Ping v. McBride
Citation | 888 F. Supp. 917 |
Decision Date | 19 July 1993 |
Docket Number | 3:92cv784 AS.,No. 3:92cv659 AS,3:92cv659 AS |
Parties | Thomas PING and Ronald Nance, Petitioners, v. Danny McBRIDE, Respondent. Ronald NANCE, Petitioner, v. Danny R. McBRIDE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Thomas Ping, Westville, IN, Ronald Nance, Palmyra, IN, for plaintiff.
Thomas D. Quigley, Indiana Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for respondent.
Both of the abovementioned petitioners are seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a CAB hearing and the resulting disciplinary action from that hearing. The return in each case was filed on April 6, 1993, and complies with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982). Petitioner Nance filed a Traverse to the Return on June 25, 1993, and an elaborate 23-page memorandum with supporting affidavits and materials which is quite lawyerlike in form and substance. Petitioner Ping filed a Traverse on June 29, 1993, which is equally lawyerlike. The court compliments these two pro se petitioners on the legal quality of their presentation to this court.
When a complaint is fashioned as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with regard to the Conduct Adjustment Board (CAB) proceedings, this court is compelled to hear those claims. Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992), Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1992), Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.1992), and Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990). See also Billops v. Wright, 803 F.Supp. 1439 (N.D.Ind.1992).
This court consolidated the abovecaptioned matters because of the common issues of law and fact. Both petitioners were confined at the Branchville Training Center in Tell City, Indiana. In the respective Conduct Reports, both petitioners are charged with battery, a violation of state law. Both Conduct Reports also contain a Report of Investigation of Incident. Both Conduct Reports charge that on December 21, 1991, the petitioners, Ping and Nance, cut another inmate, Steven West, with a sharp object, causing a laceration approximately four inches long and an inch deep. It is also indicated that the events preceding the battery occurred in the recreational room and the actual battery occurred while the victim was in the restroom.
The various exhibits reveal that each petitioner had a lay advocate. Additionally, each petitioner made a statement exculpatory in nature to the CAB. In each case, the CAB found the respective petitioner guilty of battery. In so doing, the CAB indicated:
The CAB has reviewed the evidence including the Conduct Report, Offender's Statement, Investigative Report and Lay Advocate's Statement. The CAB does not believe the offender's version and believes the investigator's summary accurately describes the incident.
See Memorandum in Support of Return to Order to Show Cause at 3 (for both petitioners). The CAB recommended sanctions of a year's disciplinary segregation, transfer to a more secure facility, demotion in time-earning class from credit class I to credit class III, and loss of 300 days' earned credit time for petitioner Ping. The CAB recommended the same sanctions for petitioner Nance except for the demotion in time-earning class.
Id. at 4. Both appeals were denied. Finally, this court notes that petitioner Ping also filed a Petition for Restoration of Time, which was also denied.
Here, in both of the abovecaptioned cases, the Attorney General of Indiana argues that both petitioners have procedurally defaulted on their respective claims. Recently, in Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir.1992), the Seventh Circuit made it clear that it is incumbent upon a petitioner challenging a CAB proceeding to demonstrate exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Here, the Attorney General of Indiana has very persuasively extended the holding of Markham to procedural default. The petitioners have also made very persuasive arguments on this issue.
In Markham, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the issue of exhaustion in the context of a CAB hearing. The § 2254 petitioner indicated that in evaluating certain disciplinary infractions, the CAB denied his constitutional due process rights. Apparently, in so doing, the CAB eliminated the petitioner's accrued good time credit and lengthened his sentence by 243 days. In Markham, the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Posner, indicated that it is axiomatic to federal habeas corpus relief that the petitioner exhaust any available state remedies, before a federal court will review the claim. The Markham court indicated that "there are two questions: whether a state prisoner is required to exhaust state administrative as well as judicial remedies, and what happens if he fails to do so." Id. at 994.
On these questions, the Markham court explained:
Here, the Attorney General argues that by making the exhaustion doctrine applicable in cases of this ilk, then the procedural default analysis must be applied as well. Specifically, the Attorney General maintains that in the abovecaptioned matters, both petitioners have appealed the CAB decisions through the prison administrative system. Apparently, the petitioners pursued certain issues on the administrative level that are different from the issues contained in their petitions here. Next, the Attorney General maintains that the petitioners are only granted one opportunity to pursue their claims on the administrative level and are barred from another opportunity to pursue such administrative remedies. The petitioners did not assert the issues in this petition at the applicable administrative level, and cannot return to the administrative level with these same claims.1 Therefore, the Attorney General argues that the claims are procedurally defaulted. The petitioners concede that the logical extension of Markham is the application of procedural default to cases of this ilk. Here, the petitioners also point out some very important and fundamental differences between the state court system and the administrative review procedures for CAB hearings. The petitioners argue that these differences make procedural default untenable for purposes of the CAB hearing, the administrative process, and § 2254. The petitioners also argue that assuming arguendo that there is a procedural default issue, then there is cause and prejudice for their procedural default.
This court must commend the Indiana Attorney General on this very cogent and refined application of habeas concepts in this area. This court is equally impressed with the response of the petitioners on this issue. This is undoubtedly an issue of first impression. This court notes that there are many similarities between a § 2254 action premised on a CAB finding and an action pursuant to a state criminal trial. There are, however, some very fundamental problems in the application of cause and prejudice and the comparison becomes very convoluted.
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...some are exacting their own schemes of revenge." McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir.1982); see also Ping v. McBride, 888 F.Supp. 917, 923 (N.D.Ind.1993) (quoting McCollum). "Requiring a reliability determination is [therefore] a procedural safeguard which helps [to] assure tha......
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