Piper v. Piper, 3938
| Decision Date | 16 August 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 3938,3938 |
| Citation | 487 P.2d 1062 |
| Parties | Eva M. PIPER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Harold PIPER, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Carl Lathrop, of Lathrop, Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, for appellant.
William R. Jones, W. H. Vines, of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellee.
Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN, and GRAY, JJ.
This case comes to us on the appeal of Eva M. Piper from a divorce judgment and decree entered in the district court of Platte County. Only property settlement questions are raised in the appeal.
The wife claims abuse of discretion by the trial court because it failed to award her alimony; because it awarded her only $15,000 as her share in the property settlement; because it did not make such allowance a lien on the husband's property; and because the wife was not awarded certain personal property.
In the recent case of Young v. Young, Wyo., 472 P.2d 784, 78, we referred once more, as we had done many times previously, to the established policy of this court with respect to a review of settlements made by district courts when a divorce is granted. In particular, we repeated once more that trial courts exercise a discretion in making thee settlements; and that the decisions of such courts will not be disturbed making these settlements; and that the decisions
Counsel on both sides of the present controversy recognize the principles we refer to and it is not at all necessary to state them again. Our careful review of the record and evidence in this case convinces us the principles are generally applicable to the settlement we are now concerned with.
That is not to say we would have decided or settled property matters as the trial court did. But it is not necessary for the settlement to be what we would have made, in order for us to say abuse of discretion has not been clearly shown.
The marriage dissolved by the court in this instance was a second marriage for both parties. It had lasted some 17 years and nine months. At the time of divorce the husband was 55 years of age and the wife was 61. According to figures quoted by counsel for both parties, the ranch property, machinery and cattle owned by the husband at the time of marriage had a net value of $83,328. The wife brought $3,000 to $4,000 into the marriage. At the time of divorce the same real estate was still owned by the husband and the net value of all assets was $62,726.00, including $16,000 in trucks and machinery.
Thus, the total net value of assets of the parties at the time of divorce was $20,599 less than the net value of the husband's assets alone at the time of marriage, despite an appreciated value on the land. The figures used are based on the assumption that the land, consisting of 1,755 acres, had advanced in value from $15 per acre to $30 per acre. This amounts to an appreciated value on the land of $26,325.
In the settlement, the court awarded Mrs. Piper an electric organ, an accordian, a 1966 Chevrolet automobile, and a savings account of about $1,000. In addition, and in full settlement of property rights, the husband was ordered to pay his wife the sum of $15,000.00, said sum to be paid in a specified manner. Mr. Piper was awarded the remaining property of the parties, including the ranch land, livestock, equipment and household goods at the ranch.
During pendency of the divorce proceedings the appellant received $250 from her husband for support. Following the decree the judge ordered te husband to pay appellant $300 per month for temporary support pending appeal. At least 13 months can be expected to elapse for the appeal, by the time a mandate goes out from our court, which means something like $3,900 will have been paid by appellee to appellant for support during appellant's appeal. Also, the husband was required by the district court to pay $500 in attorney fees for appellant.
Concerning alimony, we said in the Young case, at 472 P.2d 786, we think there has been a tendency in recent years for trial courts to get pretty much away from alimony; and that is probably good. Section 20-63, W.S.1957, requires the court, on granting a divorce, to make such disposition of the property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable. There is then a provision that the court may also decree to the wife reasonable alimony out of the estate of the husband.
It is quite apparent from § 20-63 that the awarding of alimony is not at all mandatory. As we said in Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, Wyo., 443 P.2d 524, 528, generally speaking the allowance or disallowance of alimony lies within the discretion of the trial court.
The Piper decree awards cash money in lieu of property. The settlement made was obviously thought by the trial court to be just and equitable, and we cannot say there was any abuse of discretion because alimony was not awarded.
Concerning the property settlement, we recognize no attempt was made to make the division equal. We have said many times, the statute does not require an equal division; and a just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal. 1 In this instance, if the court had undertaken to make an equal division of property, the husband might now be complaining instead of the wife.
We say that because § 20-63 makes it clear the court shall have regard 'to the party through whom the proerty was acquired.' The judge in this case followed that directive. In announcing his decision he stated:
'It appears that this is a marriage of no great length in which all of the property now held by the parties was brought into the marriage by Mr. Piper.'
There are no specific guidelines in the statute as to how much weight must be given to the factor having to do with the party through whom the property was acquired. Neither has this court set any such guidelines in its prior decisions. There is, however, in both the statutes and decisions of our court the qualification that the disposition of property shal be such as shall appear (in the judgment of the court granting the divorce) to be just and equitable.
Taking into consideration the savings account awarded to Mrs. Piper, together with her allowances for support and attorney fees, we find no great abuse of discretion in the property settlement. We therefore make no attempt to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court with respect to a disposition of the property of the parties, except for such modification as will be specified later on in this opinion.
Concerning a lien, appellant has shown no reason to believe there is a need for...
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