Plymouth Ret. Bd. v. Contributory Ret. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 03 December 2019
• Docket Number: SJC-12711
• Citation: 483 Mass. 600,135 N.E.3d 702
• Parties: PLYMOUTH RETIREMENT BOARD v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEALS BOARD & another
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

483 Mass. 600

135 N.E.3d 702

PLYMOUTH RETIREMENT BOARD

v.CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEALS BOARD & another¹

SJC-12711

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth..

Argued September 5, 2019

Decided December 3, 2019

Andrew M. Batchelor, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

Michael Sacco for the plaintiff.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

LOWY, J.

In this case, the parties ask that we determine whether a police officer who is a member of a municipal retirement system must remit payments under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), to obtain creditable service for prior work conducted as a permanent-intermittent police officer (PIPO). A Superior Court judge held that the Plymouth Retirement Board (Plymouth board) did not have to collect remittance payments from such members because G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ), which expressly discusses PIPO creditable service does not mention a payment requirement. The Contributory Retirement Appeals Board (CRAB) appeals, arguing that the provision, considered in the context of the whole statute, mandates remittance payments by member police officers for past intermittent work. We agree with CRAB and therefore reverse.

Statutory scheme. The Legislature created a "contributory retirement system" through which municipalities establish their own employee retirement systems, and form "municipal retirement boards to manage [those] systems." Retirement Bd. of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 132, 65 N.E.3d 650 (2016), citing G. L. c. 32, § 20 (4) (b ), (5) (b ). Members contribute to the system by payroll deductions. See G. L. c. 32, § 22. Retirement system members must be "regularly employed." Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra, citing G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (a ) (x). A member's retirement benefits depend on the individual's years and months of "creditable service," among other factors. See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10. Creditable service is governed by G. L. c. 32, § 4, and includes "all service rendered" while an employee is a member of a retirement system. See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (1) (a ).

Some service rendered prior to an employee becoming a member of the retirement system is creditable. G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (a ). Local retirement boards have "full jurisdiction" to determine whether a new member may receive creditable service for "part-time, provisional, ... or intermittent employment."² G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d ). A retiree's benefits depend upon the individual's years and months of "creditable service" among other factors. See G. L. c. 32, §§ 5, 10. Once an intermittent employee becomes a member of the retirement system, the member may petition the relevant local retirement board to acquire creditable service for past intermittent work. See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (a).

The statute permits local retirement boards to determine how much "service in any calendar year is equivalent to a year of [creditable] service" and how much creditable service is available for previous intermittent work. G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ). However, for certain discrete employment categories, such as permanent-intermittent police positions, the statute limits the power of such boards to determine creditable service by mandating specific calculations. Id. For example, police officers must receive one year of creditable service, with a maximum of five years, for any time spent during the calendar year as "reserve or permanent-intermittent police officer[s] ... on [their] respective list[s] and eligible for assignment to duty." Id.

To acquire creditable service for previous intermittent work, members must remit payments "with buyback interest" in "an amount equal to that which would have been withheld as regular deductions" had they "been a member ... during [that] previous period." G.L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c ). Section 4 (2) (c ) has no express exemptions from the purchase formula.

Background and procedural history. Plymouth police officer Antonio Gomes is a member of Plymouth's contributory retirement system. Before becoming a permanent police officer, Gomes served as a PIPO -- someone who worked "only on such days as [he or she] might be called, and compensated accordingly." Costa v. Selectmen of Billerica, 377 Mass. 853, 854, 388 N.E.2d 696 (1979). Gomes actively engaged in police work and earned money for his intermittent work.

In 1998, Gomes purchased full-time retirement credit for his prior intermittent service, with interest. In 2003, the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) informed the Plymouth board that under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ), the board incorrectly had charged Gomes for the creditable service he earned as a PIPO. Despite the policy of the Plymouth board that member police officers must remit payments to obtain full-time credit for previous uncredited PIPO work, the board refunded Gomes's remitted payment, including the buyback interest.

