Pizzuto v. Idaho Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 48857
• Citation: 508 P.3d 293
• Parties: Gerald Ross PIZZUTO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, an Executive Department of the State of Idaho; Josh Tewalt, Director, Idaho Department of Correction; Tyrell Davis, Warden, Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

508 P.3d 293

Gerald Ross PIZZUTO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant,

v.IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, an Executive Department of the State of Idaho; Josh Tewalt, Director, Idaho Department of Correction; Tyrell Davis, Warden, Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Respondents.

Docket No. 48857

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2021 Term.

Opinion Filed: March 15, 2022

Rehearing Denied May 5, 2022

Federal Defenders Services of Idaho, Boise, for appellant. Jonah Horwitz argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondents. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

BRODY, Justice.

This appeal concerns whether an execution protocol published by the Idaho Department of Correction ("the Department" or "IDOC") and approved by Josh Tewalt, the IDOC Director, must comply with procedural requirements for administrative rulemaking. Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr., is an inmate in the custody of the Department who has been sentenced to death. In March 2021, the Department published a document detailing the protocol for executions by the Department. Pizzuto filed a complaint in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the protocol was invalid because it had not been adopted in compliance with the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed Pizzuto's complaint. It ruled that Idaho Code section 19-2716, which provides that "[t]he director of the Idaho department of correction shall determine the procedures to be used in any execution[,]" was not a legislative grant of rulemaking authority and, therefore, the APA did not apply. We reach the same conclusion: Idaho Code section 19-2716 does not require the Director to engage in administrative rulemaking. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Pizzuto's complaint.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pizzuto was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death more than three decades ago. Pizzuto v. State , 168 Idaho 542, ––––, 484 P.3d 823, 825 (2021). On March 30, 2021, the Department published a Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP" or "protocol"), approved by the Director purporting to apply "to all Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) staff members involved in the administration of capital punishment and to persons in IDOC custody sentenced to capital punishment ...."

Two weeks after the SOP was published, Pizzuto filed a complaint in the district court against the Department and the Director (collectively, "Defendants"). Pizzuto requested a declaratory judgment that the SOP was void because it was not adopted in compliance with the rulemaking procedures of the APA. Further, Pizzuto sought an injunction preventing the Department "from implementing, giving effect to, or otherwise relying on the Protocol, including by planning, preparing, or carrying out executions" until an execution protocol is properly adopted under the APA.

The district court rejected Pizzuto's claim on the merits. Alternatively, it held the claim was non-justiciable under the generalized grievance doctrine, and that judicial abstention from rendering a decision was appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Pizzuto timely appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The dispositive question in this case is one of statutory interpretation. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law that receives de novo review from this Court." State v. Burke , 166 Idaho 621, 623, 462 P.3d 599, 601 (2020) (quoting State v. Schulz , 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Idaho Code section 19-2716 does not require the Director to engage in rulemaking.

This case turns on the interpretation of Idaho Code section 19-2716, which designates lethal injection as the method of execution in Idaho and provides that the Director shall determine lethal injection procedures:

The punishment of death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of a substance or substances approved by the director of the Idaho department of correction until death is pronounced by a coroner or a deputy coroner. The director of the Idaho department of correction shall determine the procedures to be used in any execution.

I.C. § 19-2716. Pizzuto argues that this statute—specifically its provision that the Director "shall determine" execution "procedures"—obligates the Director to promulgate lethal injection procedures as administrative rules pursuant to the APA. Because it is undisputed that the SOP was not adopted in compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the APA (such as providing notice of the intent to make rules and opportunity for public comment), Pizzuto argues the SOP must be invalidated and the Director enjoined from relying upon it. Defendants argue that this statute merely reflects that the Director is responsible for carrying out lethal injections; it does not confer rulemaking authority nor trigger the APA's rulemaking requirements.

The district court agreed with Defendants’ interpretation of 19-2716. After a detailed review of the prior versions of section 19-2716 and execution procedures and practices reaching back to Idaho's territorial days, it concluded that the legislative history of section 19-2716 revealed no intent to require the Director to comply with rulemaking procedures. We do not delve into the district court's discussion of the legislative history of section 19-2716 because the relevant statutes are unambiguous. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co. , 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993) ("We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."). We affirm the district court's dismissal of Pizzuto's complaint because we determine the Director was not required to engage in rulemaking under the plain language of the relevant statutes.

The basic disagreement between the parties involves the type of power that Idaho Code section 19-2716 instructs the Director to exercise. Executive agencies can act in up to three distinct capacities, depending on the statutes creating them and defining their scopes of authority. They may act in (1) a purely executive capacity by carrying out statutory directives; or (2) a quasi-judicial capacity by defining the rights and duties of individuals through deciding contested cases and issuing orders; or (3) a quasi-legislative capacity by defining the rights and duties of the public through rulemaking. When acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, the APA imposes certain requirements on agencies, including public notice and comment procedures, see I.C. §§ 67-5220 to -5222, and submission of rules to the legislature for review. See I.C. § 67-529. Pizzuto maintains that because section 19-2716 instructs the Director to exercise quasi-legislative authority, the APA's rulemaking requirements apply. Defendants maintain that section 19-2716 involves a purely executive authority; therefore, the APA does not apply.

At the outset, Defendants contend that the only statute we must examine to resolve this dispute is section 19-2716. Because this statute uses the words "determine" and "procedures"—instead of words such as "promulgate" and "rules," which are commonly found in statutes authorizing rulemaking—Defendants assert we need not look further than section 19-2716 to conclude the statute does not contemplate rulemaking. Pizzuto argues we must evaluate section 19-2716 alongside the APA's definition of "rule." We agree with Pizzuto. The language identified by Defendants may be sufficient in some contexts to indicate that the legislature has authorized or required rulemaking, but nothing in the APA or our case law suggests that such "magic words" are necessary. Instead, it is reasonable to conclude that when a statute requires an agency to produce something that fits the APA's definition of a rule, the legislature has required rulemaking. However, we disagree with Pizzuto that section 19-2716 is such a statute.

The APA defines "rule" as follows:

"Rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general applicability that has been promulgated in compliance with the provisions of this chapter and that implements, interprets, or prescribes:

(a) Law or policy; or

(b) The procedure or practice requirements of an agency. The term includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule, but does not include:

(i) Statements concerning only the internal management or internal personnel policies of an agency and not affecting private rights of the public or procedures available to the public ....

I.C. § 67-5201(19). "General applicability" is the first attribute of a rule under this definition—and for good reason. The general applicability of a rule is, perhaps, the most salient characteristic distinguishing quasi-legislative rulemaking from a purely executive or quasi-judicial agency action.

In the context of administrative rules, general applicability has two meanings. First, it means that rules apply uniformly to the public . Like statutes, rules apply comprehensively to the class of persons or course of conduct covered by the rule. See Eller v. Idaho State Police , 165 Idaho 147, 160, 443 P.3d 161, 174 (2019) (quoting Mallonee v. State , 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004) (noting that a rule has "the same force and effect of law and is an integral part of the statute under which it is made just as though it were prescribed in terms therein"). This distinguishes rulemaking from quasi-judicial agency actions because quasi-judicial actions determine only the rights and duties of individuals.

The second way in which rules are generally applicable is that they must be applied uniformly by the agency . Because rules have the force and effect of law, they are binding both on the public and on...