Planned Parenthood v. City of Santa Maria

• Decision Date: 15 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. B063569,B063569
• Citation: 16 Cal.App.4th 685,20 Cal.Rptr.2d 391
• Parties: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SANTA BARBARA, VENTURA AND SAN LUIS OBISPO, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants. v. CITY OF SANTA MARIA et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 391

20 Cal.Rptr.2d 391

16 Cal.App.4th 685

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SANTA BARBARA, VENTURA AND SAN LUIS OBISPO, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants. v. CITY OF SANTA MARIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. No. B063569.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

June 15, 1993.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

July 13, 1993.

McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, Beth H. Parker and Caroline D. Avery, San Francisco, Hannah Beth Jackson, Ventura, Celeste Lacy Davis and Roger K. Evans, New York City, of Counsel, Hadsell & Stormer and Dan Stormer, Pasadena, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Arthur R. Montandon, City Atty. of Santa Maria, Adams, Duque & Hazeltine, Richard R. Terzian and Remy Kessler, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

YEGAN, Presiding Justice.

Here, we hold that a governmental entity and its agents may not offer a grant of public funds on condition that the recipient waive the constitutional right to privacy. We thus agree with the trial court which found that defendants, City of Santa Maria (City), its mayor, and city council, could not impose a grant restriction that conditioned the receipt of public funds upon the recipient's agreement not to provide abortion services. (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 284-285, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779.) We also hold that where, as here, the origin of the controversy is an attempt to obtain money, as opposed to vindicating a constitutional right, the trial court does not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in denying private attorney general attorneys' fees.

Planned Parenthood of Santa Barbara, Ventura and San Luis Obispo, Inc. and Jane Doe (Planned Parenthood) appeal from a summary judgment contending that the trial court should have ordered a turnover of $60,000 in grant funds and awarded private attorney general fees. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1021.5.) Defendants, in their cross-appeal, contend that they were authorized under federal law to make the grant subject to the "no-abortions" condition. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Planned Parenthood, a private nonprofit corporation, operates a clinic in Santa Maria and provides reproductive, health care, and family planning services to indigent women. Patients seeking abortion services are referred to San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara because the Santa Maria clinic lacks the necessary facilities to perform abortions.

In 1990 Planned Parenthood decided to construct a new clinic. On April 2, 1990, it submitted a $60,000 grant proposal to the City based on a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program to renew and rehabilitate urban areas under title 1 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. (42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.) In the proposal, Planned Parenthood listed a variety of services it would be performing at the new clinic. Abortion services were not listed. Under the CDBG program, City received funds from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and subgranted the funds to qualified organizations and individuals.

On May 15, 1990, defendants approved Planned Parenthood's grant application on condition that no abortions be performed at the new clinic. Planned Parenthood lodged a protest but was advised that the funds would be reallocated if it failed to accept the CDBG grant as conditioned. On November 15, 1990, it filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, private attorney general fees, and costs. The complaint prayed for an order declaring the grant condition to be unconstitutional and enjoining "defendants from imposing and enforcing abortion-related restrictions on the award of CDBG funds to Planned Parenthood."

Defendants had the action removed to the United States District Court (28 U.S.C. § 1441) and filed a third-party complaint against HUD for indemnity, declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court remanded the action because it presented no federal questions. HUD thereafter removed the action to federal court and the district court dismissed the third-party complaint. In doing so, it ruled "we don't have any preemption question here.... If this no-abortion condition had been required by that federal law, we might have a different situation, but the condition attached by the City is not affirmatively required by the federal statute. It was imposed by a decision of the City Council and no one else."

Upon remand to the superior court, Planned Parenthood brought a motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues. Defendants opposed the motion based on the assertion that federal law prohibited the distribution of federal money to abortion-related projects. In a well-written and well-reasoned opinion, the trial court found that the grant restriction violated the California Constitution and was contrary to the California Supreme Court opinion in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d 252, 284-285, 172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779. The trial court opinion stated, in pertinent part, that "[t]he relief sought by plaintiffs will not result in an order that would require the City to disburse the grant money without the condition: Plaintiffs are simply seeking a declaration that the condition violates California law and an injunction against imposition of the condition. As defendants themselves point out, no written contract has yet been entered into for the disbursement of the CD Block Grant funds. Thus, it is not necessary to resolve in the present action questions such as whether or not Planned Parenthood made any misrepresentations in its grant application...."

Planned Parenthood Appeal

Because an appeal from a summary judgment raises only questions of law, we must independently analyze the supporting and opposing papers to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.) In doing so, we apply the same analysis required of the trial court. "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings.... [p] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor.... [p] [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203; see also Visueta v. General Motors Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1613, 286 Cal.Rptr. 402.)

Planned Parenthood contends that the trial court erred by not ordering defendants to "turnover" the $60,000. Not so. The issue was not pled in the complaint or addressed in the summary judgment motion or the separate statement of undisputed facts. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (b); United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, 282 Cal.Rptr. 368.) Planned Parenthood's reply papers conceded that the motion was limited to the relief prayed for in the complaint: "Should defendants ... refuse to conclude the grant award process, ... plaintiff would seek further relief from the courts." No evidence was presented that Planned Parenthood had a vested entitlement to the grant money. ¹

We reject the argument that the trial court should have taken the extra step and ordered a turnover of the funds. Planned Parenthood could not use a motion for summary judgment to expand the scope of the complaint. (Keniston v. American Nat. Ins. Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 803, 812, 107 Cal.Rptr. 583; Dorado v. Knudsen Corp. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 605, 611, 163 Cal.Rptr. 477.) This is so because the pleadings defined the issues for summary judgment and summary adjudication.

(Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 885, 164 Cal.Rptr. 510, 610 P.2d 407; Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 525, 536-537, 249 Cal.Rptr. 5.)

Planned Parenthood further claims that the trial court erred by not awarding private attorney general fees. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1021.5.) ² The trial court expressly found that the action was brought in furtherance of Planned Parenthood's financial interests, i.e. "... it has a stake in the outcome. It has a $60,000 stake, a substantial interest." Planned Parenthood was instructed to re-address the issue of attorneys' fees in a post-judgment motion. It elected not to do so, and instead, filed the instant appeal.

The order may not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law. (Weissman v. Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 40, 46-47, 259 Cal.Rptr. 124.) "In this case, the trial court had to evaluate whether plaintiffs' action: (1) served to vindicate an important public right; (2) conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs which was out of proportion to their individual stake in the matter. [Citations.]" (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874.)

Here, the action invalidated a grant restriction affecting the terms of the construction loan and private use of the clinic. There is no doubt that the controversy touched upon the constitutional right of privacy. However, the interests of the clinic patients and general public were incidental to Planned Parenthood's primary objective of obtaining grant money. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 166-167, 188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306; Angelheart v. City of Burbank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 460, 468-469, 285 Cal.Rptr. 463.) No evidence was presented that the litigation transcended Planned Parenthood's financial interests and imposed a financial burden disproportionate to its individual stake in the matter. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 941, 154 Cal.Rptr....