Ten years later, CRAB decided MacAloney vs. Worcester Regional Retirement Sys., No. CR-11-19 (amended June 21, 2013), ruling that member firefighters must remit payments to purchase retirement credit for past intermittent work under G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c ). See G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ) (addressing credit to intermittent work of firefighters). As a result of the MacAloney decision, the Plymouth board advised Gomes that he must "remit those funds previously refunded, together with buyback interest," in part because "it had always been the policy of the [Plymouth board] to require members ... who rendered prior service as a reserve police officer to remit contributions and interest ... in order to receive credit rendered as a reserve police officer pursuant to [ G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b) ]."

Gomes appealed from the Plymouth board's determination to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA). Siding with Gomes, the Plymouth board shifted course and claimed that it "disagree[d] with PERAC's interpretation of § 4 (2) (b ) post-MacAloney," and asked that DALA join PERAC as a necessary party-defendant. DALA rejected the argument of Gomes and the Plymouth board that the MacAloney decision did not apply to Gomes. Gomes and the Plymouth board appealed to CRAB, which upheld DALA's ruling and affirmed the MacAloney decision.

CRAB rejected the argument that, because G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ), does not explicitly state that a member is required to buy creditable service earned as a PIPO, the member is entitled to receive the creditable service at no cost. CRAB stated that that provision had to be considered in context, and that G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c ), set forth the requisite terms of payment for creditable service. The latter section, CRAB pointed out, did not contain an exemption for creditable service as a PIPO. CRAB also stated that § 4 (2) (c ) listed general types of employment or service subject to the buyback calculation, and therefore, the absence of the specific phrase "permanent-intermittent police officer" in that provision did not matter. Finally, CRAB pointed out that to consider G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ), in isolation would produce an anomalous result: a disincentive to become a member of the retirement system and to be subject to regular payments via payroll deductions. The Plymouth board sought review in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 14.³

On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the Superior Court judge accepted the Plymouth board's view that the plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (b ), does not require remittance payments by member police officers for past PIPO service because the statute states that local retirement boards "shall credit" police officers for up to five years of prior PIPO work. CRAB timely appealed to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case on our own motion. We now reverse.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. Statutory interpretation is "a pure question of law," and we therefore "exercise de novo review" of CRAB's analysis (citation omitted). Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, 476 Mass. at 134, 65 N.E.3d 650. This court "typically defer[s] to CRAB's expertise and accord[s] great weight to its interpretation and application of the statutory provisions" it administers, such as G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), and will reverse only if the "decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law" (quotations and citations omitted). Retirement Bd. of Stoneham, supra. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c ), (e ).

2. Statutory interpretation. Both parties urge that the plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2), supports their argument. We agree with CRAB's interpretation that § 4 (2) only makes sense when read as a coherent whole, because this interpretation is consistent with the statute's plain language, correctly interprets § 4 (2) within the entire statute without creating surplusage, and accords with the apparent legislative purpose behind G. L. c. 32 generally and § 4 (2) specifically.

a. Plain language. When conducting statutory interpretation, this court strives "to effectuate" the Legislature's intent by looking first to the statute's plain language (citation omitted). Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018). The express language of § 4 (2) (b ) and (c ) demonstrates that the Legislature constructed the latter provision to work together with the former. First, § 4 (2) (c ) lays out a formula for "any employee of any governmental unit" to purchase creditable service for past intermittent employment rendered "prior to becoming eligible for membership in a retirement system", see Gallagher v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 11, 340 N.E.2d 905 (1976). Section 4 (2) (c ) neither announces the necessary qualifications to measure creditable service nor determines the amount of creditable service for which a member may be eligible; rather, it states that "the board may allow [such] credit" and merely requires payment. G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c ).

Additionally, the purchase formula for past intermittent work in G. L. c. 32, § 4 (2) (c ),...