omitted).

Missouri is obligated to give full faith and credit to a judgment of a sister state unless that judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the person or over the subject matter, or is obtained by fraud. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877); Scott v. Scott, 441 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. 1969). Because Phillips did not litigate the question of subject matter jurisdiction in Washington, he is free to do so here. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963). Phillips correctly argues that under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), adopted by Washington, the Washington court had no authority to modify a foreign judgment because the statutory criteria for modification did not exist.

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), in effect in Missouri at the time of this action, and UIFSA provide a means for modifying and enforcing child support obligations in addition to simple registration of child support orders.⁵ See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, in and for the City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 98-100 (1978). These uniform laws provide an interstate mechanism for initiating an action for child support in the obligee's state of residence and then taking the child support enforcement action to the obligor's state of residence. Kulko at 98-99. The responding court in a URESA action has the ability to require an obligor to pay an amount different than the one specified in the underlying support order without modifying the order. State ex rel. Osborne v. Goeke, 806 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 1991).

"Except as otherwise provided in this article, a tribunal of [Washington] shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction." Wash. Rev. Code section 26.21.500(3) (1994) (emphasis added). Under UIFSA, adopted by Washington, a party or child support enforcement agency may petition the courts to modify a child support order issued by another jurisdiction. Wash. Rev. Code section 26.21.580 (1994) provides:

(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if, after notice and hearing, it finds that:

(a) The following requirements are met:

(i) The child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state;

(ii) A petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and

(iii) The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or

(b) An individual party or the child is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal and all of the individual parties have filed a written consent in the issuing tribunal providing that a tribunal of this state may modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order.

These provisions require that an action to modify child support be initiated in the state of the obligor's residence unless the obligor consents to Washington's jurisdiction. The elements of subsection (1)(a) and subsection (1)(b) were not fulfilled in ...